UFC 4-023-07-2008 DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS EFFECTS《抵抗火力武器直接伤害的设计》.pdf

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1、 UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2008 UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS EFFECTS APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2008 UNIFIED FACILITIES C

2、RITERIA (UFC) DESIGN TO RESIST DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS EFFECTS Any copyrighted material included in this UFC is identified at its point of use. Use of the copyrighted material apart from this UFC must have the permission of the copyright holder. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING

3、COMMAND (Preparing Activity) AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT AGENCY Record of Changes (changes are indicated by 1 . /1/) Change No. Date Location Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2008 FOREWORD The Unified Facilitie

4、s Criteria (UFC) system is prescribed by MIL-STD 3007 and provides planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization criteria, and applies to the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities in accordance with USD(AT therefore, it provides guidan

5、ce on how to implement those criteria for direct fire weapons threats. 1-6 DESIGN PROCESS. Design criteria will commonly include multiple tactics against which assets are to be protected. Because of the complexity of the interrelationships among countermeasures designed to address different tactics,

6、 the design process needs to address the integration of the countermeasures in the overall protective system. The DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual, UFC 4-020-02, was established for that purpose. It provides a preliminary design level treatment of all of the tactics and how to accom

7、plish the necessary integration. This UFC is designed to supplement UFC 4-020-02 to provide for final design level treatment of the direct fire weapons tactic. 1-7 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES. This UFC is one of a series of security engineering unified facilities criteria documents that cover mi

8、nimum standards, planning, preliminary design, and detailed design for security and antiterrorism. The manuals in this series are designed for a diverse audience to facilitate development of projects throughout the design cycle. The manuals in this series include the following: 1-7.1 DoD Minimum Ant

9、iterrorism Standards for Buildings. UFC 4-010-01 and UFC 4-010-02 establish standards that provide minimum levels of protection against terrorist attacks for the occupants of all DoD inhabited buildings. Those UFC are for use by security and antiterrorism personnel and design teams to identify the m

10、inimum requirements that must be incorporated into the design of all new construction and major renovations of inhabited DoD buildings. They also include recommendations that should be, but are not required to be incorporated into all such buildings. 1-7.2 DoD Security Engineering Facilities Plannin

11、g Manual. UFC 4-020-01 presents processes for developing the design criteria necessary to incorporate security and antiterrorism into DoD facilities and for identifying the cost 1-3Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2

12、008 implications of applying those design criteria. Those design criteria may be limited to the requirements of the minimum standards, or they may include protection of assets other than those addressed in the minimum standards (people), aggressor tactics that are not addressed in the minimum standa

13、rds, or levels of protection beyond those required by the minimum standards. The cost implications for security and antiterrorism are addressed as cost increases over conventional construction for common construction types. The construction components represented by those cost increases are tabulate

14、d for reference, but they represent only representative construction that will meet the requirements of the design criteria and should not be construed to limit designers options for providing required levels of protection. The manual also includes a means to assess the tradeoffs between cost and ri

15、sk. UFC 4-020-01 is for use by planners as well as security and antiterrorism personnel with support from planning team members. 1-7.3 DoD Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual. UFC 4-020-02 provides interdisciplinary design guidance for developing preliminary systems of countermeasures to i

16、mplement the design criteria established using UFC 4-020-01. Those countermeasures include building and site elements, equipment, and the supporting manpower and procedures necessary to make them all work as a system. The information in UFC 4-020-02 provides sufficient detail to support concept leve

17、l project development, and as such can provide a good basis for a more detailed design. The manual also provides a process for assessing the impact of countermeasures on risk. The primary audience for the reference UFC 4-020-02 is the design team, but it will also be useful to security and antiterro

18、rism personnel. 1-7.4 Security Engineering Support Manuals. In addition to the standards, planning, and design UFC mentioned above, there is a series of additional UFC that provide detailed design guidance for developing final designs based on the preliminary designs developed using UFC 4-020-02. Th

19、ese support manuals, of which this UFC is one, provide specialized, discipline specific design guidance. Some address specific tactics such as direct fire weapons, forced entry, or airborne contamination. Others address limited aspects of design such as resistance to progressive collapse or design o

20、f portions of buildings such as mailrooms. Still others address details of designs for specific countermeasures such as vehicle barriers or fences. The Security Engineering Support Manuals are intended for use by the design team during the development of design packages. 1-4Provided by IHSNot for Re

21、saleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2008 CHAPTER 2: DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS PROPERTIES 2-1 INTRODUCTION. Direct fire weapons threats involve weapons that require an unobstructed line-of-sight from the weapon to a target, for the shooter to acquire

22、 a target, and for the projectile to arrive at a target. Direct fire threat weapons include both ballistic and rocket propelled munitions. In a ballistic threat, the aggressor fires small arms such as pistols, submachine guns, shotguns, or rifles. Anti-tank (AT) weapons are military weapons or simil

23、ar improvised weapons originally designed to penetrate the armor on armored vehicles. They can also be fired at facilities, which are the focus of this UFC. 2-2 THREAT LEVELS. Table 2-1 shows the four threat severity levels associated with the direct fire weapons tactic in UFC 4-020-01. These threat

24、s provide representative weapons and munitions to the variety of direct fire weapons that can be expected to be used against people and facilities in criminal and terrorist attacks. There are more severe threats, but they are considered at this time to be less likely to be used by criminals and terr

25、orists. The effective ranges of the weapons at which aggressors could be expected to accurately target person sized targets are entered for use in identifying relevant vantage points as described in Chapter 4. Of the ballistic threats in Table 2-1, the weapon associated with the low threat severity

26、level is a handgun. The weapons for the higher threat severity levels are all rifles. Rounds include ball type and armor piercing ammunition. Refer to Appendix A for specific rounds. The anti-tank weapon is representative of a range of shoulder fired rocket propelled projectile weapons including the

27、 United States M-72 and the Russian RPG-7, RPG-18, and RPG-22. Table 2-1. Threat Parameters Design Basis Threat Weapons / Standards Effective Range Very High Anti-tank weapons ANSI/UL 752 Level 10 (12.7 mm / .50 caliber) AT Weapon: 300 meters .50 Caliber: 2000 meters High ANSI/UL 752 Level 9 (.30 ca

28、liber Armor Piercing) 800 meters Medium ANSI/UL 752 Level 5 (7.62 mm / .308 caliber) 1000 meters Low ANSI/UL 752 Level 3 (.44 caliber Magnum) 100 meters 2-1Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2008 2-3 BALLISTIC THREATS

29、. Ballistic threats are described in terms of ballistic standards developed for testing the resistance of building components to ballistic threats. These standards provide criteria to evaluate the performance of materials or systems. Test standards specify caliber, weight, projectile composition, mu

30、zzle velocity of the round, number of impacts, and spacing of impacts. They also define what constitutes failure of the building component. 2-3.1 U.S Standards. There are several recognized ballistic standards in the United States and other countries. There are many similarities among the standards,

31、 but their differences make them so they are not interchangeable. The most common commercial standards in the United States are American National Standards Institute (ANSI) / Underwriters Laboratories (UL) 752 and National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 0108.01. Additionally, there is the ASTM Internati

32、onal F 1233 standard, although it is limited to security glazing materials and systems. The three standards are mostly based on the same weapons and rounds. The ballistic threats referenced in this UFC are from the ANSI/UL 752. Two additional U.S. standards are by the U.S. Department of State and H.

33、P. White Laboratories. Those standards are not widely used commercially. Appendix A lists all of the major national and international standards and their most common parameters. For a more detailed listing of the parameters of the standards in Table 2-1, refer to Table X1.1 in ASTM F 1233. 2-3.2 Non

34、-U.S. Standards. There are several standards available from other countries. They include Australian, British, European, and German standards. All are summarized in Appendix A and are covered in more detail in Table X1.1 in ASTM F 1233. 2-4 ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS. The anti-tank weapon threa

35、ts addressed in this document are shoulder-fired weapons consisting of two components, the launcher and projectile. The projectile consists of an explosive warhead affixed to a solid fuel rocket motor. There are several types of warheads used in these weapons, but this document only addresses the ar

36、mor penetrating warheads. They are the most common and represent the greatest challenge in designing countermeasures to mitigate this threat. This document also will not address multiple stage or delayed fuse warheads that are available for these weapons due to their limited availability. While the

37、details of the specific projectiles and weapons differ, they all have similar operating mechanisms, which are summarized below. 2-4.1 Projectile. The projectile (rocket motor and warhead) is fired from a light hand-held, shoulder fired launcher. When fired, the projectile leaves the launch tube and

38、is propelled to the target by the rocket motor. When the projectile impacts the target, a fuse sends a signal to the detonator, which detonates the warhead. 2-2Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2008 2-4.2 Warhead. Th

39、e warhead incorporates a conical metal shaped charge (often copper lined) with high explosive packed behind it. See figure 2-1. On detonation, the material of the inner lining of the cone of the shaped charge collapses and forms a molten metallic “slug”. The explosive gasses and the molten metallic

40、slug together form a high velocity jet (on the order of 10,000 meters per second or 33,000 feet per second). As the gas and molten metallic jet begin to penetrate a target material, the pressure exerted by the jet tip pushes the material away in all directions, eventually driving through the target

41、material. In addition, the force of the penetration of the jet causes the inside face of the target to fracture, and it is propelled into the protected space at high velocity. That effect is called “spall.” The penetration effect of a conical shaped charge is illustrated in Figure 2-2. The kinetic e

42、nergy of the warhead will allow it to penetrate 24 to 32 inches of reinforced concrete, depending on the weapon. Note that anti-tank weapons are designed to “poke” holes in armor, and they have similar narrowly focused effects on buildings as shown in Figure 2-3. Once the jet passes through a wall,

43、it maintains its narrowly focused effects Figure 2-1. Representative Anti-tank Round Cross-Section Fuse High explosive Conical shaped charge liner Rocket propellant Figure 2-2. Shaped Charge Penetration 2-3Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-

44、,-,-UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2008 Figure 2-3. Shaped Charge Penetration of Masonry 2-4.3 Older Warheads. Some older warheads for some of the commonly available shoulder fired anti-tank weapons had design configurations in which the wires extending from the fuses to the detonators could be severed when th

45、e warheads were forced through a wire mesh or a chain-link fence. That resulted in the warhead being rendered inert, which is often called “dudding.” Because there are available warheads that do not have that design vulnerability and because the process described above is not very reliable, the whol

46、e issue of dudding anti-tank rounds will not be addressed in this UFC. 2-4Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-023-07 7 July 2008 CHAPTER 3: DESIGN APPROACH 3-1 INTRODUCTION. This chapter describes the approach to developing systems

47、of countermeasures to mitigate the effects of direct fire weapons attacks. 3-2 DESIGN STRATEGIES. In approaching solutions to any security engineering related threat, there are two applicable strategies, the general design strategy and the specific design strategy. The general design strategy is the

48、 basic approach to developing a protective system to mitigate the effects a given tactic. It governs the general application of construction, building support systems, equipment, manpower, and procedures. The specific design strategy governs how the general design strategy is applied for different l

49、evels of protection. The specific design strategies address the different performances required by the levels of protection. The general design strategy and the specific design strategies for direct fire weapons will be described below. 3-2.1 General Design Strategy. The general design strategy involves identifying vantage points from which direct fir