REG NASA-LLIS-5256-2011 Lessons Learned JPL Emergency Response The Station Fire.pdf

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1、Public Lessons Learned Entry: 5256 Lesson Info: Lesson Number: 5256 Submitting Organization: JPL Submitted by: David Oberhettinger Subject: JPL Emergency Response: The Station Fire Abstract: The largest fire in the recorded history of Los Angeles County, the August 2009 Station Fire burned to within

2、 one meter of the JPL perimeter and closed the Laboratory. Due to planning and effective leadership by JPL management and JPL incident response teams, the Laboratory came out nearly unscathed, but JPLs vulnerability to natural disasters mandates further improvements. Description of Driving Event: Th

3、e Station Fire ignited in the Angeles National Forest 3 to 4 miles northwest of the NASA/Caltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) on the afternoon of Wednesday, August 26, 2009. The largest fire in the recorded history of Los Angeles County, the flames consumed 160,000 acres. During August 27 and 28,

4、 the fire continued to grow and move toward JPL (Figures 1 and 2) through extremely steep and inaccessible terrain (Figure 3), and approached within one meter of the JPL perimeter. Friday was a non-workday for 75% of JPL personnel; the JPL Management Operation Committee (MOC) decided to close JPL to

5、 non mission-critical personnel over the weekend and to activate the JPL Emergency Operations Center (EOC). By August 30, the flames moved to the west and east and no longer posed an imminent threat to JPL, although the air quality ranged from “unhealthy” to “hazardous.“ JPL remained closed on the M

6、onday, August 31 workday, and reopened for normal operations on September 1. Figure 1. The Station Fire grew in size and intensity while moving south toward JPL. Figure 2. Detail from Figure 1 showing the JPL campus. JPL was well prepared for the Station Fire, having made steady progress in developi

7、ng emergency response protocols and processes over several prior years. Fortuitously, JPL preparedness was enhanced because JPL had spent the prior 3 months planning a full scale exercise with a wildfire scenario that was scheduled to be held on September 10. Also, there were no launches or special

8、mission-critical activities scheduled when the fire broke out. No JPL personnel were injured by the fire, and the impact to Laboratory facilities and activities was minimal. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Figure 3. The JPL Fire Depar

9、tment supported over 190 fire fighting helicopter sorties from the Labs Mesa helipad. Reference (1) documents lessons learned from the JPL response to the Station Fire emergency. The following JPL measures worked well: The JPL leadership, the JPL Facilities Maintenance training and provisioning for

10、sustained operations; EOC documentation (development of Incident Action Plans and tracking of “tickets”/calls), and better coordination with federal agencies. Continuous Lab-wide fire prevention and mitigation measures. References: 1. Regina Phelps, “Jet Propulsion Laboratory Station Fire After-Acti

11、on Report,” November 4, 2009. 2. “Station Fire After-Action Report Recommendations,” October 20, 2009. 3. “Multihazard Emergency Response Plan, Rev. 4,” JPL Document No. DocID 28012, February 8, 2008. Lesson(s) Learned: Considering the scale, proximity, and ferocity (Figures 4 and 5) of the Station

12、Fire, JPL came out with only minor damage. This was due to planning and effective leadership by JPL, but also due to external factors such as the massive state/local response, fortuitous timing, and the absence of strong winds. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted wit

13、hout license from IHS-,-,-spacespace Figures 4 developing a written EOC Incident Action Plan (IAP) for each operational period; and stocking special supplies such as satellite radios, battery powered TVs, direct outside landlines, and portable HEPA filters. o Assess the adequacy of the EOC to meet f

14、uture emergency response needs, including facility location, size, configuration, and equipment colocation. o Enhance and improve emergency communications (e.g., processes, equipment, directories, communications templates, use of social media) for use within the EOC and for communicating to outside

15、stakeholders and the external media. 2. Improve field response performance and safety: o Enhance field response support (i.e., logistic support, field communications, on-Lab reporting and tracking, provision of safety officer position) for all field responders including fire, safety, facilities, and

16、 USAR. o USAR team improvements, including a plan and logistic support for sustained operations, pre-determined meeting locations, evaluation of personal protective equipment and specialized USAR equipment, review of check-in and check-out procedures, and assessment of team training based on the fir

17、e experience. 3. Clarify the definition of “mission-critical personnel,“ and communicate to staff which personnel are mission-critical. Empower the staff who must be present during emergencies, and develop Human Resource policies for the staff who may not be working during the incident. 4. Develop a

18、n on-going fire prevention and mitigation planning program, including such ongoing fire prevention measures as roof and gutter cleaning, and review of fire suppression products. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Reference (2) tracks JPL

19、 progress in implementing the recommendations of Reference (1). Emergency response measures are also captured in Reference (3). Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: JPL is implementing the recommendations of Reference (1) in accordance with the schedule provided in Reference (2), and JPL wi

20、ll continue to upgrade its incident response capabilities. Documents Related to Lesson: NFPA 1600: Standard On Disaster/Emergency Management And Business Continuity Programs, National Fire Protection Association, 2010. BS 25999-1:2006, Business Continuity Management. Code of Practice, British Standa

21、rds Institution BS 25999-2:2007 Specification for Business Continuity Management, British Standards Institution Mission Directorate(s): N/A Additional Key Phrase(s): N/A Additional Info: Project: N/A Approval Info: Approval Date: 2011-02-10 Approval Name: mbell Approval Organization: HQ Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-