REG NASA-LLIS-0912-2000 Lessons Learned Launch Services Responsibility Under a Spacecraft Development Fixed Price Contract.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 0912Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 0912a71 Lesson Date: 2000-09-07a71 Submitting Organization: GSFCa71 Submitted by: Mary LapelosaSubject: Launch Services Responsibility Under a Spacecraft Development Fixed Price Contract Description of Driving Event: The Tracking and Data Rel

2、ay Satellite (TDRS) project entered into a firm fixed price contractual agreement to procure three spacecraft as part of the NASA replenishment program of the existing fleet. This contract contains performance penalties based upon any number of failed non-operational services after launch and checko

3、ut through years 1 to 8 on orbit. The contract also specifies that NASA is responsible for the provision of the launch vehicle, an Atlas IIA as “government furnished equipment.“ As a result, the government is responsible for providing the Atlas IIA under a separate contract and thus became responsib

4、le for the launch and delivery to orbit. The effect of this dual contract approach was to create a built in ambiguity reducing NASAs ability to make the TDRS contractor accountable for on orbit spacecraft performance and for NASA to enforce the performance penalties. The contract requires that NASA

5、is responsible for the safe delivery of the spacecraft on orbit and failure of the launch represents a total loss of mission to NASA.Lesson(s) Learned: Having a fixed price contract for a spacecraft delivery and a separate contract for the launch vehicle required the government be inserted as the re

6、sponsible party between the two contracts. The dual contract environment removed the governments ability to enforce the performance penalties in the event of a launch failure and created a complexity in the spacecraft to ELV interface requirements allocation and verification process. The complexity

7、was demonstrated by unwillingness to directly sign the launch vehicle interface control document (ICD), a joint agreement between NASA/KSC and NASA/GSFC. Instead, the TDRS Project Office at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) was forced to insert itself between the parties negotiating a launch ve

8、hicle agreement.Recommendation(s): Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Future spacecraft development activities using fixed price contracting should either include launch services as part of the overall contract or require the spacecraft

9、contractor to participate as a signature member of the Launch Vehicle Interface Control Document development process.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: Integration of launch services with spacecraft development under a fixed price contract is common commercial practice.Documents Related t

10、o Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Sciencea71 Space Operationsa71 Exploration SystemsAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 SpacecraftAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2000-09-18a71 Approval Name: Eric Raynora71 Approval Organization: QSa71 Approval Phone Number: 202-358-4738Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-