REG NASA-LLIS-0128-1992 Lessons Learned - Main Landing Gear (MLG) Tire Rupture During Postlanding Operations.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 0128Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 0128a71 Lesson Date: 1992-08-26a71 Submitting Organization: KSCa71 Submitted by: Lisa L. MusgraveSubject: Main Landing Gear (MLG) Tire Rupture During Postlanding Operations Description of Driving Event: MLG tire heat generated from max. Braki

2、ng due to a crosswind landing, heavy orbiter, or long landing, could cause a transfer of heat to continue to the MLG tires after wheel stop, resulting in a delayed tire blowout. An explosive tire rupture caused by increasing tire pressure, cuts, excessive loading, or skidding could injure personnel

3、and/or damage the orbiter/chassis hydraulic system/ground support equipment. Three thermal relief plugs in each MLG tire prevent tire overpressurization, the orbiter anti-skid/brake control system prevents locked brakes, and the orbiter hydraulic system displacement limiter limits hydraulic fluid lo

4、ss.Lesson(s) Learned: 1. Transfer of heat from brakes to the MLG tires after maximum braking could increase tire pressure and result in rupture/blowout.2. Excessive tire wear due to maximum braking or FOD may reduce strength of tire structure and cause rise in tire pressure, resulting in rupture.3.

5、Hydraulic fluid leakage in the hot wheel well area may ignite and cause orbiter damage and/or personnel injury.Recommendation(s): 1. To minimize possibility of improper braking, provide crew training with braking techniques for various landing profiles.2. Prior to orbiter leaving the OPF, perform an

6、ti-skid brake inspections and check electrical Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-power/pedal calibration integrity and hydraulic control valves.3. A fire fighting capability is mandatory at all planned landing sites should a hydraulic f

7、ire occur after wheel stop.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Space Operationsa71 Exploration SystemsAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Fire Protectiona71 Flight Equipmenta71 Ground OperationsAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 1994-06-15a71 Approval Name: James G. Klinea71 Approval Organization: KSC/HEIa71 Approval Phone Number: 407-867-7614Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-