REG NASA-LLIS-1956-2008 Lessons Learned 100+ Lessons Learned for Project Managers.pdf
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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1956Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1956a71 Lesson Date: 2008-9-30a71 Submitting Organization: JPLa71 Submitted by: David Oberhettingera71 POC Name: Jerry Maddena71 POC Email: unknown (retired)a71 POC Phone: unknownSubject: 100+ Lessons Learned for Project Managers Abstract: Je
2、rry Madden, the former Associate Director of Flight Projects at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), collected 122 lesson learned nuggets from a variety of sources that are instructive to managers of NASA spaceflight projects. These aphorisms should be accepted where they may provide insight int
3、o NASA project management success.Description of Driving Event: Jerry Madden retired in 1995 as Associate Director of Flight Projects at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Over his 37 years with NASA, he collected the following lesson learned nuggets that are instructive to managers of NASA sp
4、aceflight projects. As he obtained them from a variety of sources, they are not clearly traceable to any specific set of originating projects or “driving events.“ Arguably, it is difficult to identify project management lessons learned that are widely applicable but not obvious, and these should be
5、accepted where they may provide insight into NASA project management success. This material first appeared in the October 2003 issue of NASAs ASK Magazine, which now lists 122 of these aphorisms (Reference (1): Design Engineering 1. There is no such thing as previously flown hardware, i.e., the peop
6、le who build the next unit probably never saw the previous unit; there are probably minor changes; the operational environment has probably changed; and the people who check the unit out will in most cases Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-
7、,-,-not understand the unit or the test equipment. 2. Most equipment works “as built,“ i.e., not as the designer planned. This is due to layout of the design, poor understanding on the designers part, or poor understanding of component specifications.3. In case of a failure, make a timeline of event
8、s and include everything that is known. Put down known facts, and check every theory against them. Dont beat the data until it confesses: i.e., know when to stop trying to force-fit a scenario. Do not arrive at a conclusion too rapidly. Make sure any deviation from the norm is explained; remember th
9、e wrong conclusion is prologue to the next failure. Know when to stop.4. Redundancy in hardware can be a fiction. We are adept at building things to be identical so that if one fails, the other will also fail. Make sure all hardware is treated in a build as if it were one of a kind and needed for mi
10、ssion success.5. Dont be afraid to fail or you will not succeed, but always work at your skill to recover. Part of that skill is knowing who can help.6. Experience may be fine but testing is better. Knowing something will work never takes the place of proving that it will.7. Reviews are for the revi
11、ewed and not the reviewer. The review is a failure if the reviewed learn nothing from it.8. The amount of reviews and reports are proportional to managements understanding, i.e., the less management knows or understands the activities, the more it requires reviews and reports. It is necessary in thi
12、s type of environment to make sure the data is presented so that the average person, slightly familiar with activities, can understand it. Keeping the data simple and clear never insults anyones intelligence.9. In olden times, engineers had hands-on experience, technicians understood how the electro
13、nics worked and what it was supposed to do, and layout technicians knew too. But today only the computer knows for sure, and its not talking.10. Mistakes are all right, but failure is not. Failure is just a mistake you cant recover from; therefore, try to create contingency plans and alternate appro
14、aches for the items or plans that have high risk.11. The old NASA pushed the limits of technology and science; therefore, it did not worry about “requirements creep“ or over-runs. The new NASA has to work as if all are fixed price; therefore, “requirements creep“ has become a deadly sin.12. The numb
15、er of reviews is increasing but the knowledge transfer remains the same; therefore, all your charts and presentation material should be constructed with this fact in mind. This Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-means you should be able
16、to construct a set of slides that only needs to be shuffled from presentation to presentation.13. Occasionally things go right. The lesson learned here is: try to duplicate that which works.14. The first sign of trouble comes from the schedule or the cost curve. Engineers are the last to know they a
17、re in trouble. Engineers are born optimists.15. External reviews are scheduled at the worst possible time: therefore, keep an up-to-date set of technical data so that you can rapidly respond. Having to update business data should be cause for dismissal.16. Hide nothing from the reviewers. Their repu
18、tation and yours is on the line. Expose all the warts and pimples. Dont offer excuses: just state facts.17. NASA is establishing a set of reviewers and a set of reviews. Once firmly established, the system will fight to stay alive, so make the most of it. Try to find a way for the reviews to work fo
19、r you.18. Knowledge is often confounded by test. Computer models have hidden flaws, not the least of which is poor input data.19. Software now has taken on all the parameters of hardware, i.e., requirement creep, high percent-age of flight mission cost, need for quality control, need for validation
20、procedures, etc. It has the added feature that it is hard as hell to determine it is not flawed. Get the basic system working and then add the bells and whistles. Never throw away a version that works even if you have all the confidence in the world the newer version works. It is necessary to have c
21、ontingency plans for software.20. History is prologue. There has not been a project yet that has not had a parts problem despite all the qualification and testing done on parts. Time and being prepared to react are the only safeguards.21. The seeds of problems are laid down early. Initial planning i
22、s the most vital part of a project. Review of most failed projects or of project problems indicates that the disasters were well planned to happen from the start.22. Talk is not cheap. The best way to understand a personnel or technical problem is to talk to the right people. Lack of talk at the rig
23、ht levels is deadly.23. Never make a decision from a cartoon. Look at the actual hardware or what real information is available, such as layouts. Too much time is wasted by people trying to cure a cartoon whose function is to explain the principle.24. Though most of us in our youth have heard the po
24、em that states “for want of a nail the race Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-was lost,“ few of us realize that most space failures have a similar origin. It is the commonplace items that tend to be overlooked and thus do us in. The tou
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