TIA-1085-2006 IP-Based LCS Security Framework《基于IP的LCS安全框架》.pdf

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18、L ELEMENT OF THE USE OF THE CONTENTS HEREOF, AND THESE CONTENTS WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED BY TIA WITHOUT SUCH LIMITATIONS. IP-Based LCS Security Framework TIA-1085 1 Table of Contents 1 1 Introduction and Scope.4 2 2 References 4 3 2.1 Normative References.4 4 2.2 Informative References.4 5 3 Definitio

19、ns and Abbreviations4 6 3.1 Definitions.4 7 3.2 Abbreviations6 8 4 Overview of LCS Security Framework (Informative)7 9 4.1 Introduction to LCS 7 10 4.2 Security Functional Architecture for IP-Based LCS.8 11 4.2.1 Mobile Station (Informative)8 12 4.2.2 LCS Network Entities (Informative) 8 13 4.3 Wire

20、less All-IP Architecture Reference Points (Informative) 9 14 4.4 Summary of Security Mechanisms .10 15 4.5 Introduction to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol.11 16 4.5.1 Call Flow When Initiating a New TLS Session12 17 4.5.2 Call Flow When Resuming a New TLS Session13 18 5 LCS Security Prot

21、ocols.14 19 5.1 LCS Provisioning Protocol .14 20 5.1.1 Provisioning LCS_ROOT_KEY 14 21 5.1.2 Deriving Keys for the S-SAFE, TLS Session-A and TLS-Session-B Protocols 15 22 5.2 Secure Store-And-Forward Encapsulation (S-SAFE) Protocol.16 23 5.2.1 Version-Independent Steps for Forming an S-SAFE Envelope

22、 .17 24 5.2.2 Version-Independent Steps for Processing an S-SAFE Envelope18 25 5.2.3 Version-Dependent Steps for the S-SAFE Protocol.19 26 5.2.3.1 LCS_S_SAFE_VERSION = 0x0119 27 5.2.3.1.1 LCS_S_SAFE_GOODIES Format19 28 5.2.3.1.2 Generating GOODIES (H-PS) 20 29 5.2.3.1.3 Version Dependent Steps for P

23、rocessing an S-SAFE Message.21 30 5.3 Operations Common to LCS TLS Sessions 22 31 5.3.1 Initiating a New TLS Session.24 32 5.3.1.1 ClientHello Message.24 33 5.3.1.2 Server Hello24 34 5.3.1.3 Void 25 35 5.3.1.4 Void 25 36 5.3.1.5 Void 25 37 5.3.1.6 ServerHelloDone 25 38 5.3.1.7 Void 25 39 5.3.1.8 Cli

24、entKeyExchange 25 40 5.3.1.8.1 Generating master_secret in the MS .25 41 5.3.1.9 Void 26 42 5.3.1.10 ChangeCipherSpec and Finished Messages (from the MS)26 43 5.3.1.10.1 Generation of MSs verify_data .26 44 5.3.1.10.2 ME response to Output from the UIM 27 45 5.3.1.11 ChangeCipherSpec and Finished Me

25、ssages (from the Server) .27 46 5.3.1.11.1 The Server Generates or Retrieves master_secret.27 47 5.3.1.12 Verification of Servers verify_data and Generation of session_secrets in MS27 48 5.3.1.12.1 Verification of Servers verify_data and Generation of key_block .28 49 5.3.1.12.2 ME response to Outpu

26、t from the UIM when Initiating a New TLS Session.29 50 5.3.1.13 Regarding Resumable Sessions (Informative)29 51 5.3.1.14 Error Cases (Informative) .30 52 5.3.2 Resuming a Previous TLS Session.30 53 5.3.2.1 ClientHello Message.30 54 TIA-1085 IP-Based LCS Security Framework 2 5.3.2.2 Server Hello30 1

27、5.3.2.3 ChangeCipherSpec and Finished Messages (from the Server) .31 2 5.3.2.4 ChangeCipherSpec and Finished Messages (from the MS)31 3 5.3.2.4.1 Verification of the MSs verify_data.32 4 5.4 TLS Session-A Protocol33 5 5.5 TLS Session-B Protocol35 6 5.5.1 Security Parameter Sizes for TLS Session-B .3

28、7 7 5.5.1.1 LCS_UIM_PDE_TLS_PSK_VERSION = 0x01: Parameter Sizes.38 8 5.5.2 LCS_UIM_PDE_TLS_PSK_KEY Generation 38 9 5.5.2.1 LCS_UIM_PDE_TLS_PSK_VERSION = 0x01: Tuple Generation 39 10 5.5.3 Distribution to the PDE 39 11 5.5.3.1 LCS_UIM_PDE_TLS_PSK_VERSION = 0x01: Security Parameters sent to PDE 39 12

29、5.5.4 Distribution to the MS39 13 5.5.5 TLS Session-B Handshake.40 14 6 LCS Security Algorithms .42 15 6.1 LCS Initialization Algorithms.42 16 6.1.1 Generation of LCS_UIM_S_SAFE_KEY42 17 6.1.2 Generation of LCS_UIM_HPS_TLS_PSK_KEY 42 18 6.1.3 Generation of LCS_UIM_PDE_ROOT_KEY .43 19 6.2 S-SAFE Algo

30、rithms 44 20 6.2.1 S-SAFE Algorithms for LCS_S_SAFE_VERSION = 0x01 44 21 6.2.1.1 Generation of LCS_S_SAFE_RAND.44 22 6.2.1.2 Void 45 23 6.2.1.3 Generation of LCS_S_SAFE_CK.45 24 6.2.1.4 Generation of LCS_S_SAFE_IK45 25 6.2.1.5 Encryption.45 26 6.2.1.5.1 Mandatory Algorithms 45 27 6.2.1.6 Decryption

31、46 28 6.2.1.6.1 Mandatory Algorithms 46 29 6.2.1.7 Generation of LCS_S_SAFE_MAC .46 30 6.2.1.7.1 Mandatory Algorithms 47 31 6.2.1.8 Generation of XLCS_S_SAFE_MAC 47 32 6.3 Common TLS Algorithms 48 33 6.3.1 Key Generation Algorithms .48 34 6.3.1.1 Algorithm for Generating other_secret.48 35 6.3.1.1.1

32、 Algorithm for Generating other_secret for PSK Key Exchange .48 36 6.3.1.2 Algorithm for Generating premaster_secret.48 37 6.3.1.3 Algorithm for Generating master_secret 48 38 6.3.1.4 Algorithm for Generating session_secrets in the Server.49 39 6.3.1.5 Algorithms for Generating session_secrets in th

33、e MS49 40 6.3.1.5.1 Computing the key_block_len in ME 49 41 6.3.1.5.2 Generating the key_block in UIM50 42 6.3.2 Algorithms for Generating the Finished Message50 43 6.3.2.1 Algorithm for Generating verify_digest50 44 6.3.2.2 Algorithm for Generating verify_data from verify_digest 50 45 6.4 Void 51 4

34、6 6.5 Algorithms for TLS Session-B52 47 6.5.1 Void52 48 6.5.2 Algorithms for LCS_UIM_PDE_TLS_PSK-Tuple Generation .52 49 6.5.2.1 LCS_UIM_PDE_TLS_PSK_VERSION = 0x01: Tuple Generation 52 50 6.5.2.1.1 LCS_UIM_PDE_TLS_PSK_RAND Generation 52 51 6.5.2.1.2 LCS_UIM_PDE_TLS_PSK_KEY Generation .53 52 6.6 Addi

35、tional Algorithms 54 53 6.6.1 LCS_TIME.54 54 IP-Based LCS Security Framework TIA-1085 3 6.7 Summary of LCS Cryptographic Algorithms by Entity (Informative) .55 1 6.7.1 Cryptographic Algorithms in the Mobile Station .55 2 6.7.1.1 Cryptographic Algorithms in the User Identity Module .55 3 6.7.1.2 Cryp

36、tographic Algorithms in the Mobile Equipment .56 4 6.7.2 Cryptographic Algorithms in the Home-Positioning Server 57 5 6.7.3 Cryptographic Algorithms in the Serving-Positioning Server58 6 6.7.4 Cryptographic Algorithms in the Position Determining Entity 58 7 8 TIA-1085 IP-Based LCS Security Framework

37、 4 1 Introduction and Scope 1 This document defines the security framework for the IP-based Location Services. The security 2 framework provides a logical description of the security information, functions and protocols 3 for IP-based Location Services. The architectural design of the network that s

38、upports these 4 functions is outside the scope of this document. 5 2 References 6 2.1 Normative References 7 TIA-820-B TIA-820-B “Removable User Identity Module for Spread Spectrum Systems,” April 8 2004. 9 FIPS180-2 NIST FIPS PUB 180-2 “Secure Hash Standard”, National Institute of Standards and 10

39、Technology. 11 TIA-946 TIA-946, Enhanced Cryptographic Algorithms, June 2003. 12 RFC1321 “The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm”, Rivest, IETF RFC 1321. 13 RFC2246 “The TLS Protocol Version 1.0”, Dierks, IETF RFC 2246. 14 RFC3268 “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Securi

40、ty 15 (TLS)”, Chown, IETF RFC 3268. 16 RFC4279 “Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)”, Eronen, IETF 17 RFC 4279. 18 2.2 Informative References 19 None. 20 3 Definitions and Abbreviations 21 3.1 Definitions 22 Access Network: provides the Mobile Station with wireless access

41、for voice and data 23 services. The Access Network also provides the Mobile Station with coarse-24 grained location data in the form of ServingCellInfo. 25 Communication Mode: The Mobile Station may communicate in either Proxy or Non-26 Proxy/Direct Mode 27 Proxy Communication Mode: The Mobile Stati

42、on communicates with the 28 Position Determining Entity using the Home Positioning Server as a proxy. 29 Non-Proxy/Direct Communication Mode: The Home Positioning Server initiates a 30 direct connection between the Mobile Station and the Position Determining Entity. 31 IP-Based LCS Security Framewor

43、k TIA-1085 5 Mobile Station For the purposes of this document, the Mobile Station is considered as two 1 separate entities, the User Identity Module (UIM) and Mobile Equipment 2 (ME). 3 User Identity Module (UIM): The User Identity Module is a low power 4 processor that contains secure memory. The U

44、ser Identity Module may be a 5 Removable-UIM (R-UIM TIA-820-B) or may be integrated with the Mobile Station. 6 Removable UIM (R-UIM): An UIM that can be physically removed from the 7 ME. An R-UIM may be used in multiple MEs. 8 Mobile Equipment (ME): The ME contains a high power processor, but is 9 n

45、ot assumed to contain secure memory or secure processing. 10 Position Determining Entity: the entity that has the ability to perform position 11 determination with the Mobile Station 12 Position Estimate: The geographic position of a Mobile Station as determined by a 13 Position Determining Entity a

46、nd the MS. 14 Positioning Server: an entity that finds a suitable Position Determining Entity for 15 position determination 16 Home Positioning Server: The Positioning Server of an operator that has a 17 billing relationship with the Subscriber for the purposes of location services. 18 Serving Posit

47、ioning Server: The Positioning Server that is in the same network 19 as the appropriate Position Determining Entity. 20 Positioning Sessions: the communications between a Mobile Station and a Position 21 Determining Entity. 22 Secure Store-And-Forward Encapsulation (S-SAFE) Data to be sent via store

48、-and-forward 23 services may require security. Secure Store-And-Forward Encapsulation 24 provides authentication, freshness protection, integrity protection and 25 confidentiality protection for such messages. 26 LCS Suite The set of communications required to fulfill a request from a Location-27 Ba

49、sed Application. An LCS suite may contain multiple Position 28 Determinations. 29 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Application layer protection of data. 30 Cipher_suite A description of the set of algorithms used for authentication, key 31 agreement 32 TLS Handshake Protocol A sub protocol of TLS that performs the functions 33 of authentication, cipher_suite agreement and session secret 34 establishment for securing application data. The handshake may 35 either establish a new master secret, or resume a previous session 36 using the master secret e