Supply Chain Contracts and their Impact on Profitability.ppt

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1、Supply Chain Contracts and their Impact on Profitability,Double Marginalisation Supply Chain Co-ordination via Contracts,2,Supply Chain Contracts,A contract specifies the terms of the orders and deliveries between the buyer and the supplier Quantity, Price, Delivery lead time, Quality Over/under-sto

2、cking risks? Fixed quantity, long lead time buyer bears risk Short lead time supplier bears risk (buyer can wait until demand known) Each link in the supply chain optimises based on its own profit/cost margins (without considering other links in the supply chain) May reduce profits of the entire sup

3、ply chain,3,Double Marginalisation -Example,Manufacturer (TechFibre): Production cost v=$10, charges Wholesale price c=$100 Retailer (Ski Adventure): Selling price p=$200, Salvage value s=$0 Demand (at p=$200): Normally distributed N(1000, 3002)Retailer (solves a newsvendor problem): CSL*=(200-100)/

4、(200-0)=0.5 Orders 1000 Expected profit = $76063 Manufacturer: Produces and sells 1000 units Profit = (100-10)*1000 = $90000,4,Double Marginalisation Example,With retailer doing own optimisation, 1000 units produced, and total supply chain profit is $76,063 + $90,000 = $166,063 In fact, for the supp

5、ly chain (as a whole): Cu =200-10, Co=10 CSL* = 190/200=0.95 Optimal production level = 1493 Total supply chain profit = $183,812 Considering Manufacturer and retailer TOGETHER, the supply chain profit is higher!,5,Double Marginalisation,If each party makes decisions considering only a part of the s

6、upply chain, the decisions may not maximize profits for the whole supply chain!,6,Supply Chain Co-ordination,Can contracts/incentives be set to increase total supply chain profits?Incentives to retailers to order quantities that increase supply chain profits: Buy-back contracts : A manufacturer spec

7、ifies a wholesale price and a buyback price at which the retailer can return any unsold items at the end of the season Revenue sharing contracts: The manufacturer charges the retailer a low wholesale price and shares a fraction of the revenue generated by the retailer Quantity flexible contracts: Ma

8、nufacturer allows retailer to change order quantity after observing demand,7,Returns Policy: Buy Back contracts,Manufacturer specifies wholesale price and a buyback price b at which retailers can return unsold units at end of season Retailer: Salvage value becomes b (so, Co=c-b) Optimal Order y* inc

9、reases! Manufacturer: Expected profit = y*(c-v) b(expected overstock) Increases if b not too large.,8,Buyback contract,Both manufacturer and retailer can increase profits Increasing wholesale price (and buyback price by a larger amount) can increase manufacturers profit Cost of returning goods?,9,Re

10、venue Sharing Contracts,Manufacturer charges a low wholesale price and shares a fraction (f) of the revenue generated by the retailer Lower wholesale price decreases cost of overstocking, so retailer increases level of product availability = increase profit for BOTH manufacturer and retailer,10,Reve

11、nue Sharing Contracts,Retailer: Cu = (1-f)p - c, Co= c - sR CSL* = (1-f)p-c /(1-f)p-sR Let ES = Expected Overstock at retailer Expected profit = (1-f)p(Q-ES) + sR(ES) - cQ Manufacturer: Expected profit = (c-v)Q + fp(Q-ES),11,Quantity Flexibility contracts,Manufacturer allows retailer to adjust quant

12、ity ordered after observing demand Retail orders O Manufacturer commits to deliver Q=(1+a)O, 0 a 1 Retailer commits to buying at least q=(1-b)O, 0 b 1 Manufacturers share risk with retailers No returns required,12,Quantity flexible contracts,13,Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI),Manufacturer controls re

13、plenishments decisions Retailers share sales information VMI can mitigate the effects of double marginalisation VMI can improve manufacturer forecasts Retailers stock goods from competitors Confidentiality? Substitutability ignored by BOTH manufacturers - stock too high for retailers,14,Summary,Newsvendor model Tradeoff cost of over-stock and lost sales Supply chain co-ordination by contracts Buy-back Revenue sharing Quantity-flexible Vendor-managed inventory Incentives?,Making supply meet demand!,