among firms that manage revenue-The curious case of hotels.ppt
《among firms that manage revenue-The curious case of hotels.ppt》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《among firms that manage revenue-The curious case of hotels.ppt(48页珍藏版)》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。
1、Mergers among firms that manage revenue: The curious case of hotels,Luke Froeb Vanderbilt University May 17, 2008 (10:20am)“New Perspectives on Competition Policy“ Truland, IIOC, Arlington, VA,“an economist is somebody who sees something happen in practice and wonders if it will work in theory.“,2,J
2、oint work,Arturs Kalnins School of Hotel Administration, Cornell UniversitySteven Tschantz Mathematics, Vanderbilt University,3,Summary of Findings,Empirical Finding: Hotel in-market mergers Relative to in-market non-merging; increase capacity utilization 3%; reduce price 1% Relative out-of-market m
3、erging increase capacity utilization 3%; same price Theoretical Mechanisms: Post-merger information sharing Post-merger referrals to sister hotels Post-merger loyalty to merged hotels Antitrust Policy: short run gain from merger, “call-arounds”,4,Talk Outline,Empirical Finding Revenue management heu
4、ristics Can we find a theory to explain the finding? Post-merger information sharing Post-merger referrals to sister hotels Post-merger loyalty to merged hotel Antitrust Policy Mergers “Call arounds”,5,Data,Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. Owner, address, rooms, quarterly revenue. entry and exi
5、t dates ownership transfer Smith Travel Research (proprietary) 1999Q2 -2005Q3, self-reported Larger, brand-affiliated (82%) hotels average price per room-night (Price) room-nights sold (Quantity),6,“10th Closest” Local Merger Area,Unit changes to “green” ownership; increases HHI of local area,“Green
6、” owners other unit,10th closest unit,Descriptive Statistics,8,Fixed-Effects Regressions,Data 196 Texas hotel mergers (889 hotels) from 1999-2005 Which increase local HHI Effects Hotel dummies Year X Type dummies Type s: urban, suburban, small town, highway, airport and resort AR(1) Owner characteri
7、stics First year of new owner Experience of owner Number of other hotels,9,Regression: Mergers Increase Q,10,Regression: Mergers reduce Price,11,12,Talk Outline,Empirical Finding Revenue Management Heuristics Which theory can explain the finding? Post-merger information sharing Post-merger referrals
8、 to sister hotels Post-merger loyalty to merged hotel Antitrust Policy Mergers “Call arounds”,13,Canonical Rev. Management Problem,Firms set price before demand realized Fixed capacity, (big fixed or sunk costs, small marginal costs) Q=Mindemand(price), Capacity Price to fill ship, hotel, parking lo
9、t Maxrevenue Maxprofit,14,Rev. Mgt. pricing models: minimize expected pricing errors,Cost of over-pricing is unused capacity Q(P-MC) Could have sold more Cost of under-pricing is excess demand P(Q) Could have charged more Optimal P minimizes Eerror costs Probover-pricing*Costover-pricing + Probunder
10、-pricing*Costunder-pricing,15,Typical Profit Curve with a Rounded Peak,16,Non-binding capacity constraint: Under-pricing errors more costly,17,Expected profit curve: avoid under-pricing,18,Binding capacity constraint: Over-pricing errors more costly,19,Expected profit curve: avoid over-pricing,20,Va
11、nderbilt University,21,It takes a lot of uncertainty to make a noticeable difference,Early merger model: CompetitionMonopoly,Merger monopoly - competition No effect if capacity constrained Dowell (1984),22,Game-theory merger models: Parking lots,J. Emetrics (2003) Constraints on merging lots attenua
12、te price effects by more than constraints on non-merging lots amplify them Accounts only for “original” not “reflected” demand Certainty equivalence,23,Rev. Mgt. Merger Heuristics,Unilateral effect for unconstrained hotel: Increases under-pricing error costs because a decrease in price steals share
13、from sister hotels Info sharing: fewer pricing errors Fewer over-pricing errors higher utilization Referrals: reduce under-pricing error costs Hotel can refer over-booked customers to sister hotel Loyalty: reduces under-pricing error cost Increases future demand for hotel “network.” Role of merger?,
14、24,25,Talk Outline,Empirical Finding Revenue Management Heuristics Which theory can explain the finding? Post-merger information sharing Post-merger referrals to sister hotels Post-merger loyalty to merged hotel Antitrust Policy Mergers “Call arounds”,26,Post-merger information sharing,Our hotel par
15、ticipates in call-arounds regularly, daily at 8am, 6pm, and 11pm. We will ask for all proximate properties availability, rate, number of arrivals, and how many rooms are left to sell. Hotels that are not among the Midway Hotel Center i.e., not operated by the same management company participate as w
- 1.请仔细阅读文档,确保文档完整性,对于不预览、不比对内容而直接下载带来的问题本站不予受理。
- 2.下载的文档,不会出现我们的网址水印。
- 3、该文档所得收入(下载+内容+预览)归上传者、原创作者;如果您是本文档原作者,请点此认领!既往收益都归您。
下载文档到电脑,查找使用更方便
2000 积分 0人已下载
下载 | 加入VIP,交流精品资源 |
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- AMONGFIRMSTHATMANAGEREVENUETHECURIOUSCASEOFHOTELSPPT

链接地址:http://www.mydoc123.com/p-378250.html