CEPT ERC REPORT 76-1999 The Role of Spectrum Pricing As a Means Of Supporting Spectrum Management (Marbella September 1999)《频谱定价作为一种辅助频谱管理手段 马贝拉1999年9月》.pdf

《CEPT ERC REPORT 76-1999 The Role of Spectrum Pricing As a Means Of Supporting Spectrum Management (Marbella September 1999)《频谱定价作为一种辅助频谱管理手段 马贝拉1999年9月》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《CEPT ERC REPORT 76-1999 The Role of Spectrum Pricing As a Means Of Supporting Spectrum Management (Marbella September 1999)《频谱定价作为一种辅助频谱管理手段 马贝拉1999年9月》.pdf（43页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、 - STD.CEPT ERC REPORT 7b-ENGL 3797 9 232b414 00Lb409 2b7 ERC REPORT 76 European Radiocommunications Comi ttee (ERC) within the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT) THE ROLE OF SPECTRUM PRICING AS A MEANS OF SUPPORTING SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT Marbella, September 19

2、99 STD-CEPT ERC REPORT 7b-ENGL 1979 2326414 001bq10 Ti37 ERC REPORT 76 Copyright 1999 the European Confercnce of Postai and Telecommunications Administratiun KEPT) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In May 1998 the ERC approved Report 53 on the introduction of economic criteria in spectrum management and the princip

3、les of fees and charging in the CEPT. After publication of ERC Report 53 it was decided to work further in this area and produce also an ERC Report on the practical implications of spectrum pricing. The aim of this Report is to compare the theoretical models presented in ERC Report 53 with the concr

4、ete plans and practical experiences of CEPT and other administrations. This Report describes the practical applications and experiences with cost based pricing, administrative incentive pricing, auctions and spectrunitrading and gives some initial thoughts on spectrum refarming. Options for pricing

5、and possible impact. When cost based pricing is used, price setting may be basically addressed to: - Set simple licence fees, e.g. for light regime licensing. - Set differential fees to reflect spectrum use, but within a regime that still aims to recover the overall costs of the spectrum administrat

6、ion. There are advantages in having very simple fee regimes for simple licences. They provide a form of registration of users so it is possible to monitor usage (in contrast to licence exemption). Most administrations have however adopted some degree of differential pricing. This allows higher fees

7、for more use of channels or more services. Differential pricing is also suitable for other services, but its limitations start to arise for big blocks of spectrum, for which the cost based fee may be relatively low. This is when incentive pricing or auctions may be a better means of exercising spect

8、rum management. Administrative Incentive Pricing The introduction of incentive pricing provides a means by which licences can be priced to reflect the value of the spectrum used. Where spectrum is in heavy demand, prices may be set higher. Where spectrum is under utilised, prices may be lowered to e

9、ncourage more use. Prices may also be lowered to encourage new innovative uses of spectrum or to encourage more competition of services. Conversely the use of higher prices may also stimulate innovation itself. Administrative incentive pricing (AIP) should be closely related to supporting spectrum m

10、anagement objectives. In most administrations, new legislation may be necessary to enable Ai to be used. The approach taken in most administrations around the world who have considered it, is to work out a number of models for treating spectrum as a raw material. Another key factor is the need to wo

11、rk closely with key customers to determine tariff units. Experiences from countries that are adopting AIP include, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and United Kingdom. Auctions Auctions have been used for a long time as an instrument to allocate goods. However the actual application of the auction ins

12、trument as a means to allocate spectrum has started quite recently. The first auctions were held in New Zealand and Australia. The auction design contained a number of flaws, which made them not very successful. Therefore the US chose a novel design which is now generally known as the simultaneoirs

13、multiple roirnd auction (SMR). Not only in New Zealand, Australia and the US but also in Europe auctions have been conducted over the (recent) years and more are planned. The designs and experiences of these auctions are discussed and advice is given, based on experiences of countries that have intr

14、oduced auctions. ERC REPORT 76 Spectrum Trading Spectrum trading has been introduced for other intangible assets than spectrum and positive results were reached. Australia and New Zealand have introduced some form of spectrum trading, but it is difficult to draw conclusions from this for the Europea

15、n market. United Kingdom has held a consultation on the introduction of spectrum trading. There was broad agreement that a spectrum market could: - - - improve the economic efficiency of spectrum management; help to ensure that spectrum was assigned to those who could produce greatest benefit from i

16、t; provide valuable additional flexibility for spectrum assignments to be adjusted through the market in response to changes in demand. There was also agreement in UK that spectrum trading should be introduced selectively in a way that took account of the market and technical characteristics of the

17、different licence classes. The ERC Report concludes that variations may need to be applied selectively and pragmatically and preferred spectrum trading solutions are likely to vary from country to country. Refarmitag It should be emphasised that refarming as such is a long standing and frequently us

18、ed frequency management tool, used for strategic planning of spectrum aiming at efficient use and international harmonisation. The new element that is brought into the discussion on refarming is whether and how this will be funded. Particularly important in the context of this Report is the role tha

19、t administrative incentive pricing and secondary trading can have in these processes. It should be emphasised that refarming is not a “first choice“ activity. The possibilities of sharing of frequencies and the use of innovative technologies, which enable sharing should be used to the utmost in orde

20、r to avoid refarming. When time and transparency can not solve the issues, because refarming has to take place at short notice the issue of financial compensation of the existing users arises as does the question of who will pay for this compensation. There are a number of options for this, each wit

21、h advantages and disadvantages. Only the main issues surrounding the topic of refarming were touched upon, since it is not the prime subject of this Report. It is made clear though that administrative incentive pricing and secondary trading have a role to play in assisting refarming, as outlined abo

22、ve. The other issues are getting beyond the scope of this Report and should be studied further within the ERC. Conclusions and recommendations This Report is intended to be of an informative and advisory nature and does not propose ways of harmonisation in the area of spectrum pricing. Experiences a

23、nd plans in this area, with the emphasis on CEPT countries are brought together for reference for the benefit of administrations, which are studying these issues. It is recommended that each administration considers how pricing might best be used as a tool for assisting spectrum management. Circumst

24、ances will differ in every case, but administrations should be aware that the pressures on spectrum demand are likely to generally increase. This Report sets out some of the experiences of how spectrum pricing can help. It is not an instrument, which can be introduced without a lot of preparation. H

25、owever the benefits of using these new techniques can be significant in improving countries having experience with it are very willing to share that experience. I spectrum efficiency. It is therefore recommend that serious attention be given to the potential use of pricing. Those INDEX TABLE 1 INTRO

26、DUCTION 1 1.1 TERMINOLOGY 1 1.2 DEVELOPMENTS . 1.4 SCARC/CONGESTION 2 1.5 MISSION STATEMENT ERC 3 OPTIONS FOR PRICING AND. THE POSSIBLE IMPACT 3 2.1 COST BASED PRICING . 3 2.2 ADMINISTRATIVE INCENTIVE PRICING . 4 2.3 AUCTIONS . 6 2.3. I Auctions: some chronological background information 8 2.3.2 Auc

27、tions in Europe . . 12 2.3.3 Future airctions . . 12 2.3.4 Auction mechanism developments: combinatorial auctioning . 13 2.3.5 The relation between auctions and a secondary market . 14 3 SPECTRUM TRADING 14 1.3 POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF ECONOMIC SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT TOOLS . 1.6 ROLE OFTHE REGULATOR . 3

28、2 3.1 3.2 BACKGROUND: EXPERIENCES WITH TRADABiLlY OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS . 15 BACKGROUND: THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND SPECTRUM TRADING EXPERIENCES 15 3.3 EU GREEN PAPER ON RADIO SPECTRUM POLICY 16 3.4 MANAGING SPECTRUM BY THE MARKET IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 16 3.5 A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD FOR EUROPE 17

29、3.7 SUMMARY . 17 4 SPECTRUM REFARMING 18 4.1 BEFORE REFARMING 18 4.2 FINANCIAL COMPENSATION 19 4.3 PRODUCING CEPTERC GUIDELINES? . 20 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 21 3.6 POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS FROM TRADABILITY OF SPECTRUM USAGE RIGHTS . 17 4.4 CONCLUSION ON REFARMING ISSUES . 21 5 ANNEX 1: DEVELOPMEN

30、TS WITH REGARD TO SPECTRUM PRICING IN INDIVIDUAL ADMINISTRATIONS . 24 EKC REPORT 76 Page 1 THE ROLE OF SPECTRUM PRICING AS A MEANS OF SUPPORTING SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 1 INTRODUCTION In May 1998 the ERC approved Report 53 on the introduction of economic criteria in spectrum management and the principle

31、s of fees and charging in the CEPT. That Report discussed among other things possible approaches to the introduction of economic criteria and gave an overview of the plans of CEPT administrations in this respect. After publication of ERC Report 53 it was decided to work further in this area and prod

32、uce also a Report on the practical implications of spectrum pricing. The aim of this Report is to compare the theoretical models presented in ERC Report 53 with the concrete plans and practical experiences of CEPT and other administrations. Several administrations have introduced the instrument of a

33、uctions andor administrative pricing and others are on the verge of doing so. Others are developing a policy on the issues and this group in particular could benefit from receiving information on the experience of other administrations. Insight in specific steps in the procedures, which - looking ba

34、ckwards with the benefit of hindsight - are very advisable to take or should on the other hand be advised against is very valuable knowledge when developing proposals in this area. The Report is intended to be of an informative nature and does not propose ways of harmonisation in the area of spectru

35、m pricing. 1.1 Terminology In this Report some terms specific to spectrum pricing, administrative pricing and related issues are used and it may be helpful to define these terms at the beginning of this Report. Spectrum pricing: A generic term denoting the use of pricing as a spectrum management too

36、l. It covers both administrative incentive pricing and auctions of either apparatus licences or spectrum rights. Under spectrum pricing, charges are not set by reference to the fully allocated costs of spectrum management attributable to particular user categories but are intended to balance supply

37、of and demand for spectrum or to achieve other spectrum management policy objectives, such as facilitating the introduction of new services or promoting competition. Administrative pricing: A form of spectrum pricing in which apparatus licence fees or charges for spectrum rights are set by the spect

38、rum manager. Administrative pricing may include such variants as: incentive pricing, where an attempt is made to set prices to promote particular aspects of efficient spectrum use; regulatory pricing (cost based pricing), where fees are set unrelated to market considerations, for example, to recover

39、 spectrum management costs. Beauty contest: A comparative selection mechanism that gives weight to criteria other than financial bids in order to decide which offer(s) is (are) best. Financial transfers nevertheless can play a role in this decision making process, but only and solely as (ex ante det

40、erniiried) fixed criteria that have to be met. Tender: A selection mechanism that gives weight to both financial and non-financial criteria in order to decide which offer(s) is (are) the best. A tender looks like a mixture of a beauty contest and an auction. Auction: A selection mechanism that gives

41、 weight to financial criteria in order to decide which applicant(s) is (are) the best. Non-financial criteria nevertheless can play a role in this decision making process, but only and solely as (ex aiire determined) fixed criteria that have to be met. SD.CEPT ERC REPORT 7b-ENGL 1979 111 23Zb414 OO?

42、ib415 Sb ERC REPORT 76 Page 2 1.2 Developments As described in ERC Report 53 the experience of many CEPT administrations is that existing licensing and charging policies and mechanisms need to be changed in order to cater for the developments in the radio communications global environment. In partic

43、ular the increased demand for spectrum and its scarcity have generated a requirement for a more dynamic spectrum management process and its associated procedures. Administrations have become aware of ways in which their spectrum management policies and procedures can be improved by introducing trans

44、parency in the procedures, for example, by publishing frequency tables, licence conditions etc. and by introducing computerised spectrum assignment systems. These changes have also led to the development of new approaches to spectrum management. These approaches have included, among other things, th

45、e use of economic criteria as part of spectrum management policy as an instrument for calculating licence fee structures. The economic criteria are used, together with other more traditional spectrum management tools, with the aim of improving spectrum management and allowing the radio spectrum to b

46、e managed on a more equitable basis for the benefit of all radio users. The speed with which these changes are being introduced varies between administrations. At the moment the situation is that some administrations have introduced auctions andor full administrative incentive pricing or are plannin

47、g to do so. Even within a cost recovery regime many administrations differentiate prices to reflect the spectrum use or to encourage changes. 1.3 Compared to regulation, economic spectrum management tools can offer advantages of speed, transparency, economic efficiency and flexibility. They are not

48、expected to replace regulation, which will continue to play an important role in spectrum management. However, applied selectively, economic spectrum management tools could usefully complement regulation. It should be for national administrations to select whether and how to apply these complementar

49、y methods. In doing so, they will wish to take into account a number of considerations, including current and expected developments in the market for radio-based services and the balance between spectrum demand and availability in the various frequency bands. These considerations can be expected to vary from state to state and the optimal combination of regulation and economic tools will differ accordingly. Possible advantages of economic spectrum management tools Spectrum pricing, whether by administrative pricing or auctions, can help ensure that the spectrum resour