大学六级-1221及答案解析.doc
《大学六级-1221及答案解析.doc》由会员分享,可在线阅读,更多相关《大学六级-1221及答案解析.doc(38页珍藏版)》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。
1、大学六级-1221 及答案解析(总分:712.00,做题时间:90 分钟)一、Part Writing(总题数:1,分数:106.00)1.介绍你的姓名、班级、专业等基本信息2. 列举你的优点,证明你能胜任此职位3. 表明你对此工作的热情,渴望得到锻炼的机会An Application for the Assistant Librarian(分数:106.00)_二、Part Reading Compr(总题数:1,分数:70.00)Dont Destroy the Essential Catalyst of RiskSince the spring, and most acutely thi
2、s autumn, a global contagion (传染)of fear and panic has choked off the arteries of finance, compounding a broader deterioration in the global economy.Financial institutions have an obligation to the broader financial system. We depend on a healthy, well-functioning system but we failed to raise enoug
3、h questions about whether some of the trends and practices that had become commonplace really served the publics long-term interests.Seven important lessonsAs policymakers and regulators begin to consider the regulatory actions to be taken to address the fallings, I believe it is useful to reflect o
4、n some of the lessons from tiffs crisis.The first is that risk management should not be entirely predicated on historical data. In the past several months, we have heard the phrase“ multiple standard deviation events“ more than a few times. If events that were calculated to occur once in 20 years in
5、 fact occurred much more regularly, it does not take a mathematician to figure out that risk management assumptions did not reflect the distribution of the actual outcomes. Our industry must do more to enhance and improve scenario analysis and stress testing.Second, too many financial institutions a
6、nd investors simply outsourced their risk management. Rather than undertake their own analysis, they relied on the rating agencies to do the essential work of risk analysis for them. This was true at the inception(初期)and over the period of the investment, during which time they did not consider othe
7、r indicators of financial deterioration.This over-dependence on credit ratings coincided with the dilution of the desired triple A-rating. In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64, 000 structured finance instruments, such as collateralized
8、 debt obligations, rated triple A. It is easy and appropriate to blame the rating agencies for lapses in their credit judgments. But the blame for the result is not theirs alone. Every financial institution that participated in the process has to accept its share of the responsibility.Third, size ma
9、tters. For example, whether you owned $5 billion or $50 billion of (supposedly) low-risk super senior debt in a CDO, the likelihood of losses was, proportionally, the same. But the consequences of a miscalculation were obviously much bigger if you had a $50 billion exposure.Fourth, many risk models
10、incorrectly assumed that positions could be fully hedged. After the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management mid the crisis in emerging markets in 1998, new products such as various basket indices and credit default swaps were created to help offset a number of risks. However, we did not, as an indu
11、stry, consider carefully enough the possibility that liquidity would dry up, making it difficult to apply effective hedges.Fifth, risk models failed to capture the risk inherent in off-balance sheet activities, such as structured investment vehicles. It seems clear now that managers of companies wit
12、h large off-balance sheet exposure did not appreciate the full magnitude of the economic risks they were exposed to; equally worrying, their counterparties were unaware of the full extent of these vehicles and, therefore, could not accurately assess the risk of doing business.Sixth, complexity got t
13、he better of us. The industry let the growth in new instruments outstrip(超过)the operational capacity to manage them. As a result, operational risk increased dramatically and tiffs had a direct effect on the overall stability of the financial system.Last, and perhaps most important, financial institu
14、tions did not account for asset values accurately enough. I have heard some argue that fair value accounting - which assigns current values to financial assets and liabilities - is one of the main factors exacerbating(使恶化) the credit crisis. I see it differently. If more institutions had properly va
15、lued their positions and commitments at the outset, they would have been in a much better position to reduce their exposures.Fair value: a discipline for financial institutionsThe daily marking of positions to current market prices was a key contributor to our decision to reduce risk relatively earl
16、y in markets and in instruments that were deteriorating. This process can be difficult, and sometimes painful, but I believe it is a discipline that should define financial institutions.As a result of these lessons and others that will emerge from this financial crisis, we should consider important
17、principles for our industry, for policymakers and for regulators. For the industry, we cannot let our ability to innovate exceed our capacity to manage. Given the size and interconnected nature of markets, the growth in volumes, the global nature of trades and their cross-asset characteristics, mana
18、ging operational risk will only become more important.Risk and control functions need to be completely independent from the business units. And clarity as to whom risk and control managers report to is crucial to maintaining that independence. Equally important, risk managers need to have at least e
19、qual stature with their counterparts on the trading desks: if there is a question about the value of a position or a disagreement about a risk limit, the risk managers view should always prevail.Understandably, compensation continues to generate a lot of anger and controversy. We recognize that havi
20、ng troubled asset relief programme money creates an important context for compensation. That is why, in part, our executive management team elected not to receive a bonus in 2008, even though the firm produced a profit.More generally, we should apply basic standards to how we compensate people in ou
21、r industry. The percentage of the discretionary (任意的)bonus awarded in equity should increase significantly as an employees total compensation increases. An individuals performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. To ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject
22、 to future delivery and/or deferred exercise. Senior executive officers should be required to retain most of the equity they receive at least until they retire, while equity delivery schedules should continue to apply after the individual has left the firm.Limitations of self regulationFor policymak
23、ers and regulators, it should be clear that self-regulation has its limits. We rationalized and justified the downward pricing of risk on the grounds that it was different. We did so because our self-interest in preserving and expanding our market share, as competitors, sometimes blinds us - especia
24、lly when exuberance is at its peak. At the very least, fixing a system-wide problem, elevating standards or driving the industry to a collective response requires effective central regulation and the convening power of regulators.Capital, credit and underwriting standards should be subject to more“
- 1.请仔细阅读文档,确保文档完整性,对于不预览、不比对内容而直接下载带来的问题本站不予受理。
- 2.下载的文档,不会出现我们的网址水印。
- 3、该文档所得收入(下载+内容+预览)归上传者、原创作者;如果您是本文档原作者,请点此认领!既往收益都归您。
下载文档到电脑,查找使用更方便
2000 积分 0人已下载
下载 | 加入VIP,交流精品资源 |
- 配套讲稿:
如PPT文件的首页显示word图标,表示该PPT已包含配套word讲稿。双击word图标可打开word文档。
- 特殊限制:
部分文档作品中含有的国旗、国徽等图片,仅作为作品整体效果示例展示,禁止商用。设计者仅对作品中独创性部分享有著作权。
- 关 键 词:
- 大学 1221 答案 解析 DOC
