REG NASA-LLIS-0057-1992 Lessons Learned - Fuel Farm Fire Detection Suppression and Alarm System Fuel Farm Firex Deluge System Operations SCAPE Van Personnel Protective Equipment Co.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 0057Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 0057a71 Lesson Date: 1992-02-03a71 Submitting Organization: KSCa71 Submitted by: David PenningtonSubject: Fuel Farm Fire Detection, Suppression and Alarm System; Fuel Farm Firex Deluge System Operations; SCAPE Van Personnel Protective Equipme

2、nt; Communications During Hazardous Operations Description of Driving Event: During the replacement of a faulty flodyne valve, a leak occurred which resulted in a spill of approximately 20 gallons of MMH. Several minutes after the spill was reported, spontaneous combustion of the MMH occurred. The f

3、ire detection system high temperature detectors (HADs) did not activate, therefore, no automatic system activation or alarms occurred during the fire. The locations of the HADs (roof beam mid-line, one at apex and one each half-way down on roof underside) are unlikely to detect fires occurring near

4、the farm edges, where much of the hypergolic maintenance is performed.Lesson(s) Learned: 1. Fire detection system high temperature detectors must be located near areas where conflagration is likely.2. The fire detection system high temperature detectors did not activate, resulting in no automatic fi

5、re suppression system activation.3. Lack of fire alarm activation boxes along the evacuation route could prevent egressing personnel from activating the system.4. During operation of Firex Deluge Systems, the deluge spray may miss the fire if high winds exist.5. SCAPE Van personnel were not properly

6、 equipped or prepared to take contaminated personnel onboard during a spill/fire mishap.6. Switching to an emergency channel (without monitoring the primary circuit) may prevent effective communication.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-

7、Recommendation(s): 1. Fire service organizations should evaluate fire detector locations to ensure sufficient detector coverage.2. Fire service organizations should evaluate fire detector locations and assure that sufficient detector coverage exists in high activity areas.3. The fire services organi

8、zation should install additional activation boxes along the egress routes or at the fallback area.4. Fire service organizations should relocate or add additional nozzles to provide coverage in all likely wind conditions.5. SCAPE Van personnel should be fully prepared to take contaminated personnel o

9、nboard during all phases of the operation.6. Primary communication channels must be monitored, even when switching to emergency channels.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Space Operationsa71 Exploration SystemsAdditional Key

10、Phrase(s): a71 Emergency Preparednessa71 Energetic Materials - Explosive/Propellant/Pyrotechnica71 Fire Protectiona71 Flight Equipmenta71 Ground Operationsa71 Ground EquipmentProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-a71 Hardwarea71 Hazardous/T

11、oxic Waste/Materialsa71 Packaging Handling Storagea71 Personal Protective EquipmentAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 1994-06-01a71 Approval Name: James G. Klinea71 Approval Organization: KSC/HEIa71 Approval Phone Number: 407-867-7614Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-