REG NASA-LLIS-0886--2000 Lessons Learned Mission Assurance During Mars Climate Orbiter Operations (1999).pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 0886Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 0886a71 Lesson Date: 2000-04-27a71 Submitting Organization: JPLa71 Submitted by: David OberhettingerSubject: Mission Assurance During Mars Climate Orbiter Operations (1999) Abstract: Although a mission assurance manager was assigned to MCO du

2、ring project development, there was no independent mission assurance function established for the work performed at JPL following launch. Require an independent Mission Assurance representative during the operational phase of every flight project. This individual should become familiar with and inte

3、grated into the project during the latter phases of development, and possess independent responsibility to verify compliance with design and operational requirements. Require all flight projects to report and track post-launch anomalies on ISAs. Project management should rigidly enforce this require

4、ment and maintain a disciplined disposition, tracking and resolution process. Description of Driving Event: Although a mission assurance manager (MAM) was assigned to Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) during project development, there was no independent mission assurance function established for the work p

5、erformed at JPL following launch. The decision whether to have a project-level mission assurance function during the operations phase was previously at the discretion of the JPL project manager. The JPL Mission Assurance Management and Independent Assessment process now requires a Mission Assurance

6、representative for all flight mission operational phases.A lack of continuous mission assurance oversight was noted by the JPL MCO review board. Contrary to established practice:a71 The spacecraft was launched without end-to-end testing to validate Angular Momentum Desaturation (AMD) file compatibil

7、ity with the ground-data system navigation software. The Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-JPL MCO review board identified file incompatibility as the root cause of the MCO mission loss.a71 Discrepancies between the delta-Vs expected by

8、 the Navigation Team and those produced by the AMD file were observed during mission operations. However, no Incident/Surprise/Anomaly report (ISA) or Problem/Failure Report (PFR) was ever written on this issue. The Navigation Team documented the issue in an e-mail and attempted to resolve it inform

9、ally. The investigation was dropped prior to resolution as it was considered to be low priority subsequent trajectory correction maneuvers (TCMs) were expected to resolve these discrepancies.Reference:1. Report on the Loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter Mission, JPL D-18441, JPL Special Review Board, N

10、ovember 11, 1999.2. Phase I Report, (NASA) Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board, November 10, 19993. “Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board - Phase I Report“, Lesson Learned Number 0641, December 1, 1999.4. Corrective Action Notice No. Z66257, MCO-JPL/SRB Finding 4.4:“Mission As

11、surance,“ November 23, 1999.5. Corrective Action Notice No. Z66268, MCO-JPL/SRB Finding 4.5: “Problem Reporting, Tracking, and Closeout,“ November 23,1999.Additional Key Words:FRACAS, Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System, Product Assurance, Software Test, SQA, Software Quality Assurance, D

12、ocumentation, Management OversightLesson(s) Learned: See Recommendation(s)Recommendation(s): 1. Revise JPL mission assurance policies and procedures to require an independent Mission Assurance representative during the operational phase of every flight project. This individual should become familiar

13、 with and integrated into the project during the latter phases of development, and possess independent responsibility to verify compliance with design and operational requirements. See Lesson No. 0641, Recommendation #14.2. Require all flight projects to report and track post-launch anomalies on ISA

14、s. Project management should rigidly enforce this requirement and maintain a disciplined disposition, tracking, and resolution process. See Lesson No. 0641, Recommendation #10.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Note: Any project member o

15、bserving an anomaly is empowered to write an anomaly report.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Flight Operationsa71 Policy & Planninga71 Risk Management/

16、Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 Softwarea71 Spacecrafta71 Test & VerificationAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2000-06-14a71 Approval Name: Eric Raynora71 Approval Organization: QSa71 Approval Phone Number: 202-358-4738Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-