Enterprise Worm Mitigation--A Community of Interest based .ppt

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1、1,Enterprise Worm Mitigation- A Community of Interest based approach,Bill Aiello Computer Science UBC,2,The Network Effect for (In)Security,Where were we twenty years ago? PSTN: signaling over a separate network Layer 2 data networks: single administrative domain, closed user group Since then, IP an

2、d the Internet have grown exponentially and surpassed the PSTN, Frame and ATM. Why? Internetworking/Interoperability: IP originally designed to “glue” together different layer 2 and layer 3 technologies Open access: Access is not controlled by a single administrative domain. It is not a closed user

3、group Control plane and data plane carried over same network fabric: Allows disparate network services to be integrated These combine to create the Network Effect Once an open network has a large number of nodes with whom to communicate and a large number of services, new hosts have a great deal of

4、incentive to connect to the network The flip side-the Network Effect for (In)Security For each new host connected to the network, every other host is a potential attacker and every network service is a potential attack point.Securing an integrated, packet-based IP network is a much more complex task

5、 than securing segregated/circuit switched networks,3,IP Network Security Vulnerabilities,IP Protocol Vulnerabilities: No admission control for “data” services Susceptible to flooding attacks Weak source authentication in: UDP/TCP protocols, routing table update protocols, Domain Name Service protoc

6、ols Protocols/mechanisms for authentication and QoS must be added on top of basic protocol suite for some services Software Vulnerabilities: Frequent implementation errors in OSes, protocols and applications Cause of the large majority of security incidents An unfortunate fact of life for the forese

7、eable future An accurate and up-to-date software inventory and a well-defined change control process are needed Configuration Vulnerabilities Syntax for configurations are low level, complex and vendor specific Configuration provisioning is currently prone to error Scalable, vendor agnostic automate

8、d provisioning and management tools are required.,4,Security Threats,Base Vulnerabilities + the Network Effect for Insecurity make large-scale automated attacks possible Worms, Viruses, and DDoS Unmanaged complexity gives hackers additional opportunities Software modules are very large and complex I

9、ndividual hosts require great care to manage-few are receiving such care Timely software updates Proper configurations Networks are very large, very complex, very heterogeneous, very hard to manage Network perimeter is disolving Evolution from client-server to automated workflow Hackers take advanta

10、ge of all this complexity and chaos Install zombies, trojan horses, backdoors Use as launch points for DDoS attacks, worms, spam Routing infrastructure attacks a looming threat,5,SecurityWhy so complicated? The Network Security Matrix,6,Current Initiatives,Enterprise-level Worm Mitigation Enterpise-

11、level virus mitigation through host diversity ISP-level DDoS Mitigation Traffic Anomaly Detection, control and data plane correlation ISP & Enterprise Configuration Provisioning & Management VoIP Security Interdomain Routing Security,7,Viruses,Worms, DDoS,Worms and Viruses Many sources, many destina

12、tions Carriers have mixed incentives to block or thwart them Enterprises feel the most pain from worms and viruses and thus have a lot of incentive DDOS Many sources, few destinations exhaust b/w on a link exhaust server resources Enterprise has few tools to combat DDoS attacks ISP may have some too

13、l and it has incentives to do so Main idea: Deploy farms of resources, e.g., scrubbing farms, email server farms, etc. Reroute attack traffic through shared resources.,8,Enterprise Pain,Enterprises are feeling the most pain from viruses and worms Carriers have mixed incentives to block virus and wor

14、m propagation in their networks + marketing - hard to do it in a way that doesnt break real applications Two main problems Large monocultures of complex, vulnerable code The enterprise lan and enterprise desktops are complete chaos Our main approach Restriction of lan and desktop behavior,9,Beyond C

15、ommunities of Interest Reducing Desktop Chaos,Potential Enterprise Restrictions A. Software download: restrict and enable automated up-to-date database view Can be done for Windows 2000/XP B. Software configuration: automate provisioning and enable database view Need strong config management tools C

16、. Communities of interest: Most desktops only need to talk to a handful of servers Desktops almost never need to talk to other desktopsbut this is precisely how many worms propagate Restrict Who x who x what on the LAN These restrictions can be automatically coupled to the applications and configura

17、tion of each desktop E.g., a desktop can only talk to one email server and that server is governed by the email client installed on that machine. All policies and meta data should be stored and managed in centralized databases Policies may allow user to “auto-provision” through, say, a Web interface

18、 for some resources But user choices are recorded in central database,10,Restricting LAN Connectivity,Smart HubReverse Firewall Transparent to PC and rest of network Looks like an ethernet hub to other devices Layer 3 and 4 aware Enforces connectivity policies based on layer 3 and 4 (and possibly ap

19、p layer) info Capabilities Filtering (firewaling)particularly traffic from a PC Connection and/or rate limiting monitoring/analyzing and reporting Philosophycentralized policy, distributed enforcement Goal: protect hosts and servers from an infected host A if they dont communicate with A in the cour

20、se of normal business,11,Policies,Internal hosts-within the enterprise External hosts-outside the enterprise Firewalls: Protect internal hosts from potentially malicious external hosts Rules for dropping or passing packets from external hosts to internal hosts This doesnt help during a worm outbreak

21、 that breaches the firewall The worm perspective: internal hosts are also potentially malicious Need rules for dropping or passing packets from internal hosts to internal hosts Rules based on protocol, origin/client IP, dest/server IP, server port Design space for rules. Three axes: Manageability, U

22、sability, and Security We stick to simple manageable policies and explore their usability/security tradeoffs,12,Greenfield vs Brownfield,In a greenfield environment may be possible to impose quite rigid internal-to-internal communication policies Our work aimed at a brownfield environment-an existin

23、g complex enterprise network Imposing simply and rigid rules will severely affect usability Need automated methods for inferring existing, implicit rules Our work uses several weeks of training data to infer traffic profiles Capture ever packet header on a subnet, stitch packets together into flows

24、300 hosts, 4.5 Tbytes of data High level issues Security: Anomalous traffic in training data Filter known anomalies in training set Usability: legitimate traffic may be blocked if not in training data Need to allow some out of profile traffic Policies-two components Profiles and throttling disciplin

25、es (rate of out-of-profile packets and the action to take when the rate is exceeded),13,Profiles,Simple Profiles Protocol,Server,Client,Port (PSCP) Profile All four tuples in the training data Most closely resembles actual communication Protocol,Server,Client (PSC) Profile All three tuples in the tr

26、aining data E.g., if a client queried a server on a given port, the client could subsequently query the server on any port Servers are mostly servers and clients and mostly clients Better usability but less security than the PSCP Profile Protocol,Sever (PS) Profile All the two tuples in the training

27、 data E.g., if any client queried a server, then every host can query that server,14,Throttling Disciplines,Trigger = threshold and window If the number of out-of-profile connections exceeds the threshold within the window then an action is taken,Before a trigger,After a trigger,15,Ephemeral Ports,F

28、or a large number of applications, an original connection to a server on a port launches a connection on a random server port The latter is called an ephemeral port The most restrictive profile, PSCP, is doomed to have bad usability The other profiles are too permissive to have good security One les

29、son: need a profile that distinguishes between ephemeral and non-ephemeral communication We use clustering algorithm to distinguish the two Non ephemeral communication is used to generate a PSCP Profile Ephemeral communication is used to generate a PSC Profile with a small caveat,16,Usability Simula

30、tions,Use data from test weeks Set a profile Set a throttling disciple with set threshold and window Thresholds of 0, 1, 5, 10, 15, 20 Windows of 1 hour and 1 day Set a reset time-time it takes the admin to reset a host after a trigger 1 minute, 10 minutes, 1 hour Simulation required to count the nu

31、mber of blocked connections E.g.: Relaxed TD, threshold of 10, window of 1 hr, reset time of 10 minutes Fewer than 10 blocked connections for all profiles at 50 percentile Fewer than 100 blocked connections for all profiles at 90 percentile Strict Relaxed Open Extended Profile decreases number of tr

32、igger events by 50% at 50 percentile and 20% at 90 percentile depending on TD,17,Security Simulations,Set a profile Set a throttling discipline with threshold and window Set a port for the simulated worm We used 25, 80, 53, 135, 137, 139, 443, 445 Large number of exploits and actively monitored Set

33、a success rate s for a compromised host to infect another vulnerable host in a round Models the ability of a worm to identify vulnerable hosts Most experiments done with s = 1% Perform many trials, one for each randomly choosen initial host Stop when no more hosts are infected Measure number of host

34、s infected Measure time to completion,18,Security Simulations,For port 137, n = 10, s = 1% For strict and relaxed TD No more than 3 infected host on any run No more than 25 rounds on any runfor all of the profiles The open throttling discipline is a different story On some runs, the worm infected al

35、l vulnerable hosts On others, the worm was contained True for all profiles,19,Conclusion,A combination of The extended profile The relaxed throttling disciplineAppears to have both reasonable usability and good security properties Lots more work to test this preliminary conclusion and to explore other profiles and throttling disciplines,