ICAO CIRCULAR 234-1992 Human Factors Digest No 5 Operational Implications of Automation in Advanced Technology Flight Decks Printed 01 1993《人为因素文摘No 5 先进技术中的自动化的操作影响 飞行甲板1993年1月印刷》.pdf

《ICAO CIRCULAR 234-1992 Human Factors Digest No 5 Operational Implications of Automation in Advanced Technology Flight Decks Printed 01 1993《人为因素文摘No 5 先进技术中的自动化的操作影响 飞行甲板1993年1月印刷》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《ICAO CIRCULAR 234-1992 Human Factors Digest No 5 Operational Implications of Automation in Advanced Technology Flight Decks Printed 01 1993《人为因素文摘No 5 先进技术中的自动化的操作影响 飞行甲板1993年1月印刷》.pdf（46页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、ICAO CIRCULAR*234 * m 4841rLiLb 002b78b 75T m CIRCULAR 234-Awl42 ICAO CIRCULAR 1992 HUMAN FACTORS DIGEST No. 5 OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATION IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY FLIGHT DECKS Approved by the Secretary General and published under his authority INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION MONT

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10、OPYRIGHT International Civil Aviation OrganizationLicensed by Information Handling ServicesICA0 CIRCULAR*234 * m 484141b 002bBB 522 m TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction . 1 Chapier 1 . An introduction to Automation Chapter 2 . Issues and Concerns in Automation . Chapter 3 . Training for Automation

11、Chapter 4 . Management Techniques and Coping Strategies . Appendix 1 . Field studies in automation Appendix 2 . Automation principles from Wiener and Curry (1980) . Appendix 3 . Statement of automation philosophy. Delta Air Lines (1990) Appendix 4 . Recommended reading . 3 11 20 27 31 37 39 40 COPYR

12、IGHT International Civil Aviation OrganizationLicensed by Information Handling ServicesICA0 CIRCULARt234 tf I 4843436 0026989 469 H INTRODUCTION 1. This digest presents the Human Factors implications of automation and advanced technology flight decks. The purpose of the digest is to identify operati

13、onal and training issues, and to provide an understanding of the problems in the interface between humans and automation, with emphasis on the way in which automation affects human performance. It is primarily directed to training managers and operational personnel, but pilots and other operational

14、personnel will also benefit from this digest, as will regulatory authorities. 2. This digest has an operational orientation, and it does not address issues of equipment design and certification. A special digest on flight deck and systems design will be published later, and it is expected that these

15、 two digests will contribute to the understanding of the problems faced by operational personnel when new technology is introduced. 3. Automation has been gradually introduced in flight decks (and in the aviation system) over time. Flight deck automation has made aircraft operations safer and more e

16、fficient (a one per cent reduction in fuel consumption translates into annual savings of $1 O0 O00 O00 for the IATA carriers of one particular State) by ensuring more precise flight manoeuvres, providing display flexibility, and optimising cockpit space. In the interest of flight safety, however, th

17、is digest focuses on actual and potential problems and issues. This is because of the need to define and understand these problems, and it is not intended to be a reflection on the technology itself. To keep a proper perspective, it must be unequivocally stated that, in the long run, the benefits of

18、 automation far outweigh the problems. 4. Although there is still no international consensus regarding the proper use of automation, there is no question that the reduction in accidents related to human error can, in part, be explained by the introduction of automation on the flight deck. However, t

19、he record also shows that failures of automatic equipment, and, more frequently, mismatches at the human-equipment interface, remain as crucial links in the causal chain of accidents and incidents. 5. One of the reasons for the introduction of automation was the elimination of human error. So far, i

20、t has been successful in the elimination of certain type of errors. But in other cases, what has taken place is a displacement of error. Experience indicates that while automation may eliminate small errors, it may increase the potential for large errors. These are examples of the messages which thi

21、s digest attempts to convey. 6. This digest comprises the following: - Chapter 1 presents the history of automation in aviation, proposes a definition of automation, addresses the evolutionary nature of automation, and stresses the need for an automation philosophy. - Chapter 2 addresses some of the

22、 problems of automation and illustrates what worked and what did not with regard to the expectations for automation. - Chapter 3 refers to the training of operational personnel with special emphasis on flight crew training. COPYRIGHT International Civil Aviation OrganizationLicensed by Information H

23、andling ServicesICAO CIRCULAR*234 Y* 484l14Lb 002bO LBO M 2 ICAO Circular 234-AWl42 - Chapter 4 refers to management techniques and coping strategies, other than training, which have been or can be employed to solve automation problems. - Appendix 1 includes the field studies in automation completed

24、 to the present date. - Appendix 2 presents the Automation Principles elaborated by Wier!er and Curry in 1980. - Appendix 3 presents an example of automation philosophy, as proposed by one operator. - AppendBc 4 presents a list of recommended reading. 7. This digest was produced with the assistance

25、of the ICAO Flight Safety and Human Factors Study Group, and especially of its advisor Prof. Earl L. Wiener of the University of Miami and NASA Ames. Additional sources of information included the Report of the NASNlndustry workshop “Flight Deck Auto- mation: Promises and Realities” (Susan Norman an

26、d Harry Orlady, editors; August 1988), and the docu- ment “Training for Advanced Technology Aircraf”, by Study Group advisor Capt. Harry Orlady, July 1988. 8. Four other Human Factors digests have been published by ICAO: - Digest No. 1 - fundamental Human factors Concepts (Circular 216); - Digest No

27、. 2 - Flight Crew Training: Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) and Line- Oriented flight Training (LO- (Circular 21 7); - Digest No. 3 - Training OJ Operational Personnel in Humn Factors (Circular 227); and - Digest No. 4 - The Proceedings of the ICAO Hm Factors Seminar at Leningrad (Circular 229). C

28、OPYRIGHT International Civil Aviation OrganizationLicensed by Information Handling ServicesICA0 CIRCULAR*234 * 44141b 002b793 O17 Chapter 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO AUTOMATION 1.1 The Oxford dictionary defines automation as “automatic control of manufacture of product through successive stages; use of aut

29、omatic equipment to save mental and manual labour.” For the purpose of this digest, the following definition of flight deck automation is proposed: “the assignment to machinery, by choice of the crew, of some tasks or portion of tasks performed by the human crew to machinery. Included in this defini

30、tion are warning and alerting systems that replace or augment human monitoring and decision-making (this may not be at the choice of the crew, but preassigned, such as systems monitoring, flight status monitoring, fire detection).” 1.2 Automation was initially aimed at stabilizing aircraft attitude

31、through the control of aerodynamic surfaces. This need was met with gyroscopic devices, which were used in the maintenance of attitude for all spatial axes (aircraft inner loop control) for many years. During World War II, vacuum-driven gyroscopes, which also provided information on heading and atti

32、tude in the flight deck, were intensively used to provide better information, alleviate fatigue, and reduce manual control requirements. 1.3 Progress was fast after the war. Electrical systems and electronic amplifiers replaced vacuum- driven gyros. The introduction of very high frequency omnidirect

33、ional radio range (VOR) transmitters and the instrument landing system (ILS) permitted the coupling of autopilots to the output signals of this equipment and track radials, localizer and glide slope beams. Precise data regarding external references, integrated into the autopilot system, enhanced out

34、er loop control. This was the prevailing state of the art when commercial jet transports were introduced in the late 1950s. 1.4 The increase in speed and altitude capability of these new transports required a more accurate inner loop control - especially at high altitudes - as well as more precise f

35、light instruments. Yaw dampers, to damp oscillations as well as to prevent the tendency to yaw away from banked turns, and Mach trimmers to counteract the tendency to pitch down at high Mach numbers, were introduced during this period, and are good examples of automatic devices used without crew int

36、ervention. The introduction of flight directors, which integrated attitude and navigational information into a single instrument, provided better inner loop control, but at the same time raised concerns about pilots losing sight of the raw data from which the information was derived. 1.5 Advances in

37、 solid-state electronics during the 1960s fostered the appearance of autopilot and flight director systems which made automatic landings possible, and allowed the integrated control of power and flight path through autothrottle systems. Reported difficulties by flight crews in learning to operate th

38、e more complex aspects of these systems led to the requirement to demonstrate proficiency in their use during pilot certification, whereas previous requirements emphasized the ability to operate without i. There are two levels of systems management which must be considered in flight deck design: air

39、craftcontro/(innerlwp, exercising psychomotor skills), and aircraft monitoring (outer loop, demanding cognitive abilities). 2. Flight directors gave, for the first time, “command information”. The raw data were available to the pilot, but it was not always used as a check or monitor of the integrate

40、d information presented by the flight director. 3 COPYRIGHT International Civil Aviation OrganizationLicensed by Information Handling ServicesICAO CIRCULAR8234 88 = 4843436 O026992 T53 4 ICAO Circular 234-Afv142 these aids. The ground proximity warning systems (GPWS), and, more recently, the airborn

41、e collision avoidance system (ACAWCAS) represented a further extension of the concept of automated commands advising the pilot to manoeuvre he aircraft, rather than using automation merely to maintain aerodynamic or navigational control. This philosophy of automated pilot advisory/warning prevails t

42、oday in wind shear advisory and collision avoidance systems. The introduction of area navigation (RNAV) and four-dimensional flight managemeni systems integrated with the autopilot increased the level of automation complexity prevailing M civd transport aircrat. it also expanded the capability of ai

43、rcraft and air traffic control (ATC) to use airspace more effectively: 1.6 Economics, including the goal of reducing flight deck workload to permit safe and efficient utilization of two- rather than three-person crews, was a major driving force behind the next major step in flight deck automation: e

44、lectronic cathode ray tube (CRT) displays and automated system management devices. (The reMionship between automation and workload has yet to be established, however, and it is incorrect to accept as a general statement that automation reduces workload, since there are conditions under which the ver

45、y opposite occurs.) The reduction of human error by monitoring the human management of aircraft systems and flight control was another major objective, as were optimizing flight performance nd. managing fuel consumption. Operationally, the new systems enabled vertical and horizontal automated naviga

46、tion and guidance, as vueEl as completely automtic thrust management. Yet the implications of this new tecAndogy were anly beginning to be undercfood. As thece aircraft were introduced, it was soon evident that the ATC system was not adaptive enough to permit fu use of the capabilities of the newer

47、aid Riht management systems (M). 1.7 The recentb mfroduced mw ah MD-t1; A320) are equipped with danced forms of automa?ion, whose control systems incoqmate bgic to prevent the navigation; engines and flight controls monitoring; and systems monitoring. The conventional control wheels, throttles, knob

48、s and buttons have been replaced as the primary means of information transfer between aircraft and crew. Their function has been assumed by a flight control unit for short-term, real-time (tactical) instructions and a control display unit for long-term (strategic) data input. COPYRIGHT International

49、 Civil Aviation OrganizationLicensed by Information Handling ServicesICA0 CIRCULAR*23Y * Y841YLb 002b993 99T D ICA O Circular 234-A N/142 5 EVOLUTION OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AUTOMATION AIRCRAFT A CONTROLS A I PILOT AIRCRAFT i- 1 CONTROLS I AIRCRAFT I t AUTOPILOT 7 I CONTROLLER k 4 I AIRCRAFT A CONTROL SYSTEMS A I AUTOPILOT I A NAVAIDS CONTROLLER INS A CADC FMS PMS t - I PILOT I I PILOT I Increasing peripheraIization of the pilot Figure 1 COPYRIGHT International Civil Aviation OrganizationLicensed by Information Handling ServicesICAO CIRCULARU234 ff m 4843436 O0