ETSI TR 103 308-2016 CYBER Security baseline regarding LI and RD for NFV and related platforms (V1 1 1)《网络 关于网络功能虚拟化和相关平台的合法侦听和数据保留LI和RD的网络安全基线(V1 1 1)》.pdf

《ETSI TR 103 308-2016 CYBER Security baseline regarding LI and RD for NFV and related platforms (V1 1 1)《网络 关于网络功能虚拟化和相关平台的合法侦听和数据保留LI和RD的网络安全基线(V1 1 1)》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《ETSI TR 103 308-2016 CYBER Security baseline regarding LI and RD for NFV and related platforms (V1 1 1)《网络 关于网络功能虚拟化和相关平台的合法侦听和数据保留LI和RD的网络安全基线(V1 1 1)》.pdf（17页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、 ETSI TR 103 308 V1.1.1 (2016-01) CYBER; Security baseline regarding LI and RD for NFV and related platforms TECHNICAL REPORT ETSI ETSI TR 103 308 V1.1.1 (2016-01) 2 Reference DTR/CYBER-0006 Keywords cyber security, Lawful Interception, NFV ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex

2、- FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N 7803/88 Important notice The present document can be downloaded from: http:/www.etsi.org/standards-search The present document may

3、be made available in electronic versions and/or in print. The content of any electronic and/or print versions of the present document shall not be modified without the prior written authorization of ETSI. In case of any existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions and/or in pri

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5、his and other ETSI documents is available at http:/portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services: https:/portal.etsi.org/People/CommiteeSupportStaff.aspx Copyright Notification No part may be reproduced or u

6、tilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. The content of the PDF version shall not be modified without the written authorization of ETSI. The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend t

7、o reproduction in all media. European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2016. All rights reserved. DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTMand the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM and LTE are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and

8、 of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. GSM and the GSM logo are Trade Marks registered and owned by the GSM Association. ETSI ETSI TR 103 308 V1.1.1 (2016-01) 3 Contents Intellectual Property Rights 4g3Foreword . 4g3Modal verbs terminology 4g3Introduction 4g31 Scope 6g32 References 6g32.1 Normative r

9、eferences . 6g32.2 Informative references 6g33 Definitions and abbreviations . 7g33.1 Definitions 7g33.2 Abbreviations . 7g34 Problem statements 8g34.1 In support of LI and RD for NFV . 8g34.2 For LI in NFV 8g35 Transposed LI and RD requirements into NFV platforms . 9g35.1 Attestation 9g35.2 Data at

10、 rest encryption 9g35.3 Data in Transit Encryption . 9g35.4 Verified, Trusted or Measured Boot . 9g35.5 Tamper Evidence and Resistance . 9g35.6 Physical telemetry 10g35.7 Secure encryption . 10g35.8 Secure execution 10g35.9 Secure Cryptographic Mechanisms 10g35.10 Re-use of State from Templated Imag

11、es 10g35.11 Random Number Generation, Seeding and Operating System Devices/Components 10g35.12 Reset Vulnerability . 11g35.13 Inspection of State 11g35.14 Memory Inspection. 11g35.15 Secure Cryptographic Mechanism Summary . 11g36 Trust models . 11g36.1 Secure Cryptographics Mechanisms - Entropy and

12、Randomness 11g36.2 Basic Model of a Virtualized System . 12g37 Security objectives . 16g37.1 Host platform security objectives . 16g37.2 Related objectives. 16g3History 17g3ETSI ETSI TR 103 308 V1.1.1 (2016-01) 4 Intellectual Property Rights IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present doc

13、ument may have been declared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respect o

14、f ETSI standards“, which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (http:/ipr.etsi.org). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of other I

15、PRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document. Foreword This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Cyber Security (CYBER). Modal verbs terminology In the present docum

16、ent “shall“, “shall not“, “should“, “should not“, “may“, “need not“, “will“, “will not“, “can“ and “cannot“ are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions). “must“ and “must not“ are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except w

17、hen used in direct citation. Introduction ETSI ISG NFV (and others) are creating an ecosystem whereby traditional network functions that may have been tangible, are now virtualized, potentially onto commercial “off the shelf“ hardware. There is a requirement for ISG NFV to utilize features and funct

18、ions available within the underlying platform for the purposes of ensuring lawful interception (LI) and Retained Data (RD) operations are appropriately protected and delivered - the present document intends to outline those requirements, capabilities and how they could be utilized. The security prin

19、ciples themselves can include: Effective use of TPMs/Roots-of-Trust/Trusted-boot. Hardware and Software Integrity for NFV related platforms. Validation of hardware components. Restriction of interfaces. Process isolation. Effective and appropriately secure logging/reporting/crash management. Control

20、 of Root account or equivalents. OAM access is authenticated and isolated as appropriate. Availability of patching/software update process. Management of logical entities in terms of physical and (potentially) legal constraints. The present document intends to promote the minimum set of security fea

21、tures that telecommunications network equipment subject to LI or RD operations should have, and operators should expect, regardless of whether the vendor wishes to undergo an assurance process. ETSI ETSI TR 103 308 V1.1.1 (2016-01) 5 The establishment of a baseline will also simplify establishing se

22、curity principles for more specific network equipment. For example, the baseline would be a natural place to start when establishing security principles/requirements for NFV hosts. ETSI ETSI TR 103 308 V1.1.1 (2016-01) 6 1 Scope The present document treats the Lawful Interception (LI) and, where rel

23、evant, Retained Data (RD) capability being virtualized, taking into account the legal and physical challenges of doing so. This initial study is focused on the LI and RD aspects and establishes the fundamental security principles for generic platforms upon which the related groups can build. It incl

24、udes a minimum set of security principles for those generic telecommunications platforms that are subject to LI that will allow the virtualized network functions to utilize the features necessary to afford them appropriate protection and at the same time to undertake appropriate activities (LI and R

25、D). Establishing such a baseline will help the industry as a whole to be better protected against Cyber threats. 2 References 2.1 Normative references References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references,

26、only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the reference document (including any amendments) applies. Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http:/docbox.etsi.org/Reference. NOTE: While any

27、hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document. Not applicable. 2.2 Informative references References are either specific (identifie

28、d by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this claus

29、e were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity. The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area. i.1 ETSI TS 101 331: “Lawful Interception (LI);

30、Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies“. i.2 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003: “Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Security and Trust Guidance“. i.3 S. Cadzow: “Secure Cryptographic Mechanisms - entropy and randomness“. NOTE Available at http:/www.tvra-tools.eu/blog/technology/cryptography/s

31、ecure-cryptographic-mechanisms-entropy-and-randomness/. i.4 T. Ristenpart and S. Yilek: “When Good Randomness Goes Bad: Virtual Machine Reset Vulnerabilities and Hedging Deployed Cryptography“, ISOC, 2010. i.5 Z. Gutterman, B. Pinkas and T. Reinman: “Analysis of the Linux Random Number Generator“. E

32、TSI ETSI TR 103 308 V1.1.1 (2016-01) 7 3 Definitions and abbreviations 3.1 Definitions For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply: Element Management System (EMS): management function for a VNF Hosting Provider: entity that owns and/or runs the NFVI and is as

33、sumed to provide the interfaces for an operator to manage their VNF Network Functions Virtualisation Infrastructure (NFVI): totality of all hardware and software components that build up the environment in which VNFs are deployed NFV Management and Orchestration (MANO): component consisting of the O

34、rchestrator, Virtualized Infrastructure Manager and VNF Manager NOTE: It may additionally contain other management related systems as necessary (e.g. including but not limited to security orchestration). Operator: runs the network and manages the VNFs Orchestrator: component in charge of the managem

35、ent of NFV infrastructure and software resources Virtualized Infrastructure Manager: allocates resources to the NFV infrastructure (i.e. energy efficiency) Virtualized Network Function (VNF): software implementation of a network function VNF Manager: in charge of the lifecycle of an NFV 3.2 Abbrevia

36、tions For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply: AUC Authentification Centre CPU Central Processor Unit EMS Element Management System GPU Graphics Processing Unit GSMA Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) Association IN Intelligent Network IPC Inter-Process

37、 Communication ISG Industry Specification Group ISO International Standards Organisation LEA Law Enforcement Agency LEMF Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility LI Lawful Interception MANO Management and Orchestration NFS Network File System (protocol) NFV Network Functions Virtualisation NFVI Network F

38、unctions Virtualisation Infrastructure OAM Operatjion and Maintenance PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator RD Retained Data SDN Software Defined Networking SMS Short Message Service SSL Secure Sockets LayerTC Technical Committee TPM TrustIed Platform Module VM Virtual Machine VNF Virtualized Network

39、Function VNFI Virtualized Network Function Infrastructure ETSI ETSI TR 103 308 V1.1.1 (2016-01) 8 4 Problem statements 4.1 In support of LI and RD for NFV The following requirements derived from LI and RD work in both ISG NFV and TC LI describe the challenges facing NFV. The following general securi

40、ty issues need to be considered: The LI VMs are likely to have to exist in a separate security domain. The VM hypervisor administration often needs to enable the LI functionality but once paired to an external LI administration system it needs not to be possible to disable it again without authoriza

41、tion by the LI administration system. All VMs in the array may need to use code signing integrity protection to prevent unauthorized and/or undetected VM module code changes. The LI administration system needs to be able to dual sign the LI VMs and check the signatures. Each LI VM may need to be pai

42、rable using separate security keys. All events performed by the LI VMs need to generate logged events which can be read by the LI administration system (prevents changes to VMs outside of audit times). Log events which result from events occurring within the LI VMs need to only be visible to the LI

43、administration system and not the hypervisor or other VMs/administrators. 4.2 For LI in NFV Virtual Network Functions can be verified - the intent behind this principle is that VNFs are signed and that the static component of the VNF can be verified during boot, run-time, suspension and transfer. Ad

44、ditionally, data used by the VNFs is properly structured and hence its integrity can be checked. Data used by the VNF is properly structured (according to known schemata), can be integrity checked (e.g.: signing, etc.) and is tamper-proof. The virtualization layer contains a security component - the

45、 intent behind this principle is that security is a central component of the virtualization layer. In addition, the virtualization layer needs to facilitate the integrity scanning of VNFs and the monitoring of network links. Host platforms are updatable and auditable - the intent behind this princip

46、le is that host platforms are limited in functionality and that this functionality has been scrutinized and kept up-to-date. The virtual and physical architecture is managed - the intent behind this principle is the operator is able to define a secure virtual architecture that will be implemented by

47、 the host infrastructure. Furthermore, operators need to be able to place security constraints on the physical architecture that is hosting the virtual network. NFV management needs to incorporate security management - the intent behind this principle is that the NFV management system is the entity

48、which is able to fully understand the risks to the architecture. As such, it needs to be able to ensure that components of the system are instructed to protect data appropriately and that the monitoring processes are in place to detect any compromise of the system. The target list is critical inform

49、ation, which should be protected such that only the appropriate LI functions are entitled to read or modify this information. The location is verified and evidential - the location of any LI activity is known to ensure LI activity takes place where it can be protected and is legal to do so. This is critical to LI functionality. An essential requirement is that the LI takes place in the country/jurisdiction, or authorized countries/jurisdictions, that issued the authorization (this means that any LI-VMs plus the networ