EN 419251-2-2013 en Security requirements for device for authentication - Part 2 Protection profile for extension for trusted channel to certificate generation application《身份验证用装置的.pdf

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1、raising standards worldwideNO COPYING WITHOUT BSI PERMISSION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY COPYRIGHT LAWBSI Standards PublicationBS EN 419251-2:2013Security requirements for device for authenticationPart 2: Protection profile for extension for trusted channel to certificate generation applicationBS EN 4192

2、51-2:2013 BRITISH STANDARDNational forewordThis British Standard is the UK implementation of EN 419251-2:2013. The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to T e c h n i c a l Committee IST/17, Cards and personal identification.A list of organizations represented on this committee can be o

3、btained on request to its secretary.This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Users are responsible for its correct application. The British Standards Institution 2013. Published by BSI Standards Limited 2013.ISBN 978 0 580 74077 0 ICS 35.240.15 Complia

4、nce with a British Standard cannot confer immunityfrom legal obligations.This British Standard was published under the authority of the Standards Policy and Strategy Committee on 30 April 2013.Amendments issued since publicationDate T e x t a f f e c t e dBS EN 419251-2:2013EUROPEAN STANDARD NORME E

5、UROPENNE EUROPISCHE NORM EN 419251-2 March 2013 ICS 35.240.15 English Version Security requirements for device for authentication - Part 2: Protection profile for extension for trusted channel to certificate generation application Profils de protection pour dispositif dauthentification - Partie 2: D

6、ispositf avec import de cl, gnration de cl et administration; Communication scurise vers lapplication de gnration de certificats et lapplication dadministrationSicherheitsanforderungen fr Gerte zur Authentisierung - Teil 2: Schutzprofil fr Erweiterung fr vertrauenswrdigen Kanal zur Zertifikaterzeugu

7、ngsanwendung This European Standard was approved by CEN on 7 December 2012. CEN members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration. Up-to-date lists and biblio

8、graphical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre or to any CEN member. This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation under the responsi

9、bility of a CEN member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the same status as the official versions. CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republ

10、ic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION COMIT EUROPEN DE NORMALI

11、SATION EUROPISCHES KOMITEE FR NORMUNG Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels 2013 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members. Ref. No. EN 419251-2:2013: EBS EN 419251-2:2013EN 419251-2:2013 (E) 2 Contents Page Foreword . 5 1

12、Scope 6 2 Normative references . 6 3 Conformance 6 3.1 CC Conformance Claim . 6 3.2 PP Claim . 6 3.3 Package Claim 6 3.4 Conformance Rationale . 6 3.5 Conformance Statement 6 4 Terms and definitions 7 5 Symbols and abbreviations . 9 6 Overview of the target of evaluation . 9 6.1 TOE Type 9 6.2 TOE U

13、sage 9 6.3 Security Features of the TOE . 9 6.4 Examples of applications. 11 6.4.1 E-government . 11 6.4.2 Multiple applications 11 6.5 Required non-TOE Hardware and Software 12 6.6 Protection Profile Usage 12 7 TOE Environment . 13 7.1 Overall view 13 7.2 Personalisation application . 14 7.2.1 Gene

14、ral . 14 7.2.2 Functionalities 14 7.2.3 Communication 14 7.3 Administration application 15 7.3.1 General . 15 7.3.2 Functionalities 15 7.3.3 Communication 15 7.4 Authentication application . 16 7.4.1 General . 16 7.4.2 Functionalities 16 7.4.3 Communication 16 7.5 Verifier 17 7.5.1 Functionalities 1

15、7 7.5.2 Communication 17 7.6 Key Generator 17 7.6.1 Functionalities 17 7.6.2 Communication 17 7.7 Certification Authority 18 7.7.1 Functionalities 18 7.7.2 Communication 18 8 Life Cycle 19 8.1 Overview . 19 8.2 Pre-Personalisation phase . 20 8.3 Personalisation phase . 20 8.3.1 General . 20 BS EN 41

16、9251-2:2013EN 419251-2:2013 (E) 3 8.3.2 Personalisation application . 21 8.4 Usage phase . 21 8.4.1 Authentication application . 21 8.4.2 Administration application . 22 8.4.3 Verifier 23 9 Security problem definition . 23 9.1 Assets . 23 9.1.1 General . 23 9.1.2 Assets protected by the TOE . 23 9.1

17、.3 Sensitive assets of the TOE . 23 9.2 Users . 24 9.3 Threats 25 9.4 Organisational security policies 27 9.4.1 Provided services . 27 9.4.2 Other services 27 9.5 Assumptions 28 10 Security objectives . 29 10.1 General . 29 10.2 Security objectives for the TOE . 29 10.2.1 Provided service . 29 10.2.

18、2 Authentication to the TOE 29 10.2.3 TOE management . 30 10.3 Security objectives for the operational environment 31 10.4 Rationale for Security objectives . 33 11 Extended component definition Definition of the Family FCS_RNG . 38 12 Security requirements 39 12.1 General . 39 12.2 Introduction 40

19、12.2.1 Subjects Objects and security attributes 40 12.2.2 Operations 40 12.3 Security functional requirements 41 12.3.1 General . 41 12.3.2 Core 41 12.3.3 KeyImp 49 12.3.4 KeyGen . 52 12.3.5 Admin 55 12.3.6 Untrusted CA 59 12.3.7 Untrusted AdminAppli 60 12.4 Security assurance requirements 61 12.5 S

20、FR / Security objectives . 61 12.6 SFR Dependencies . 67 12.7 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements 69 Bibliography 70 Index 71 Figures Figure 1 TOE Security Features 13 Figure 2 Personalisation application environment 14 Figure 3 Administration application environment 15 Figure 4 Authentication

21、application environment 16 Figure 5 TOE Life Cycle 19 BS EN 419251-2:2013EN 419251-2:2013 (E) 4 Tables Table 1 protection of sensitive data 29 Table 2 Security objectives vs problem definition rationale 34 Table 3 Security attributes 40 Table 4 Core security attributes 44 Table 5 Core operations . 4

22、4 Table 6 Core security attributes - operation. 46 Table 7 Core security attributes - initial value 46 Table 8 Core security attributes updates 47 Table 9 TSF data updates . 47 Table 10 KeyImp security attributes 49 Table 11 KeyImp security attributes - operations . 50 Table 12 KeyImp security attri

23、butes update authorised roles 51 Table 13 KeyImp security attributes update values 52 Table 14 KeyGen operations 53 Table 15 KeyGen security attributes . 53 Table 16 KeyGen operation rules . 54 Table 17 KeyGen security attributes update authorised roles . 54 Table 18 KeyGen security attributes initi

24、al values 55 Table 19 KeyGen security attributes update values 55 Table 20 Admin security attributes update authorised roles 58 Table 21 Admin security attributes initial values . 58 Table 22 Admin security attributes update values 58 Table 23 Admin TSF data operations . 59 Table 24 SFR vs Security

25、objectives rationale 62 Table 25 SFR dependencies 67 BS EN 419251-2:2013EN 419251-2:2013 (E) 5 Foreword This document (EN 419251-2:2013) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 224 “Personal identification, electronic signature and cards and their related systems and operations”, the secreta

26、riat of which is held by AFNOR. This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by September 2013, and conflicting national standards shall be withdrawn at the latest by September 2013. Attention is

27、drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN and/or CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. EN 419251 contains the following parts: EN 419251-1, Security requirements for device for authentic

28、ation Part 1: Protection profile for core functionality; EN 419251-2, Security requirements for device for authentication Part 2: Protection profile for extension for trusted channel to certificate generation application (the present document); EN 419251-3, Security requirements for device for authe

29、ntication Part 3: Additional functionality for security targets. The present document was submitted to the Enquiry under the reference prEN 16248-2. According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the following countries are bound to implement this European

30、 Standard: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sloveni

31、a, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. BS EN 419251-2:2013EN 419251-2:2013 (E) 6 1 Scope This European Standard is a Protection Profile that defines the security requirements for an authentication device. 2 Normative references The following documents, in whole or in part, are

32、 normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996, Information technology Open System

33、s Interconnection Security frameworks for open systems: Authentication framework ISO/IEC 15408-1:20091), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 1: Introduction and general model ISO/IEC 15408-21), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation crit

34、eria for IT security Part 2: Security functional components ISO/IEC 15408-31), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 3: Security assurance components ISO/IEC 18045, Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT security evaluation 3 Confo

35、rmance 3.1 CC Conformance Claim This Protection Profile (PP) is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant and written according to ISO/IEC 15408-1, -2, -3 and ISO/IEC 18045. 3.2 PP Claim This PP does not claim conformance to any other Protection Profile. 3.3 Package Claim The evaluation assurance

36、level for this PP is EAL4-augmented with the assurance components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2. 3.4 Conformance Rationale Since this PP is not claiming conformance to any other protection profile, no rationale is necessary here. 3.5 Conformance Statement The conformance required by this PP is the demonst

37、rable-PP conformance. This would facilitate conformance claim to both the PP “Authentication device” and other PPs for Security Target (ST) authors. 1) ISO/IEC 15408-1, -2 and -3 respectively correspond to Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts 1, 2 and 3. BS EN 419251

38、-2:2013EN 419251-2:2013 (E) 7 4 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. 4.1 Administrator person who is allowed administration operations on the authentication device Note 1 to entry: See 9.2 for more details. 4.2 Authentication Protocol se

39、nsitive data data used in the process of authentication of the TOE by the external entity Note 1 to entry: These data are linked to the Authentication private key, e.g. Authentication Certificate or APuK. Note 2 to entry: Authentication Protocol sensitive data may be empty if the environment is trus

40、ted, and the holder public key known to the system. 4.3 Certificate electronic attestation, which links the APuK to a person and confirms the identity of that person (as defined in Directive 8, article 2, Clause 9) 4.4 Certificate Info information associated with an Authentication key pair that cons

41、ists of either: a signers public key certificate; or one or more hash values of a signers public key certificate together the identifier of the hash function used to compute these hash values, and some information which allows the signer to disambiguate between several signers certificates 4.5 Confi

42、guration set of groups Note 1 to entry: Each configuration corresponds to one PP. It has its own rationale. See 2. 4.6 Group set of Assets, threats, objectives, and Requirements, addressing a specific function Note 1 to entry: See 2. 4.7 Holder legitimate holder of the authentication device Note 1 t

43、o entry: See 9.2 for more details. 4.8 Issuer user of the authentication device during personalisation Note 1 to entry: See 9.2 for more details. BS EN 419251-2:2013EN 419251-2:2013 (E) 8 4.9 Protection Profile PP implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408

44、-1:2009, Clause 4 “Terms and definitions“, modified in ISO/IEC 15408-1, the protection profile refers to a TOE type instead of a TOE in this document 4.10 PP collection document defining groups and configurations 4.11 Reference Authentication Data usually called RAD, data stored inside the TOE and u

45、sed as a reference to which the VAD will be compared Note 1 to entry: This RAD can be biometrics data, a PIN, or a symmetric key. It can also be a combination of these factors. The RAD is not an Asset, it is TSF data. 4.12 Trusted channel means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can comm

46、unicate with necessary confidence SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, Clause 4 “Terms and definitions“ 4.13 Trusted Environment environment that ensures the protection of sensitive data transfers between the TOE and a remote trusted IT product (resp. a user) Note 1 to entry: A trusted (or untrusted) envir

47、onment relates to the whole communication channel between the TOE and the remote trusted IT product (resp. the user). 4.14 Untrusted Environment environment that does not ensure the protection of sensitive data transfers between the TOE and a remote trusted IT product (resp. a user) Note 1 to entry:

48、 An untrusted (or trusted) environment relates to the whole communication channel between the TOE and the remote trusted IT product (resp. the user). 4.15 User current User of the TOE Note 1 to entry: The User can be the Issuer, the Holder, the Administrator. 4.16 Verifier entity which is or represe

49、nts the entity requiring an authenticated identity Note 1 to entry: A verifier includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication exchanges. SOURCE: ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996, modified the full sentence at the end of the definition in the ISO/IEC has been turned into the present Note 1 to entry 4.17 Verification Authentication Data usually called VAD, data entered into the TOE and checked against the RAD as a means