REG NASA-LLIS-1042--1998 Lessons Learned Space Shuttle Program Operations-Processing Workforce.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1042Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1042a71 Lesson Date: 1998-02-01a71 Submitting Organization: HQa71 Submitted by: David M. LengyelSubject: Space Shuttle Program/Operations-Processing/Workforce Description of Driving Event: Implementation of the Shuttle Processing Contract (SP

2、C)Lesson(s) Learned: Operations and processing in accordance with the Shuttle Processing Contract (SPC) have been satisfactory. Nevertheless, lingering concerns include: the danger of not keeping foremost the overarching goal of safety before schedule before cost; the tendency in a success-oriented

3、environment to overlook the need for continued fostering of frank and open discussion; the press of budget inhibiting the maintenance of a well-trained NASA presence on the work floor; and the difficulty of a continued cooperative search for the most meaningful measures of operations and processing

4、effectiveness.Recommendation(s): 1a. Both NASA and the SPC contractor should reaffirm at frequent intervals the dedication to safety before schedule before cost.1b. NASA should develop and promulgate training and career paths leading to qualification for senior NASA Space Shuttle management position

5、s.1c. NASA should continue to ensure that a trained and qualified Government personnel presence is maintained on the work floor.1d. NASA and SPC should continue to search for, develop, test, and establish the most meaningful measures of operations and processing effectiveness possible.Provided by IH

6、SNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: 1a. The Space Shuttle Program concurs with the ASAP affirmation that safety is our first priority. The potential for safety impacts as a result of restructuring and downs

7、izing are recognized by NASA at every level. From the Administrator down there is the communication of and the commitment to the policy that safety is the most important factor to be considered in our execution of the program and that restructuring and downsizing efforts are to recognize this policy

8、 and solicit and support a zero tolerance position for safety impacts. The restructuring efforts across the Program in pursuit of efficiencies which might allow downsizing of the workforce consistently stress that such efficiencies must be enabled by identification and implementation of better ways

9、to accomplish the necessary work, or the unanimous agreement that the work is no longer necessary, but that in either case that the safety of the operations are preserved.In the case of the restructuring and downsizing enabled by the SPC transition of some responsibility and tasks to the contractor,

10、 the transition plans for these processes and tasks specifically address the safety implications of the transition. Additionally, the Program has required the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) organizations to review and concur on the transition plans as an added assurance. Other Program down

11、sizing efforts have similar emphasis embedded in the definition and implementation of their restructuring, and the S&MA organizations are similarly committed as a normal function of their institutional and programmatic oversight to assure this focus is not compromised. Additionally, the Program prio

12、rities of 1) fly safely, 2) meet the manifest, 3) improve mission supportability, and 4) reduce cost are incorporated into almost every facet of planning and communication within both the NASA and contractor execution of the Program. Besides the continuous presentation of these priorities in employe

13、e awareness media, the Program highlights their relative order in the formal consideration of design and/or process changes being considered by the various Program control boards. Additionally, these priorities are the focus point for most of the Program management forums such as the Program Managem

14、ent Reviews and SPC Contract Management Reviews (CMRs). They are specified as the basis for the Program Strategic Plan, as well as the SPC goals and objectives used by the contractor and NASA to manage and monitor the success of the SPC. Finally, these priorities are embedded in the SPC award fee pr

15、ocess (which provides for four formal reviews each year). Specifically, the award fee criteria provide for both safety and overall performance gates which, if not met by the contractor, would result in loss of any potential cost reduction share by the contractor.In summary, NASA and all of the contr

16、actors supporting the Space Shuttle Program have always been and remain committed to assuring that safety is of the highest priority in every facet of the Program operation. While downsizing does increase the challenge of management to execute a successful Program, process changes, design modificati

17、ons, employee skills maintenance, and reorganizations are all part of the management challenges to be faced and resolved, and maintenance of the high level of attention to safety in resolving these challenges is recognized by NASA and the contractors alike as not being subject to compromise.Provided

18、 by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-1b. While it is true that the roles for NASA management and technical personnel are being reduced in number and reshaped to focus on the critical areas of anomalies and changes, these roles and the ongoing role

19、 of assessing the contractors performance against the contract and Program requirements should provide a continued source of trained and capable future NASA senior managers. NASA has an active commitment to development of the skills for senior managers for all functional areas of the Agency, and Spa

20、ce Shuttle Program senior managers are generally products of both their in-line experiences as well as these career development programs. It is anticipated at this time that the roles for NASA personnel and the career development programs which have served NASA well to this point will be sufficient

21、to assure a continuation of highly qualified and capable senior managers in the future. Given the nature of the still evolving definition of the NASA and prime contractor roles and responsibilities for the SPC operational model, it is reasonable to provide special attention to this concern, and the

22、Program will ensure that specific consideration is given to this concern in the transition plans being developed and implemented by the functional and institutional organizations across the Program.1c. NASA/KSC has maintained a physical presence on the work floor since the beginning of the Shuttle P

23、rocessing Contract and will continue this presence for SPC, Payload Ground Operations Contract, and Base Operations Contract. NASA engineering, operations, safety, and quality personnel maintain a surveillance and audit presence of overall operations for insight purposes and are formally involved fo

24、r selected tasks being performed. Presence on the floor monitoring hazardous or safety critical operations has been maintained through the transition to performance based contracting and will be maintained in the future. The frequency and depth of the insight and presence may be adjusted as justifie

25、d by the results of the contractors performance, but the value of these checks and balances has long been recognized by NASA and will be maintained. To a lesser degree, this same floor presence is executed at production sites through Resident Office presence and periodic audit and surveillance activ

26、ities by NASA Center personnel.While there is a focused initiative to minimize Government mandatory inspection points (GMIPs) across the Program, it is mutually recognized by NASA that the criticality of some checks and balances in critical processes demands that some small percentage (10-15 percent

27、) will be maintained on the production and processing floors. This presence also supports the desired training and qualification needs for NASA to remain a smart customer. Finally, there are functional roles anticipated for continued NASA participation, such as flight controllers, astronauts, and la

28、unch directors which will also provide a significant avenue for NASA skills maintenance in the long-term management model.1d. NASA recognize the value of meaningful measures of the operational and processing effectiveness for the Program and continually strive to evolve and improve on the measures c

29、urrently in place. The SPC Performance Measurement System (PMS) has been a significant development project since the beginning of the contract, continues to take shape as the primary repository for the performance metrics, which provide management insight into the cost, and technical performance acr

30、oss the complete contract. Once the system is complete and populated with viable metrics, NASA Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-will validate the system. The goal is to complete the validation by the fall of 1998. Key metrics are revie

31、wed quarterly at the SPC CMR, and individual functional areas such as flight operations and ground processing use these on a continual basis for their management execution and insight. Additional measures are continually developed at the Program level and within individual functional areas to enhanc

32、e the understanding of performance trends, and when proven to be effective management tools, these metrics roll into the PMS and/or other forums and products used to manage the Program.Documents Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Space Operationsa71 Exploration SystemsAdditional Key P

33、hrase(s): a71 Administration/Organizationa71 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panela71 Communication Systemsa71 Ground Operationsa71 Human Resources & Educationa71 Policy & Planninga71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission AssuranceAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2001-12-12a71 Approval Name: Bill Loewya71 Approval Organization: HQa71 Approval Phone Number: 202-358-0528Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-