SAE J 2990-2012 Hybrid and EV First and Second Responder Recommended Practice《混合动力汽车和电动汽车(EV)一次和二次相应推荐实施规程》.pdf

《SAE J 2990-2012 Hybrid and EV First and Second Responder Recommended Practice《混合动力汽车和电动汽车(EV)一次和二次相应推荐实施规程》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《SAE J 2990-2012 Hybrid and EV First and Second Responder Recommended Practice《混合动力汽车和电动汽车(EV)一次和二次相应推荐实施规程》.pdf（55页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

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5、rid and EV First and Second Responder Recommended Practice RATIONALE Electrification of the vehicle industry is increasing at a rapid pace with many countries adopting goals for increasing the number of electrified vehicles (xEVs), including a US goal of having one million PHEVs on the road by 2015

6、and Chinas goal of 500 000 new energy vehicles in production by the end of 2015. This new propulsion technology in the automotive sector has raised concerns for these vehicles when involved in severe crashes because of the potential consequences associated with new hazards from the high voltage syst

7、ems on board. While the high voltage system, under most crash situations, is likely to be protected and maintain electrical isolation from the rest of the vehicle, a rare but possible severe crash may compromise some of the safety features of the high voltage system. Due care needs to be taken when

8、working around the electrified propulsion systems and components or charging systems, regardless of their condition. Some progress has been made in educating first responders about safe procedures when working around xEVs involved in crashes. However, considerable work is needed to develop common an

9、d consistent procedures for emergency responders across the automotive industry. In addition, further effort is needed to identify and address the consequences of the new hazards associated with xEVs for second responders consisting of tow, storage, repair and salvage personnel. INTRODUCTION Recent

10、electrified product offerings by automotive manufacturers have brought renewed attention to the post-crash safety of vehicles containing high-voltage electrified powertrains. The first generation of regulations associated with the safety of xEVs was developed in the early 1990s. Regulations and stan

11、dards were put in place by both national and international regulatory bodies to service the communities and countries, where these vehicles were being introduced. Regulations and standards were developed by bodies such as the International Organization for Standards (ISO), US National Highway Traffi

12、c Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA). These initial vehicles were predominantly full battery electric vehicles (BEV), utilizing high voltage and high energy batteries that provided the single primary energy source for propulsion. Experience was gained

13、in using these standards and practices, with both the first generation of modern xEVs, which followed on approximately five years later. Hybrid electric vehicles have retained the high voltage electrical architecture of the BEVs, but utilized compact batteries with more advanced chemistries, while r

14、etaining a conventional internal combustion powertrain. This combination of features led to some initial confusion for first and second responders, in how the post-incident vehicle should be handled. SAE J2990 Issued NOV2012 Page 2 of 55 The most recent generation of xEVs has led to a renewed need f

15、or information, by first and second responders, in order to ensure their actions maintain the highest level of safety to individuals and the community. There has been a proliferation in the variety of makes, models, powertrain configurations, and electrified energy storage technologies that has come

16、 along with this new vehicle generation. A review of current regulations and standards has led to an understanding that there is an opportunity to provide a means to better coordinate and communicate those elements from many of the regulations, so that the first and second responders may apply a mor

17、e standardized execution, and be more confident in their outcome. This recommended practice provides first and second responders with the ability to identify an xEV, avoid the hazards associated with the high voltage system, communicate hazard identification to other incident responders, and manage

18、the risks in a manner consistent with best practices utilized by first responders, second responders and by the vehicle manufacturers and other responsible organizations. FORWARD The cross-functional task force examined a baseline crash scenario provided by NFPA (Reference Appendix A) involving a he

19、ad on collision on a two lane road at approximately 45 mph. The assumed vehicles were a mid-sized sport utility vehicle and a mid-size passenger vehicle. The passenger vehicle contained two occupants that needed attention. The task force contrasted the emergency response of a traditional non-xEV pas

20、senger vehicle with an xEV passenger vehicle for the same crash scenario. For the xEV scenario, the passenger vehicle was assumed to be an electric vehicle (EV). This analysis was inclusive of the first responders and second responders up to and including vehicle salvage. Several gaps were identifie

21、d in the analysis of the response scenario for the xEV and are the focus of J2990 recommendations. The gaps identified are: 1. Consistent emergency response guides (ERG) for xEVs. 2. Consistent identification of xEVs at an incident scene. 3. High voltage system disabling practice. 4. Inspection proc

22、ess post-incident to determine if vehicle poses an abnormal safety risk. 5. Tow they may or may not simultaneously remove the vehicles 12V, 12V components or other non-high voltages from the vehicle. Also consider that these other vehicle systems are simultaneously disconnected or de-energized, thes

23、e other systems may not be disconnected or de-energized in the timeframe given below for the high voltage components. To comply with this recommendation for high voltage disconnection, the following methods of initiating the disconnection are allowed (listed in order of preferred sequence): 1. Autom

24、atic shutdown of the high voltage system based on the detection of a prescribed level of vehicle impact that might damage the high voltage system or that activates the vehicles SRS. Assuming no damage to the shutdown circuits, this method should disconnect the high voltage system and discharge the p

25、ropulsion side of the automatic disconnect to less than or equal to 60 volts for DC buses or 30 volts for AC buses within the time period recommended by SAE J1766, 4.4.3.1. 2. Switching the xEVs ignition switch or power button to the OFF position and assuming no damage to the shutdown circuits or hi

26、gh voltage discharge circuits. This method should disconnect the high voltage system from the high voltage sources and discharge the high voltage system to less than or equal to 60 volts for DC buses or 30 volts for AC buses within 10 minutes of being initiated. NOTE: To prevent unintended reactivat

27、ion of the ignition switch or power button, if the vehicle has a key-FOB that could reactivate the high voltage system the FOB should be moved at least 5 meters from the vehicle. 3. Either cut or disconnect both the negative and positive 12V battery cables to discharge the 12V system and also cut or

28、 disconnect the DC/DC converters 12V output cable. Some OEM designs may not require the DC/DC cables to be cut or disconnected to disable the high voltage system and the SRS system. In these cases, only the 12V battery cable needs to be disconnected. Assuming no damage to the shutdown circuits, this

29、 method should disconnect the high voltage system from the high voltage sources and discharge the high voltage system to less than or equal to 60 volts for DC buses or 30 volts for AC buses within 10 minutes of being initiated. SAE J2990 Issued NOV2012 Page 16 of 55 DESIGN NOTE: If the OEM shutdown

30、procedure requires cutting the 12V battery cables and/or DC/DC converter cable, labels should be provided to give an indication of the cable cut location(s). DESIGN NOTE: OEMs should consider first-responder access when packaging the cables suggested to be cut or disconnected. To facilitate easy ide

31、ntification OEMs should make cut-points close to the 12V supplying components and should also label the suggested cut points or disconnection points. 4. Removing the manual disconnect (MD) should not be one of the primary methods for first responders to disable the vehicles high voltage circuits. Be

32、cause there are a variety of MD designs, as well as MD mounting locations, it is often not time efficient for first responders to locate and activate the MD. Furthermore, first responders do not always have the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) that may be required to activate the MD. Finally, the

33、 MD may not be accessible because of impact damage or because vehicle cargo may block access. 6.3.2 MD Design Considerations for First Responder If the OEM does utilize the removal of the manual disconnect as a method for first responders to disable high voltage, the following manual disconnect desi

34、gn requirements should be met: 1. Activation of the MD should not require electrical PPE (e.g., high voltage electrical gloves) although it should be designed to be accessible by a gloved hand, where glove sizes are defined in NFPA 1971: Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting

35、and Proximity Fire Fighting. 2. Activation of the MD should not expose the first responder to arch flash assuming the MD was not damaged and that the activation is performed in the correct sequence. 3. The MD should be colored orange for consistent identification across OEMs. 4. Tools should not be

36、required to access or activate, unless that tool is part of the vehicle or the MD. When a tool is required, the tool should be clearly visible near the MD or instructions provided at the MD where to locate the tool. 5. Assuming no damage to the shutdown circuits, this method should disconnect the hi

37、gh voltage system from the high voltage sources and discharge the high voltage system to less than or equal to 60 volts for DC buses or 30 volts for AC buses within 10 minutes of being initiated. 6. Due to the variety of MD designs noted above, the MD should have an illustrated label on or near the

38、MD that shows the steps for removal or disconnect. NOTE: Relative to the Manual Disconnect, to comply with the recommendations of SAE J2929, section 4.13.2 the vehicle OEM may decide to have a high voltage shutdown time of within 5 seconds of the manual disconnect being actuated. 6.3.3 MD Design Con

39、siderations for Second Responder If the OEM recommends that second responders remove the manual disconnect the following manual disconnect design requirements should be met: 1. Activation of the MD should be designed to be accessible by a hand in a leather work glove or in recommended OEM PPE. Activ

40、ation of the MD should not expose the responders to arch flash assuming the MD was not damaged and that the activation is performed in the correct sequence. 2. The MD should be colored orange for consistent identification across OEMs. 3. Non-standard tools should not be required to access or activat

41、e, unless that tool is part of the vehicle or the MD. 4. Assuming no damage to the shutdown circuits, this method should disconnect the high voltage system from the high voltage sources and discharge the high voltage system to less than or equal to 60 volts for DC buses or 30 volts for AC buses with

42、in 10 minutes of being manually initiated. SAE J2990 Issued NOV2012 Page 17 of 55 7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIGH VOLTAGE VEHICLE INSPECTION PROCESS POST-INCIDENT 7.1 Background Inspection of high voltage vehicles post-incident is necessary to ensure the high voltage electrical system has properly shut

43、down and the battery system has not been damaged. A two-stage inspection of these vehicles, one at the incident scene and a second at the storage site post incident, is recommended. At the incident scene, inspection is limited due to time constraints, accessibility and availability of high voltage p

44、ersonal protective equipment (PPE). For this reason, a series of initial inspection steps by the tow driver and / or first responders is recommended prior to removing the vehicle from the incident scene. A second inspection process is recommended once the vehicle has been delivered to a repair shop

45、or storage facility where time and resources are more readily available. The initial inspection process, described in 7.3, is to provide reasonable diagnostics to be used by first responders and tow personnel to determine if a vehicle exhibits a safety risk without the need for high voltage training

46、 or specialized tools. This initial inspection process relies on visual, audible and olfactory senses for indications of problems within the high voltage system and limits the use of specialized tools. This initial inspection should be completed at the incident scene. If possible, it is highly recom

47、mended that within 24 hours of unloading a high voltage vehicle post-incident, a second inspection, possibly requiring high voltage training and specific tools, should be completed as identified in both 7.4 and 7.5. When a damaged xEV arrives at a storage facility post incident, the vehicle should b

48、e secured in a well-ventilated and isolated storage area, as described in 7.2.2, until the vehicle has completed a full inspection and it has been determined that the high voltage system is not significantly damaged. During and after isolation, a placard or some other identifier should be placed on

49、the roof and hood of the vehicle to identify and warn others it is a high voltage vehicle with suspect damage. The OEM or responsible organization, as appropriate, should be contacted to determine additional inspection and diagnostic steps prior to removing the vehicle from isolation. 7.2 Summary 7.2.1 Potential Hazards of Damaged xEVs xEVs with damaged high voltage systems may pose hazards during transit or during storage.