REG NASA-LLIS-1404--2004 Lessons Learned - NASA Engineering and Safety Center Consultation on Mars Exploration Rover Ground Operations Human Factors.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1404Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1404a71 Lesson Date: 2004-05-07a71 Submitting Organization: GSFCa71 Submitted by: David LeckroneSubject: NASA Engineering and Safety Center Consultation on Mars Exploration Rover Ground Operations Human Factors Abstract: The existence of Agen

2、cy-wide standards for work time limits for personnel engaged in critical flight operations has apparently not been widely communicated across NASA. The standards need to be properly promulgated and implemented across all flight programs.Description of Driving Event: Mars Exploration Rovers Spirit an

3、d Opportunity successfully landed on January 4 and 25, respectively, each with a primary mission duration of 90 days. Ground controllers of the MER vehicles have primary operational responsibility 24 hours per day for the health, safety and commanding of the two rover vehicles. They play the central

4、 roll in successful implementation of the mission plan. The work schedules of these individuals are directly locked in to the length of a Martian day - 40 minutes longer in duration than an Earth day - and thus constantly shift in start and stop time, relative to a clock keeping earth time. The long

5、 shift duration (10-12 hours), coupled with loss of synchronization with the daily pattern of events outside the work place can result in fatigue and personal stress which pose potential risks to work performance and ultimately to mission success. This was the subject of consultation by NESC Human F

6、actors experts to the JPL MER Project. Although the MER Project took many effective steps to mitigate these risks, neither they nor the NESC experts were aware at the time of the existence of NASA Procedural Requirement 1800.1 (2002) that sets specific standards for work time limits for critical ope

7、rations across the Agency. The need for such specific Agency-wide standards has been recognized going back at least to the Challenger accident. It is very important that the existence of these new standards by communicated effectively across the Agency and that they be implemented.Lesson(s) Learned:

8、 Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-NASA should implement the work time limits for critical operations across the Agency as outlined in NASA Procedural Requirement 1800.1.Recommendation(s): The Safety and Mission Assurance organization a

9、t NASA Headquarters and each NASA Field Center should familiarize themselves with the new standards for work time limits in critical operations and should pro-actively communicate those limits to the relevent flight programs and projects. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Re

10、lated to Lesson: NPR 1800.1Mission Directorate(s): a71 Sciencea71 Space Operationsa71 Exploration SystemsAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Flight Operationsa71 Ground Operationsa71 Human Factorsa71 NASA Standardsa71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 StandardAdditional Info: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo r

11、eproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2004-05-20a71 Approval Name: Al Galloa71 Approval Organization: GSFCa71 Approval Phone Number: 301-286-3756Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-