ASME FORGING A NEW NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT-2013 Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct - WORKSHOP SUMMARY《锻造新的核安全建设 研讨会摘要》.pdf

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1、WORKSHOP SUMMARYDecember 45, 2012Willard InterContinental HotelWashington, DC Forging a New NuclearSafety ConstructForging a New Nuclear Safety Construct Workshop Summary Convened December 4-5, 2012 Willard Intercontinental Hotel Washington, DC Prepared by: The ASME Presidential Task Force on Respon

2、se to Japan Nuclear Power Plant Events ii Date of Issuance: February 21, 2013 This Workshop Summary report was prepared for the workshop convened by the ASME Presidential Task Force on Response to Japan Nuclear Power Plant Events. Neither ASME, the authors, nor others involved in the preparation or

3、review of this report, nor any of their respective employees, members or persons acting on their behalf (i) makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclose

4、d, or (ii) represents that its use would not infringe upon privately owned rights. ASME does not “approve,” “rate,” or “endorse” any item, construction, proprietary device or activity. Reference in the report to any particular commercial product, process or service by trade name, trademark, manufact

5、urer or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by ASME or others involved in the preparation or review of this report. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect those of ASME or others involved in the preparation

6、 or review of this report. ASME is the registered trademark of The American Society of Mechanical Engineers. No part of this document may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The American Society of Mechanic

7、al Engineers Two Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5990 ISBN No. 978-0-7918-6873-7 Copyright 2013 by THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS All Rights ReservedForging a New Nuclear Safety Construct: Workshop Summary iii ASME PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE MEMBERS Chairman Nils J. Diaz Vice Chairman Reg

8、is A. Matzie Kenneth R. Balkey John D. Bendo John C. Devine Jr. Romney B. Duffey Robert W. Evans Thomas R. Hafera James A. Lake David E. W. Leaver Robert Lutz, Jr. Roger J. Mattson Richard R. Schultz J. Robert Sims Douglas E. True John M. Tuohy Jr. Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct: Workshop Su

9、mmary iv TABLE OF CONTENTS BACKGROUND 1 WORKSHOP SUMMARY 5 Plenary Panel Working Session 1 The Development and Implementation of a New Nuclear Safety Construct . 5 Breakout Session 1 - Extending and Standardizing the Design Basis for Severe Events . 5 Breakout Session 2 - The Role of Risk-Informed R

10、egulation and an All-Risk Approach . 6 Breakout Session 3 Accident Management then additional prevention measures from the post-9/11 (September 11, 2001) equipment and accident management improvements; plus the difference in inherent safety features of new reactors; then the safety improvements from

11、 the international regulatory and industry post-Fukushima efforts; and, finally, an additional level of coordinated systems to address requirements for avoiding disruption of society. One of the critical issues to be resolved for achieving an effective safety construct is the important role that reg

12、ulatory authorities will play in resolution of the extended safety basis emerging after Fukushima, and the role of industry in implementing additional safety requirements that satisfy the goal of societal protection. These improvements require coordinated efforts of regulatory authorities, plant own

13、ers-operators and other industry stakeholders, with industry taking a leadership role. Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct: Workshop Summary 3 Figure 1 - Relationship of the New Nuclear Safety Construct to Existing must think of multiple units at a site. o Emergency drills should cover all levels

14、 of decision-making. o Drills/training need to be more realistic (e.g., event sequences and timelines). Need integration of in-plant EP exercises with broader stakeholder exercises. Need to consider full scale simulators and training centers in a collaborative, perhaps global manner. o Public commun

15、ication should be prompt, understandable (layman terms) and not limited to public notification and information. Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct: Workshop Summary 8 Linear No Threshold Model (LNT) o Research on the science of low level radiation effects should continue, even though it will be

16、difficult to definitively resolve the LNT issue due to the complexity of the problem. o The global nuclear industry needs to better understand and quantify the socio-political and economic impacts of LNT in order to achieve an appropriate balance between costs and benefits, similar to ALARA (As Low

17、As Reasonably Achievable). o Top industry leaders need to communicate to the public with a consistent global message and terminology, putting the risk from dose in a relative measure that people can easily understand (e.g., reduction of life expectancy, or dose equivalent to flying across country).

18、Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Size basis o Does the basis of EPZ sizing need to be revisited? Assumptions and data may not be up to date. EPZ size and basis are different from one country to the next. Breakout Session 5 Public Trust This session identified and discussed the factors that engender pub

19、lic trust and the actions that can be taken to achieve it, in particular the importance of effective communications between the technical community and the general public both for everyday occurrences and during accidents. Summary of key points: Socio-political consequences of accidents are a functi

20、on of the event, but are no less determined by the perception of the event by the public. People struggle to trust something they dont understand. Must do a better job educating the public to improve science and technology literacy. Need to establish a coordinated effort to upgrade school science ed

21、ucation to ensure we are on a path to having an informed public. People must trust the people designing, building, and operating the technology and the regulator that monitors it. In working with journalists, recognize that they rarely understand the science and are typically skeptical. It is import

22、ant to build lines of communication and trust prior to a crisis. Need to communicate early and frequently, not just during an emergency. Dont want the first encounter with stakeholders, particularly media/policy makers to be during a crisis. Need to repeat a message many times. It helps to have a te

23、am of communicators and third parties available. Need to have a crisis communication plan. In this time of 24/7 news coverage, the media wants continuous coverage during a crisis, even when it is not easy to discern what is actually happening. This leads to speculation. Companies are often reluctant

24、 to allow individual contributors to speak with the media, so the media may go to more questionable sources. As a result, industry losses control of the message. During a crisis, spokespeople must speak clearly using language and terminology the average person can understand. This is a challenge for

25、 engineers. Do not use industry terminology/semantics/slang that may be common within the industry, but is unknown by the general public. Recognize the need to talk with empathy and to multiple types of audiences in a crisis. Need to establish and disseminate the value proposition for nuclear power

26、globally, including safe and reliable power, environmental friendliness, etc. Use social media as a modern and effective communications tool. Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct: Workshop Summary 9 Plenary Panel Working Session 2 The Globalization of the New Nuclear Safety Construct This session

27、addressed the challenge of achieving consistent application of the proposed New Nuclear Safety Construct, worldwide. Discussions covered principles, priorities, prospective approaches, and initial steps. Summary of key points: Strengthen the roles of international organizations like the World Associ

28、ation of Nuclear Operators (WANO). Recognize the importance of regional requirements one size will not fit all. Need agreement at highest levels on shared safety goals and seeking harmonized safety levels. Utilize more extensively periodic safety reviews and strengthen peer reviews. Global support s

29、ystems (e.g., a global accident response/assistance system) are very important, but we need to be mindful of their limitations, e.g., language barriers, lack of information sharing protocols, authorization to release on-site information, etc. We should be mapping all the technical elements contained

30、 in the New Nuclear Safety Construct to the existing framework of standards and regulations to show what the baseline is and then build from there. We should identify points of tangency with other safety improvement initiatives already underway, e.g., in Europe, the U.S. and Asia, and then develop s

31、ub-groups aimed at the major NNSC recommendations. How are we going to come to agreement on what are “good practices” that go beyond existing regulations? Form an International Steering Committee o Determine what role global organizations should play in the development of the NNSC. o Inventory nucle

32、ar safety improvement activities already underway by other organizations, regulators, operating groups, etc. o Seek sponsorship from organizations and groups to help defray the expenses of developing and implementing the NNSC Convene a planning workshop with the other organizations identified to des

33、ign a worldwide implementation plan for the NNSC. Evaluate participation of the ASME Task Force members in post workshop activities to carry forward with the proposed work establish roles and responsibilities for ongoing work. At the conclusion of the workshop, the task force developed a near-term a

34、ction plan with the following actions confirmed: Speaker presentations would be compiled and posted on the ASME website (for those with speaker consent) for participants to view. The presentations are available at: http:/events.asme.org/NuclearSafetyConstructWorkshop/ A summary report would be devel

35、oped and distributed to workshop participants The task force would evaluate the discussions from each session and would provide a summary of the most important topics and focus in on several urgent actions (next steps) to be considered by the global nuclear community. Once the priorities are establi

36、shed, engage cognizant individuals or organizations to coordinate the development of implementation plans and schedules. Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct: Workshop Summary 10 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADVANCING THE NEW NUCLEAR SAFETY CONSTRUCT The governing principle supporting the global implementa

37、tion of the NNSC is that it must be led by the nuclear industry, a principle supported by a consensus of interested participants in the Workshop. It is essential that global nuclear utilities and plant owners be major motivators for the process and program going forward. They have the responsibility

38、 for the safety and reliability of their nuclear plants, and for the cost of NNSC implementation. A small yet inclusive international steering committee is needed soon to establish the path forward, focusing on a global agreement to improve the safety of nuclear reactors, both currently operating an

39、d those to be built. Safety is now inclusive of protection of public health and safety and the environment, and protection of society and socio-political and economic impacts. The majority of respondents to the ASME workshop held in December 2012 suggested that a highly regarded international organi

40、zation strongly tied to power companies or a large power company itself would be a good candidate to take lead responsibility for implementing the NNSC initiative, while stressing the importance of advisory participation from regulators and cognizant international agencies. Potential members of the

41、international steering committee are: WANO and selected influential utilities (e.g., Electricite de France, Korea Electric Power Company, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Exelon, etc.) and/or representatives of major utility associations (Nuclear Energy Institute, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Institu

42、te of Nuclear Power Operations, Owners Groups) with an advisory group representing regulatory bodies, international nuclear agencies (Nuclear Energy Agency within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - OECD/NEA, IAEA), and nuclear reactor vendors. Vendors need to participate be

43、cause there will be significant design issues to be addressed as part of the actions that will likely come out of the NNSC, particularly for operating reactors. The participation of regulators in an advisory capacity has to be considered as a priority. They should be involved so that they are fully

44、and currently informed of the efforts of the industry, and could provide important feedback to the efforts. Because of the potentially large number of candidate members of the international steering committee, it may be necessary to have focused sub-committees, e.g., regulators, vendors, etc., that

45、will provide their collective input to the steering committee. Some of the first activities that the steering committee might undertake are: Converge on overriding goals, objectives, and common terminology, definition and metrics. Over the longer term, it is important to strive for harmonization of

46、processes and activities. Identify, categorize and understand initiatives already underway by various international groups to address enhanced nuclear power safety. Determine the feasibility of incorporating these initiatives in the NNSC. The goal is to arrive at a global consensus on a consistent a

47、pproach to safety improvements, with overall benefits on reliability, cost considerations, and societal recognition. Define the components of NNSC, which will be subject to implementation steps. These will likely include design issues, technical issues, procedural issues, training issues, etc., and

48、communication approaches to inform a wide range of audiences. From that list, prioritize and Forging a New Nuclear Safety Construct: Workshop Summary 11 identify targets for initial implementation. There is a need to make sure the most important ones are undertaken first. These activities must not d

49、istract from normal safe plant operation. The goal is to demonstrate success via ongoing tangible achievement. Develop a detailed plan and schedule for the first year of implementation. Convene a planning workshop led by the steering committee and supplemented by other key stakeholders. Define an implementation concept for the New Nuclear Safety Construct, including the roles of the various stakeholders, including ASME. Agree on the funding mechanism or approach for moving the New Nuclear Safety C