Automation for System Safety Analysis.ppt

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1、Automation for System Safety Analysis,Jane T. Malin, Principal Investigator Project: Automated Tool and Method for System Safety Analysis Software Assurance Symposium September, 2007,Complex systems typically fail because of the unintended consequences of their design, the things they do that were n

2、ot intended to be done. - M. Griffin, System Engineering and the “Two Cultures” of Engineering, March 28, 2007,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,2,Problem,Need early evaluation of software requirements and design Assess test and validation plans Assess system failures and anomalous

3、conditions that may challenge software in system integration testing Identify software-system interaction risks Identify requirements gaps Perform virtual system integration tests prior to software-hardware integration Benefits Reduce software-system integration risks early Reduce requirements-induc

4、ed errors and rework in later development phases Improve efficiency and repeatability of analyzing system and software risks Reduce time spent reanalyzing when specifications and designs change Reduce contention for software-hardware integration laboratory resources,SAS 07 Automation for System Safe

5、ty Analysis Malin,3,Technical Approach,Systematic semi-automated analysis for early evaluation and rapid update Capture model of the controlled system architecture Abstract physical architecture models with subsystems, functions, interfaces, connections Extracted directly from requirements and desig

6、n text and data Capture risks and hazards in model Constraints, hazards, risks from requirements and design Risk and failure libraries Analyze model and risk data to identify relevant risks and constraints Analyze and simulate risk propagation in the system Use operational and off-nominal scenarios

7、and configurations Identify possible test scenarios for virtual system integration testing,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,4,Relevance to NASA,This work leverages component tools that have been used in NASA applications Goal: Integrate and enhance these tools for software assuranc

8、e during requirements and design phases Project test case is NASA Constellation Launch Abort System (LAS),SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,5,Extend and Integrate Existing Technology,Requirements and Constraints Text,Discrete Time Simulation Model,Extraction Tool: Model Parts, Inter

9、faces, Risks, Scenarios,Aerospace OntologyTaxonomy, Thesaurus,Classes, Synonyms,Modeling Tool: - Map ConnectVisualize - Embed problems and states,Reports Pairs, Paths, Risky Scenarios, Test Cases for Virtual System Integration Testing,Inputs Extraction Modeling Analysis Simulation Testing,Interactio

10、n Model,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,6,Extraction Tool and Nomenclature,Reconciler Extractor Extract model parts from requirements text and data from functional analysis and threat/risk analysis Semantic parsing for text analysis and word/phrase classification Extract operation

11、al scenarios from functional analysis data Aerospace Systems Library and Ontology Classes of model elements with properties and defaults Taxonomy with synonym lists, for parsing and mapping to types of model elements Extensive problem taxonomy and thesaurus that includes hazard types from Constellat

12、ion Hazard Analysis handbook Current NASA use: Semantic text mining to classify JSC Discrepancy Reports (DRs) for trend analysis Discrepancy Reports describe mechanical, electrical, software and process discrepancies in engineering and operating NASA-furnished equipment,SAS 07 Automation for System

13、Safety Analysis Malin,7,Discrepancy Report Analysis Tool,Cross-Cutting Teams Receive Subsets of DRs in Excel File and Browsers,Extract DRs from Database,Analyze text in each DR Problem DescriptionIdentify categories of problems describedSort DRs into subsets for cross-cutting teams: Mechanical, Elec

14、trical, Software, Process, Other,Browsers for Each Cross-Cutting Team, with links to Database,Filterable Excel File,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,8,Model-Based Safety Analysis Case,Model extraction and hazard analysis were demonstrated in 2005 Case: Generic unmanned spacecraft;

15、concerns about transmitter noise Requirements from SpecTRM and risks from Defect Detection and Prevention (DDP) Tool Reference: J. T. Malin, D. R. Throop, L. Fleming and L. Flores, “Transforming Functional Requirements and Risk Information into Models for Analysis and Simulation,” 2005 IEEE Aerospac

16、e Conference Proc., March 2005.,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,9,Reconciler Information Extractor,Risks and Mitigations,Parse and Extract: Model Parts Interfaces Vulnerabilities Threats/Risks Mitigations Scenarios,Functional Diagrams,XML- Structured Data,Aerospace OntologyClasses

17、, Synonyms,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,10,Reconciler Tool Extracts Model Parts from Text,Parses the Process and Requirements sentences from SpecTRM or Cradle Extracts functions and objects Classifies functions (uses Aerospace Ontology) Formats the parsed knowledge In XML forma

18、t or OWL format Passes results for mapping into models,OWL XML,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,11,Requirements Model (Shift Info) Operation/Function: Transfer (“Downlink”)Agent/contributor: ?Affected Operand: InformationOperand Source: ?Operand Destination/Goal: ?Path Type: Inform

19、ationEffect value/measures: “Successful”,Problem Model (Failure of Function) Problem: Failure of function (“Failure”) Agents/contributors: “Transmission Subsystem, Transmitter”Impacted Entity: “Telecom Subsystem”Impacted Objective (link to): “Downlink Successful”,Reconciler Tool Extracts Risks,RAP o

20、r ARM Risk Analysis and Matrix,DDP Analysis and Visualization of Risks, Mitigations and Costs,Mitigation Model (Replace) Function Type: Replace (“Redundancy”) Replaced: “Transmitter”Replacement: “Transmitter Spare”Counteraction Type: RecoverCounteracted Problem (link to): “Telecom Sub Failure Transm

21、itter”,Objective: “Downlink successful” Risk: “Telecom Subsystem Failure: Transmission: Transmitter” Mitigation: “Redundant Systems: Transmitter”,Transmitter FailureMitigation: Redundant Transmitter,Telesub: Failure (Transmission sub: Transmitter),SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,1

22、2,Modeling and Analysis Tools,Hazard Identification Tool (HIT) identifies threats and risks Model mapper and developer Hazard path analyzer Model diagram visualizer Least mature tool in the suite Hazard Identification Tool was demonstrated in SpecTRM spacecraft case Use Reconciler output to develop

23、interaction architecture and risk model Identify pairs that are not intended to interact Hazard sources Sensitive or vulnerable objects or functions Analyze paths between pairs and estimate severity,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,13,Hazard Identification Tool,Library Components F

24、unctions Problems,Modeler: - Map - Connect - Embed problems and states,Aerospace OntologyClasses, Synonyms,Report Pairs, Paths Risky Scenarios, Test Cases,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,14,Modeler: Each Requirement Provides Pieces of the Architecture,C.1 Telecommunication Subsyst

25、em (Telesub) C.1.1 The CDHC sends the TeleSub a compressed picture. FG.1 TeleSub C.1.4 C.1.2 The CDHC sends the TeleSub telemetry. FG.2 FR.1 FR.5 TeleSub C.1.5 C.1.3 The CDHC sends In View of Ground alerts to the TeleSub. DP.5.6 TeleSub C.1.6 C.1.4 The CDHC receives plan files from the TeleSub. FR.3

26、 TeleSub C.1.3 C.1.5 The CDHC receives ground commands from the TeleSub. FR.3 TeleSub C.1.2 C.1.6 The CDHC receives the TeleSub operating state from the TeleSub. DP.5.5 TeleSub C.1.1 C.2 Camera Subsystem C.2.1 The CDHC sends the Camera a “take picture“ command. FG.2 FR.1 FR.3 C.2.2 The CDHC sends th

27、e Camera x, y and z gimballing coordinates. FG.2 FR.1 FR.3 C.2.3 The CDHC sends a turn on command to the Camera. DP.5.3 H Constraint 1.1.4 C.2.4 The CDHC sends a turn off command to the Camera. DP.5.3 C.2.5 The CDHC receives a compressed picture file from the Camera. FG.1 FG.2 FR.1 C.4 Attitude Dete

28、rmination Subsystem C.4.1 The CDHC receives an In View of Ground alert from the ADS. DP.5.6 ADS C.4.2 The CDHC receives the ADS operating state from the ADS. DP.5.5 ADS,Requirements Model (Shift Info) Function Type: Transfer (“Send”)Agent/Contributor: Subsystem (“CDHC”)Affected Operand: Information

29、(“Telemetry”)Operand Source: Subsystem (“ CDHC”)Operand Destination/Goal: Subsystem (“ Telesub”)Path Type: Information,Physical/Functional Architecture Fragment,SpecTRM: Spacecraft Command and Data Handling Computer (CDHC) Send/Receive Requirements,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,

30、15,Modeler: Architecture Model and Visualization of a Set of Requirements,C.1 Telecommunication Subsystem (TeleSub) C.1.1 The CDHC sends the TeleSub a compressed picture. FG.1 TeleSub C.1.4 C.1.2 The CDHC sends the TeleSub telemetry. FG.2 FR.1 FR.5 TeleSub C.1.5 C.1.3 The CDHC sends In View of Groun

31、d alerts to the TeleSub. DP.5.6 TeleSub C.1.6 C.1.4 The CDHC receives plan files from the TeleSub. FR.3 TeleSub C.1.3 C.1.5 The CDHC receives ground commands from the TeleSub. FR.3 TeleSub C.1.2 C.1.6 The CDHC receives the TeleSub operating state from the TeleSub. DP.5.5 TeleSub C.1.1 C.2 Camera Sub

32、system C.2.1 The CDHC sends the Camera a “take picture“ command. FG.2 FR.1 FR.3 C.2.2 The CDHC sends the Camera x, y and z gimballing coordinates. FG.2 FR.1 FR.3 C.2.3 The CDHC sends a turn on command to the Camera. DP.5.3 H Constraint 1.1.4 C.2.4 The CDHC sends a turn off command to the Camera. DP.

33、5.3 C.2.5 The CDHC receives a compressed picture file from the Camera. FG.1 FG.2 FR.1 C.4 Attitude Determination Subsystem (ADS) C.4.1 The CDHC receives an In View of Ground alert from the ADS. DP.5.6 ADS C.4.2 The CDHC receives the ADS operating state from the ADS. DP.5.5 ADS Note: CDHC is Command

34、and Data Handling Computer,Physical/Functional Architecture Model,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,16,Modeler: Seed the Spacecraft 1 (SC1) Model with Problems and Mitigations,Libraries of objects (components) and functions Typical components and operating modes Typical functions an

35、d failures Typical output that may be a problem Typical sensitivities and tolerances Typical mitigations Manual additions to model Add spare transmitter (xmitter) Transmission performance (rate) degradation due to noise CDHC Comm Controller controls mitigation: switch to spare transmitter Add Comm N

36、etwork, Ground data components Remove Reaction Control System (RCS) and camera Add Power (PwrSpply) and Thermal Control (ThermalSys) subsystems, with new risks and mitigations ThermalSys is noise source (when on) Power lines can transmit noise,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,17,Pa

37、th Analyzer: Find Potential Interaction Problems,Find matching pairs of components (hazard source-vulnerable sink) Find system interaction paths that permit hazards to impact sensitive components and functions Estimate local and integrated system hazard impact severity,SAS 07 Automation for System S

38、afety Analysis Malin,18,Path Analyzer: Incremental Quick Look Approach,Simple early threat analysis, refined as design information becomes available Identify risky matching pairs from component or function vulnerabilities, threats and hazards Search for paths between pairs along connections or depen

39、dencies Make search dependent on configuration information, with changeable configuration and operational states Estimate impact severity from local estimates of severity,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,19,Simulator: CONFIG Simulation Tool to Assess Timed Scenarios,NASA experience

40、 with CONFIG hybrid discrete event simulation tool: Used for software virtual validation testing for 1997 90-day manned Lunar Life Support Test,Software: Intelligent control for gas storage and transfer Testing: Simulated failures and imbalances that would not be tested in hardware-software integrat

41、ionToo slow to develop, too expensive, too destructiveResults: Identified software requirements deficiencies,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,20,Add Timing to Selected Scenarios and Narrow Potential Problem Set,Model data,Integrated Architecture Model,Mapped Timed Simulation Model,

42、Log/Report Specifications,Scenario Scripts,Map components and connectionsReuse scenario scripts and report specifications,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,21,Virtual System Integration Lab (VSIL),Triakis has used VSIL in 25 avionics verification projects Models and problem configur

43、ations for new tests and test suite models,Models and Test Definitions,DE: detailed executable, the simulation of the embedded controller hardware ES: executable specifications V&V: verification and validation,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,22,Accomplishments: First 9 Months,Draf

44、ted Concept of Operations Enhanced tools Completed a simple integration of tool functions, inputs and outputs Based on SpecTRM-style requirements text Selected Constellation Launch Abort System Case Gained access to Cx Windchill materials 9/07 Takes time, but requirements may now be mature enough,SA

45、S 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,23,Concept of Operations,Drafted and iterated a draft Concept of Operations Document with Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) (Due 12/07) Data flow diagram shows use of tools to support S&MA software processes and virtual system integration testing,SA

46、S 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,24,Tool Enhancements,Refined Reconciler parsing and extraction capabilities Re-implemented Hazard Identification Tool functions for constructing hierarchical models from extracted model parts No longer uses Protg Uses elements of CONFIG simulation too

47、l for automatic and manual model construction and visualizing architecture models Re-implemented risk path analyzer code, to make planned extensions feasible,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,25,Aerospace Ontology Library Objects,Enhanced Aerospace Ontology class objects for modelin

48、g risks and qualitative dependency relationships General for multiple types of influences among entities and functions/actions Capability, integrity/reliability, performance timing and quality or controllabilityInfluencing Factor Relationships Positive-Negative (signed) relation to influenced variab

49、le or problem Importance (degree of worst-case impact) Likelihood (probability of occurrence of factor) Cross-reference to Requirements and Constraints,SAS 07 Automation for System Safety Analysis Malin,26,Aerospace Ontology Action Primitives,Enhanced Aerospace Ontology taxonomy for straightforward

50、mapping to primitives used in path analysisPlace/Arrange Move + EntityOperand + Path Transport + SourcePlace + DestinationPlace Change “Owner” Transfer + EntityOperand + Source + Sink Input/Output + EntityOperand Output Emit (Active-Output) Release (Passive-Output) Take-In Input (Active Take-In) Receive (Passive Take-In) Process Transform + EntityOperand + Parameter Phase change, change in composition Change Position on a Scale + EntityOperand + Parameter Increase Decrease Control Regulate + EntityOperand + Parameter,