BS PD ISO TS 16901-2015 Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship shore interface《包括船 岸上支持接口的陆上液化天然气装置风险评估设计执行指南》.pdf

《BS PD ISO TS 16901-2015 Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship shore interface《包括船 岸上支持接口的陆上液化天然气装置风险评估设计执行指南》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《BS PD ISO TS 16901-2015 Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship shore interface《包括船 岸上支持接口的陆上液化天然气装置风险评估设计执行指南》.pdf（68页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、BSI Standards Publication Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship/shore interface PD ISO/TS 16901:2015National foreword This Published Document is the UK implementation of ISO/TS 16901:2015. The UK participation in its preparation was entr

2、usted to Technical Committee PSE/17, Materials and equipment for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries. A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary. This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a cont

3、ract. Users are responsible for its correct application. The British Standards Institution 2015. Published by BSI Standards Limited 2015 ISBN 978 0 580 82717 4 ICS 75.180.01 Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity from legal obligations. This Published Document was published under

4、the authority of the Standards Policy and Strategy Committee on 31 March 2015. Amendments/corrigenda issued since publication Date Text affected PUBLISHED DOCUMENT PD ISO/TS 16901:2015 ISO 2015 Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship/ shor

5、e interface Guide pour lvaluation des risques dans la conception dinstallations terrestres pour le GNL en incluant linterface terre/navire TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISO/TS 16901 Reference number ISO/TS 16901:2015(E) First edition 2015-03-01 ISO/TS 16901:2015(E)ii ISO 2015 All rights reserved COPYRIGHT

6、 PROTECTED DOCUMENT ISO 2015 All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission

7、. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISOs member body in the country of the requester. ISO copyright office Case postale 56 CH-1211 Geneva 20 Tel. + 41 22 749 01 11 Fax + 41 22 749 09 47 E-mail copyrightiso.org Web www.iso.org Published in Switzerland PD ISO/TS 16901

8、:2015 ISO/TS 16901:2015(E)Foreword v 1 Scope . 1 2 Normative references 1 3 T erms and definitions . 1 4 Abbreviations. 6 5 Safety Risk Management 7 5.1 Decision support framework for risk management 7 5.2 Prescriptive safety or risk performance . 8 5.3 Risk assessment in relation to project develop

9、ment . 9 6 Risk 11 6.1 What is risk .11 6.2 Safety philosophy and risk criteria .11 6.3 Risk control strategy .11 6.4 ALARP 12 6.5 Ways to express risk to people .13 6.5.1 General.13 6.5.2 Risk contours (RC) 13 6.5.3 Risk transects (RT) . .14 6.5.4 Individual risk (IR) 14 6.5.5 Potential loss of lif

10、e (PLL) .14 6.5.6 Fatal accident rate (FAR)14 6.5.7 Cost to avert a fatality (CAF) .14 6.5.8 F/N curves (FN) .14 6.6 Uncertainties in QRA.15 7 Methodologies 15 7.1 Main steps of risk assessment 15 7.2 Qualitative risk analysis .15 7.2.1 HAZID .15 7.2.2 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) 17 7.2.

11、3 Risk matrix .17 7.2.4 Bow-tie 18 7.2.5 HAZOP 19 7.2.6 SIL analysis 21 7.3 Quantitative analysis: consequence and impact assessment .21 7.3.1 Consequence assessment 21 7.3.2 Impact assessment 23 7.4 Quantitative analysis: frequency assessment 24 7.4.1 General.24 7.4.2 Failure data 24 7.4.3 Consensu

12、s data .25 7.4.4 FAULT tree 25 7.4.5 Event tree analysis (ETA) 25 7.4.6 Exceedance curves based on probabilistic simulations 25 7.5 Risk assessments (consequence*frequency) .26 7.5.1 Risk assessment tools .26 7.5.2 Ad hoc developed risk assessment tools 27 7.5.3 Proprietary risk assessment tools .27

13、 8 Accident scenarios .28 8.1 Overview accident scenarios .28 8.2 LNG import facilities including SIMOPS .28 8.3 LNG export facilities 31 8.4 Chain of events following release scenarios .32 ISO 2015 All rights reserved iii Contents Page PD ISO/TS 16901:2015 ISO/TS 16901:2015(E)9 Standard presentatio

14、n of risk 34 Annex A (informative) Impact criteria 36 Bibliography .57 iv ISO 2015 All rights reserved PD ISO/TS 16901:2015 ISO/TS 16901:2015(E) Foreword ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of p

15、reparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental,

16、in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electrotechnical standardization. The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/

17、IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives). Attention is drawn to the possibilit

18、y that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of pate

19、nt declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents). Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not constitute an endorsement. For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as info

20、rmation about ISOs adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information. The committee responsible for this document is ISO/TC 67, Materials, equipment and offshore structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas

21、 industries. ISO 2015 All rights reserved v PD ISO/TS 16901:2015 Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship/shore interface 1 Scope This Technical Specification provides a common approach and guidance to those undertaking assessment of the ma

22、jor safety hazards as part of the planning, design, and operation of LNG facilities onshore and at shoreline using risk-based methods and standards, to enable a safe design and operation of LNG facilities. The environmental risks associated with an LNG release are not addressed in this Technical Spe

23、cification. This Technical Specification is aimed to be applied both to export and import terminals, but can be applicable to other facilities such as satellite and peak shaving plants. It applies to all facilities inside the perimeter of the terminal and all hazardous materials including LNG and as

24、sociated products: LPG, pressurised natural gas, odorizers, and other flammable or hazardous products handled within the terminal. The navigation risks and LNG tanker intrinsic operation risks are recognised, but they are not in the scope of this Technical Specification. Hazards arising from interfa

25、ces between port and facility and ship are addressed and requirements are normally given by port authorities. It is assumed that LNG carriers are designed according to the IGC code, and LNG fuelled vessels receiving bunker is designed according to IMOs regulations. Border between port operation and

26、LNG facility is when the ship/shore link (SSL) is established. It is not intended to specify acceptable levels of risk; however, examples of tolerable levels of risk are referenced. This Technical Specification is not intended to be used retrospectively. It is recognised that national and/or local l

27、aws, regulations, and guidelines take precedence where they are in conflict with this Technical Specification. Reference is made to ISO 31010 and ISO 17776 with regard to general risk assessment methods, while this Technical Specification focuses on the specific needs scenarios and practices within

28、the LNG industry. 2 Normative references The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (i

29、ncluding any amendments) applies ISO/IEC Guide 73:2009, Risk management Vocabulary ISO 17776:2000, Petroleum and natural gas industries Offshore production installations Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment. 3 T erms a nd definiti ons For the purposes of t

30、his document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC G u i d e 7 3 a n d t h e following apply. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISO/TS 16901:2015(E) ISO 2015 All rights reserved 1 PD ISO/TS 16901:2015 ISO/TS 16901:2015(E) 3.1 as low as reasonably practical ALARP reducing a risk (3.26) to a level that re

31、presents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble, difficulty, and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained 3.2 boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion BLEVE sudden release of the content of a vessel contai

32、ning a pressurised liquid and for flammables often followed by a fireball Note 1 to entry: This hazard is not applicable to atmospheric LNG tanks, but to pressurized forms of hydrocarbon storage. 3.3 bow-tie pictorial representation of how a hazard can be hypothetically released and further develope

33、d into a number of consequences (3.6) Note 1 to entry: The left-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the fault tree (causal) analysis and involves those threats associated with the hazard, the controls associated with each threat, and any factors that escalate likelihood. The right-hand side

34、 of the diagram is constructed from the hazard event tree (consequence) analysis and involves escalation factors and recovery preparedness measures. The centre of the bow-tie is commonly referred to as the “top event”. 3.4 cost to avert a fatality CAF value calculated by dividing the costs to instal

35、l and operate the protection/mitigation (3.18) by the reduction in potential loss (3.20) of life (PLL) Note 1 to entry: It is a measure of effectiveness of the protection/mitigation. 3.5 c o m p u t a t i o n a l f l u i d d y n a m i c s CFD numerical methods and algorithms to solve and analyse pro

36、blems that involve fluid flows 3.6 consequence outcome of an event 3.7 c o s t b e n e f i t a n a l y s i s CBA means used to assess the relative cost and benefit of a number of risk (3.26) reduction alternatives Note 1 to entry: The ranking of the risk reduction alternatives evaluated is usually s

37、hown graphically. 3.8 design accidental load DAL most severe accidental load that the function or system shall be able to withstand during a required period of time, in order to meet the defined risk (3.26) acceptance criteria 3.9 explosion barrier structural barrier installed to prevent explosion d

38、amage in adjacent areas Note 1 to entry: A wall is an example of an explosion barrier.2 ISO 2015 All rights reserved PD ISO/TS 16901:2015 ISO/TS 16901:2015(E) 3.10 F/N curve FN plot of cumulative frequency versus N or more persons that sustain a given level of harm from defined sources of hazards 3.

39、11 failure mode and effect analysis FMEA analytically derived identification of the conceivable equipment failure modes and the potential adverse effects of those modes on the system and mission Note 1 to entry: It is primarily used as a design tool for review of critical components. 3.12 fatal acci

40、dent rate FAR number of fatalities per 100 million hours exposure for a certain activity 3.13 harm physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or the environment 3.14 hazard potential source of harm (3.13) 3.15 h a z a r d ident i f ic at ion HAZID brainstorming exercise

41、using checklists the hazards in a project are identified and gathered in a risk register (3.37) for follow up in the project 3.16 hazard and operability study HAZOP systematic approach by an interdisciplinary team to identify hazards and operability problems occurring as a result of deviations from

42、the intended range of process conditions Note 1 to entry: All four steps are in place and recorded to manage a hazard completely. 3.17 impact assessment assessment of how consequences (3.6) (fires, explosions, etc.) do affect people, structures the environment, etc. 3.18 mitigation limitation of any

43、 negative consequence (3.6) of a particular event 3.19 Monte Carlo simulation simulation having many repeats, each time with a different starting value, to obtain distribution function 3.20 potential loss product of frequency and harm (3.13) summed over all the outcomes of a number of top events 3.2

44、1 probability extent to which an event is likely to occur ISO 2015 All rights reserved 3 PD ISO/TS 16901:2015 ISO/TS 16901:2015(E) 3.22 probit inverse cumulative distribution function associated with the standard normal distribution Note 1 to entry: Probit is used in QRA to describe the relation bet

45、ween exposure, e.g. to radiation or toxics, and fraction fatalities. 3.23 protective measure means used to reduce risk 3.24 quantitative risk assessment QRA techniques which allow the risk (3.26) associated with a particular activity to be estimated in absolute quantitative terms rather than in rela

46、tive terms such as high or low Note 1 to entry: QRA may be used to determine all risk dimensions, including risk to personnel, risk to the environment, risk to the installation, and/or the assets and financial interests of the company. Reference is made to ISO 17776:2000, B.12. 3.25 residual risk ri

47、sk (3.26) remaining after protective measures (3.23) have been taken 3.26 risk combination of the probability (3.21) of occurrence of harm (3.13) and the severity of that harm 3.27 risk analysis systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk (3.26) 3.28 risk assessment ov

48、erall process of risk analysis (3.27) and risk evaluation (3.31) 3.29 risk contour RC two dimensional representation of risk (3.26) on a map Note 1 to entry: Also called individual risk contours (IRC) or location-specific risk (LSR). 3.30 risk criteria terms of reference by which the significance of

49、 risk (3.26) is assessed 3.31 risk evaluation procedure based on the risk analysis (3.27) to determine whether the tolerable risk (3.45) has been achieved 3.32 risk management coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk (3.26) 3.33 risk management system set of elements of an organizations management system concerned with managing risk (3.26)4 ISO 2015 All rights reserved PD ISO/TS 16901:2015 ISO/TS 16901:2015(E) 3.34 risk matrix matrix portraying risk (3.26) as the product of probability (3.21) and c