REG NASA-LLIS-1414-2004 Lessons Learned Acquisition Philosophy and Mechanism.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1414Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1414a71 Lesson Date: 2004-01-01a71 Submitting Organization: ARCa71 Submitted by: Donald R. MendozaSubject: Acquisition Philosophy and Mechanism Abstract: A “Fly-off” type of procurement using a relatively small Source Evaluation Board (SEB) c

2、an minimize the time to assess, award, and implement a contract. However, in order to minimize the Governments risk under this process, the SEB must leverage enough expertise (in “ex-official” status, if necessary, to fill any knowledge gaps the small SEB might have) to ensure all the Contractors bu

3、siness practices are adequate and reflect a system that provides sufficient insight/oversight to build the required “hands-off” Government/Contractor relationship after contract award.Description of Driving Event: Due to several constraints, schedule being the most significant, the Project implement

4、ed a procurement mechanism that was aimed at minimizing the time to assess and select the Contractor. This procurement mechanism consisted of three phases. The first phase was geared around having, the three “best” small business companies proficient in composite blade design and construction; enter

5、 into a “paper fly-off”. The second phase was aimed at down selecting one of the three designs and manufacturing proposals while the last phase was a contract award to manufacture and deliver the winning design. This approach was chosen to minimize the Governments risk such that the Contractor award

6、ed the work, under this relatively short time frame, would have a high probability of successfully meeting the Governments requirements. Thus, the Government placed a high priority on upfront screening and studies to enable its own participation to transition into an oversight mode once the contract

7、 was awarded. The idea was to build a SEB that was small yet complete with regard to the expertise required to assess both the technical and programmatic areas of each proposal. Then, key SEB individuals were transitioned into the Project after the award was made such that the entire three-phase pro

8、curement cycle was seamless and the one contractor chosen to complete the work would be able to move from design to manufacture with little interruption. While this approach allowed the SEB to meet its schedule constraints, it also exposed several Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or netw

9、orking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-opportunities for continuous improvement (as successfully demonstrated during the Projects implementation) such that the mechanisms next application could build on the success of this experience. These areas for improvement are summarized in the followin

10、g Lessons Learned and Recommendations. References: none Additional Key Words: Fly-off procurement, SEB, expert ex-official, timely & efficient. Lesson(s) Learned: In order to use a “fly-off” type of procurement to minimize the time to assess, award, and implement a contract while ensuring the Govern

11、ments risk is minimized, the following issues should be considered. 1. While it can improve efficiency, a small selection team (SEB) may not be adequately effective in assessing all technical and programmatic areas.2. Any technical or programmatic areas not sufficiently addressed during procurement

12、may increase the Governments risk during contract implementation. This is especially true in instances where an originally selected system design is found to be inadequate and in need of a re-design (in the case of the Project in question, new analytical tools and techniques available after Contract

13、 award helped to identify new risks and needed design improvements). While the Government is responsible to identify inadequacies at any and all times during the project life cycle, it must make every effort to completely remove itself from the Contractors design process. Any participation by the Go

14、vernment in the design undermines the philosophy of placing the risk (via ownership of design) on the Contractor and exposes the Government to a higher level of risk. The Government must be cognizant of this immigration of risk when it elects to participate in a design process, and must balance the

15、risk of effectively acquiring ownership of the design against other risks inherent in the situation or migrating to it.3. Since the procurements goal is to minimize the time from start to finish, part of it its philosophy is to instill efficiency into the Contractor-Government roles and relationship

16、s. Thus, it becomes paramount during the selection process to ensure that the Contractors processes, procedures, and tools are adequate (as based on some established criteria such as ISO 9001 and/or CMMI) to allow the Government to take a “hands-off” approach during implementation. Also, any criteri

17、a to be used to verify/validate and or assess the Contractors work after contract award must be consistent and compatible with the performance criteria levied on the Contractor.The Project successfully addressed these issues with the addition of extra resources (technical experts, analysis tools, sc

18、hedule, and funding) and the willingness to accept additional development risk via more hands-on involvement in order to reduce the overall risk. In addition, the Project planned its recovery efforts such that they where focused on the product and did not overburden its Provided by IHSNot for Resale

19、No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-delivery with force fit or unnecessary processes, i.e. only those processes critical to the products success were developed and employed rather than imposing a conventional process certification/assessment approach. Thus, the Proje

20、cts approach to compliment the SEBs fly-off approach with real-time adjustments (even against conventional wisdom and/or original intent) based on the increased knowledge that contract implementation brings ensured that the best interests of the Agency where secured. Recommendation(s): Based on the

21、above observations and LL the following recommendations have been developed to help others plan for a successful SEB: 1. Ensure that all major technical and programmatic elements of a project are represented on an SEB. To minimize the SEBs size, experts in support and critical process areas such as

22、quality and safety should be included as “ex-official” SEB members and consulted as necessary. As the SEB is being formed a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) representative of a developed or hypothetical project corresponding to the acquisition in question should be developed to help identify the exper

23、tise required of the SEB.2. Every effort must be made to ensure all system level requirements (what is the system supposed to do and what environment will it be subjected to) are identified prior to contract award. Under certain circumstances, such as an ongoing activity parallel to the SEB having s

24、ignificant influence on the Governments requirements (i.e. failure investigations and/or technical assessments of products similar to that being acquired), delay the SEB and contract award should be considered. The risks associated with entering into contract that constructively requires of the Cont

25、ractor an iterative design process pursuing slowly converging changing requirements. This iterative process will increase the Governments risk significantly by impacting the projects schedule and budget and could even erode the apparent selection advantages of the winning Contractor over its competi

26、tors.a. Should there be a need to significantly change the system level requirements after contract award, the Project must assess and mitigate any increased risk by: i. Bringing in experts to help resolve the resulting design and fabrication challenges ii. Employing in-house specific design and ana

27、lysis tools and sharing the results with the Contractor iii. Adapting a more hands on role and accepting joint ownership of the resulting design with the Contractor as supported by any necessary contractual changes iv. Modifying the funding level and schedule to reflect the new challenges 3. Ensure

28、that all proposals submitted to the Government include an adequate description of the Contractors management, systems engineering, and QA processes, procedures, and tools. While an explicit ISO/CMMI type of rating, certification, or assessment may not be necessary or appropriate, the Contractors pro

29、cesses must still be sufficient (as based on the Contractors past performance and expert assessment) to ensure the Governments risk is minimized. It is Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-critical that the Government have adequate insight

30、 into the business practices of the Contractor in order to ensure success (effectiveness and efficiency) of a “hands-off” Government/Contractor relationship.a. Should the winning Contractors management, system engineering, SS&MA, or other critical processes turn out to be insufficient during contrac

31、t implementation the Project must address and mitigate the increased risk by: i. Adding more expertise to their team and using it to increase their oversight of the Contractors processes - adjusting the level of their “hands-off/on” to fit the existing environment ii. Maintaining focus on the produc

32、t and developing processes appropriate to its delivery such that the recovery efforts do not add unnecessary burden to an already challenged effort iii. Communicating the increased risk to their stakeholders Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: NPR 7120.5Miss

33、ion Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Sciencea71 Space Operationsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Procurement Small Business & Industrial Relationsa71 Program and Project Managementa71 Risk Management/AssessmentAdditional Info: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2004-05-20a71 Approval Name: Andrew Hockera71 Approval Organization: ARCa71 Approval Phone Number: 650-604-4120Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-