[外语类试卷]雅思（阅读）模拟试卷105及答案与解析.doc

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1、雅思（阅读）模拟试卷 105及答案与解析 一、 Reading Module (60 minutes) 0 You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 1-13, which are based on Reading Passage 1 below. A Americans today choose among more options in more parts of life than has ever been possible before. To an extent, the opportunity to choose enhance

2、s our lives. It is only logical to think that if some choices are good, more is better; people who care about having infinite options will benefit from them, and those who do not can always just ignore the 273 versions of cereal they have never tried. Yet recent research strongly suggests that, psyc

3、hologically, this assumption is wrong, with 5% lower percentage announcing they are happy. Although some choices are undoubtedly better than none, more is not always better than less. B Recent research offers insight into why many people end up unhappy rather than pleased when their options expand.

4、We began by making a distinction between “maximisers“ (those who always aim to make the best possible choice) and “satisficers“ (those who aim for “good enough,“ whether or not better selections might be out there). C In particular, we composed a set of statements the Maximisation Scale to diagnose

5、peoples propensity to maximise. Then we had several thousand people rate themselves from 1 to 7 (from “completely disagree“ to “completely agree“) on such statements as “I never settle for second best.“ We also evaluated their sense of satisfaction with their decisions. We did not define a sharp cut

6、off to separate maximisers from satisficers, but in general, we think of individuals whose average scores are higher than 4 (the scales midpoint) as maximisers and those whose scores are lower than the midpoint as satisficers. People who score highest on the test the greatest maximisers engage in mo

7、re product comparisons than the lowest scorers, both before and after they make purchasing decisions, and they take longer to decide what to buy. When satisficers find an item that meets their standards, they stop looking. But maximisers exert enormous effort reading labels, checking out consumer ma

8、gazines and trying new products. They also spend more time comparing their purchasing decisions with those of others. D We found that the greatest maximisers are the least happy with the fruits of their efforts. When they compare themselves with others, they get little pleasure from finding out that

9、 they did better and substantial dissatisfaction from finding out that they did worse. They are more prone to experiencing regret after a purchase, and if their acquisition disappoints them, their sense of well-being takes longer to recover. They also tend to brood or ruminate more than satisficers

10、do. E Does it follow that maximisers are less happy in general than satisficers? We tested this by having people fill out a variety of questionnaires known to be reliable indicators of well-being. As might be expected, individuals with high maximisation scores experienced less satisfaction with life

11、 and were less happy, less optimistic and more depressed than people with low maximisation scores. Indeed, those with extreme maximisation ratings had depression scores that placed them in the borderline of clinical range. F Several factors explain why more choice is not always better than less, esp

12、ecially for maximisers. High among these are “opportunity costs.“ The quality of any given option cannot be assessed in isolation from its alternatives. One of the “costs“ of making a selection is losing the opportunities that a different option would have afforded. Thus an opportunity cost of vacat

13、ioning on the beach in Cape Cod might be missing the fabulous restaurants in the Napa Valley. Early Decision Making Research by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky showed that people respond much more strongly to losses than gains. If we assume that opportunity costs reduce the overall desirability of

14、the most preferred choice, then the more alternatives there are, the deeper our sense of loss will be and the less satisfaction we will derive from our ultimate decision. G The problem of opportunity costs will be better for a satisficer. The latters “good enough“ philosophy can survive thoughts abo

15、ut opportunity costs. In addition, the “good enough“ standard leads to much less searching and inspection of alternatives than the maximisers “best“ standard. With fewer choices under consideration, a person will have fewer opportunity costs to subtract. H Just as people feel sorrow about the opport

16、unities they have forgone, they may also suffer regret about the option they settled on. My colleagues and I devised a scale to measure proneness to feeling regret, and we found that people with high sensitivity to regret are less happy, less satisfied with life, less optimistic and more depressed t

17、han those with low sensitivity. Not surprisingly, we also found that people with high regret sensitivity tend to be maximisers. Indeed, we think that worry over future regret is a major reason that individuals become maximisers. The only way to be sure you will not regret a decision is by making the

18、 best possible one. Unfortunately, the more options you have and the more opportunity costs you incur, the more likely you are to experience regret. I In a classic demonstration of the power of sunk costs, people were offered season subscriptions to a local theatre company. Some were offered the tic

19、kets at full price and others at a discount. Then the researchers simply kept track of how often the ticket purchasers actually attended the plays over the course of the season. Full-price payers were more likely to show up at performances than discount payers. The reason for this, the investigators

20、 argued, was that the full-price payers would experience more regret if they did not use the tickets because not using the more costly tickets would constitute a bigger loss. To increase sense of happiness, we can decide to restrict our options when the decision is not crucial. For example, make a r

21、ule to visit no more than two stores when shopping for clothing. Questions 1-4 Look at the following descriptions or deeds (Questions 1-4) and the list of catego ries below. Match each description or deed with the correct category, A-D. Write the correct letter, A-D, in boxes 1-4 on your answer shee

22、t. A “maximisers“ B “satisficers“ C neither “maximisers“ nor “satisficers“ D both “maximisers“ and “satisficers“ 1 rated to the Maximisation Scale of making choice 2 dont take much time before making a decision 3 are likely to regret about the choice in the future 4 choose the highest price in the r

23、ange of purchase 4 Do the following statements agree with the information given in Reading Passage 1? In boxes 5-8 on you answer sheet, write TRUE if the statement agrees with the information FALSE if the statement contradicts with the information NOT GIVEN if there is no information on this. 5 In t

24、odays world, since the society is becoming wealthier, people are happier. （ A） TRUE （ B） FALSE （ C） NOT GIVEN 6 In society, there are more maximisers than satisficers. （ A） TRUE （ B） FALSE （ C） NOT GIVEN 7 People tend to react more to loses than gains. （ A） TRUE （ B） FALSE （ C） NOT GIVEN 8 Females a

25、nd males acted differently in the study of choice making. （ A） TRUE （ B） FALSE （ C） NOT GIVEN 8 Choose the correct letter, A, B, C or D. Write the correct letter in boxes 9-13 on your answer sheet. 9 The Maximisation Scale is aimed to （ A） know the happiness when they have more choices. （ B） measure

26、 how people are likely to feel after making choices. （ C） help people make better choices. （ D） reduce the time of purchasing. 10 According to the text, what is the result of more choices? （ A） People can make choices more easily. （ B） Maximisers are happier to make choices. （ C） Satisficers are qui

27、cker to make wise choices. （ D） People have more tendency to experience regret. 11 The example of theatre ticket is to suggest that （ A） they prefer to use more money when buying tickets. （ B） they dont like to spend more money on theatre. （ C） higher-priced things would induce more regret if not us

28、ed properly. （ D） full-price payers are real theatre lovers. 12 How to increase the happiness when making a better choice? （ A） use less time （ B） make more comparisons （ C） buy more expensive products （ D） limit the number of choices in certain situations 13 What is the best title for Reading Passa

29、ge 1? （ A） Reasoning of Worse Choice Making （ B） Making Choices in Todays World （ C） The Influence of More Choices （ D） Complexity in Choice Making 13 You should spend about 20 minutes on Questions 14-26, which are based on Reading Passage 2 below. Implication of False Belief Experiments A A conside

30、rable amount of research since the mid-1980s has been concerned with what has been termed childrens theory of mind. This involves childrens ability to understand that people can have different beliefs and representations of the world a capacity that is shown by four years of age. Furthermore, this a

31、bility appears to be absent in children with autism. The ability to work out what another person is thinking is clearly an important aspect of both cognitive and social development. Furthermore, one important explanation for autism is that children suffering from this condition do not have a theory

32、of mind (TOM). Consequently, the development of childrens TOM has attracted considerable attention. B Wimmer and Perner devised a “false belief task“ to address this question. They used some toys to act out the following story. Maxi left some chocolate in a blue cupboard before he went out. When he

33、was away his mother moved the chocolate to a green cupboard. Children were asked to predict where Maxi will look for his chocolate when he returns. Most children under four years gave the incorrect answer, that Maxi will look in the green cupboard. Those over four years tended to give the correct an

34、swer, that Maxi will look in the blue cupboard. The incorrect answers indicated that the younger children did not understand that Maxis beliefs and representations no longer matched the actual state of the world, and they failed to appreciate that Maxi will act on the basis of his beliefs rather tha

35、n the way that the world is actually organised. C A simpler version of the Maxi task was devised by Baron-Cohen to take account of criticisms that younger children may have been affected by the complexity and too much information of the story in the task described above. For example, the child is sh

36、own two dolls, Sally and Anne, who have a basket and box, respectively. Sally also has a marble, which she places in her basket, and then leaves to take a walk. While she is out of room, Anne takes the marble from the basket, eventually putting it in the box. Sally returns, and the child is then ask

37、ed where Sally will look for the marble. The child passes the task if she answers that Sally will look in the basket, where she put the marble; the child fails the task if she answers that Sally will look in the box, where the child knows the marble is hidden even though Sally cannot know, since she

38、 did not see it hidden there. In order to pass the task, the child must be able to understand that anothers mental representation of the situation is different from her own, and the child must be able to predict behaviour based on that understanding. The results of research using false-belief tasks

39、have been fairly consistent: most normally-developing children are unable to pass the tasks until around age four. D Leslie argues that, before 18 months, children treat the world in a literal way and rarely demonstrate pretence. He also argues that it is necessary for the cognitive system to distin

40、guish between what is pretend and what is real. If children were not able to do this, they would not be able to distinguish between imagination and what is real. Leslie suggests that this pretend play becomes possible because of the presence of a de-coupler that copies primary representations to sec

41、ondary representations. For example, children, when pretending a banana is a telephone, would make a secondary representation of a banana. They would manipulate this representation and they would use their stored knowledge of “telephone“ to build on this pretence. E There is also evidence that socia

42、l processes play a part in the development of TOM. Meins and her colleagues have found that what they term mind-mindedness in maternal speech to six-month-old infants is related to both security of attachment and to TOM abilities. Mind-mindedness involves speech that discusses infants feelings and e

43、xplains their behaviour in terms of mental states (eg “youre feeling hungry“). F Lewis investigated older children living in extended families in Crete and Cyprus. They found that children who socially interact with more adults, who have more friends, and who have more older siblings tend to pass TO

44、M tasks at a slightly earlier age than other children. Furthermore, because young children are more likely to talk about their thoughts and feelings with peers than with their mothers, peer interaction may provide a special impetus to the development of a TOM. A similar point has been made by Dunn,

45、who argues that peer interaction is more likely to contain pretend play and that it is likely to be more challenging because other children, unlike adults, do not make large adaptations to the communicative needs of other children. G In addition, there has been concern that some aspects of the TOM a

46、pproach underestimate childrens understanding of other people. After all, infants will point to objects apparently in an effort to change a persons direction of gaze and interest; they can interact quite effectively with other people; they will express their ideas in opposition to the wishes of othe

47、rs; and they will show empathy for the feelings of others. All these suggest that they have some level of understanding that their own thoughts are different from those in another persons mind. Evidence to support this position comes from a variety of sources. When a card with a different picture on

48、 each side is shown to a child and an adult sitting opposite her, the three-year-old understands that she see a different picture to that seen by the adult. H Schatz studied the spontaneous speech of three-year-olds and found that these children used mental terms, and used them in circumstances wher

49、e there was a contrast between, for example, not being sure where an object was located and finding it or between pretending and reality. Thus the social abilities of children indicate that they are aware of the difference between mental states and external reality at ages younger than four. I A different explanation has been put forward by Harris. He proposed that children use “simulation“. This involves putting yourself in the other persons position, and then trying to predict what the other person would do. Thus success on false belief tasks can be explained by child