REG NASA-LLIS-1612--2005 Lessons Learned - Cost Estimating Assessing the Human Capital and Facilities Required for New Moon-Mars Missions.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1612Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1612a71 Lesson Date: 2005-08-19a71 Submitting Organization: ARCa71 Authored by: Donald R. MendozaSubject: Cost Estimating: Assessing the Human Capital and Facilities Required for New Moon-Mars Missions Abstract: A senior individual with exper

2、ience in many space flight projects, including several X-vehicles, had several observations regarding the readiness of the Agencys human capital and facilities to support the new moon-Mars missions. Description of Driving Event: A senior individual with experience in many space flight projects, incl

3、uding several X-vehicles, had several observations regarding the readiness of the Agencys human capital and facilities to support the new moon-Mars missions: The majority of the Agencys current scientists and engineers have not had the benefit of working on a major space flight development program;

4、the last major manned space flight vehicle development (the shuttle) was 30 years ago and most of those people are now retired. The X-vehicle programs aimed at space flight that have occurred over the last few decades have been cancelled prematurely due to schedule and budget overruns and/or signifi

5、cant technical failures and thus havent provided the same level of training and experience for personnel that worked on programs running trough completion (flight). Many of the Agencys engineers have never experienced a flight test. The facilities used in the development and testing of major space m

6、issions have not seen much use in recent years and have deteriorated. The competence of the operators of these facilities has also deteriorated from disuse; many of the people with operating experience and knowledge are gone. Work on the NASP (National Aerospace Plane) indicated the agency had to ma

7、ke a significant Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-investment in facilities in order to be successful and yet during the Programs run and 20 years later, the investments have not been made. Lesson(s) Learned: 1. Without sustaining work,

8、 the Agency has lost the expertise required for developing the types of systems needed for manned space exploration.2. Scientists and engineers learn the most from completing a project.a. Bad habits (those contributing to failures) are not “un-learned” if personnel are not involved in thorough postm

9、ortem reviews of failed projects. 1. Most missions ignore developing people and facilities.a. Paper studies and cancelled projects do not address this issue and can mask the real state of Agency health. b. Lack of qualified people can result in unexpected project slowdowns due to the required time t

10、o climb up the learning curve or in assembling knowledgeable participants for review teams. 1. Inadequately experienced scientists and engineers will still rely on old rules of thumb for design margins and factors of safety.2. If knowledge capture and transfer is not explicitly part of a plan, and p

11、rovided with adequate resources, it will not happen.a. The existing Agency culture does not value knowledge management and it is not a priority. b. Because planned knowledge capture usually occurs during the end stages of a project, it is one of first items cut when budgets are tight at the end of a

12、 project. Recommendation(s): 1. The Agency should hold reunions of the alumni of the major space missions (Gemini, Apollo and Shuttle) to capture their experience and lessons learned.a. The successes and failures of more recent missions, such as all the X vehicle programs and planetary exploration m

13、issions (such as MER), should be reviewed. In particular, understanding the successes should be a priority. 1. The Agency should consider the training value and long-term investment before canceling projects.a. However, for those projects that warrant cancellation, the existing project team should b

14、e required Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-to perform a postmortem review and document all lessons learned. 1. All projects and missions should be required to develop a training and facilities plan, which includes how the people and f

15、acilities that are developed will address the long-term goals of the Agency as well as support the project.a. All current decisions with regard to maintaining and developing facilities should be reconsidered to take into account the requirements of the new Moon-Mars mission. 1. Design philosophies t

16、hat are based on probabilistic failure rates should be emphasized in new designs and need to be supported by simulation and testing. Some projects should be carried through failure, as long as adequately instrumented and safe.a. The Agency needs to work with the academic community to develop curricu

17、lum aimed at space missions. 1. Projects and missions should be required to include knowledge management in their plans and should be given the budget and schedule to accomplish it.a. The Agency should consider putting a hold on an employees promotion or reassignment until they have accomplished the

18、ir assigned knowledge management tasks. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: NPR 7120.5Mission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Sciencea71 Aeronautics Researcha71 Space OperationsAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Policy & Planninga71 ProcurementProvided

19、 by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-a71 Small Business & Industrial Relationsa71 Program and Project Managementa71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission AssuranceAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2006-04-18a71 Approval Name: dkruhma71 Approval Organization: HQProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-