REG NASA-LLIS-6657-2012 Reduce MOS Development Cost Risk by Matching MOS to Existing AMMOS Capabilities.pdf

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1、Public Lessons Learned Entry: 6657 Lesson Info: Lesson Number: 6657 Lesson Date: 2012-06-5 Submitting Organization: JPL Submitted by: David Oberhettinger Subject: Reduce MOS Development Cost/Risk by Matching MOS to Existing AMMOS Capabilities Abstract: Use of a multi-mission operations system has pe

2、rmitted new NASA projects to reduce the cost, schedule, and risk of developing such systems anew, while improving mission performance. Projects should be AMMOS “capability-driven,“ matching their MOS needs to the established AMMOS capabilities instead of vice versa. Description of Driving Event: A M

3、ission Operations System (MOS) is a ground-based control system that commands a spacecraft flight system and spacecraft/ground communications as needed to obtain mission science and programmatic data, while managing mission resources such as the Deep Space Network (DSN). An MOS is composed of hardwa

4、re, software, people, processes, and facilities designed and implemented for a specific spaceflight mission. In the 1980s, the NASA/Caltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) developed the Advanced Multi-Mission Operations System (AMMOS) that provides an MOS framework and functionality (Figure 1) that

5、can be used for multiple deep space NASA missions by adapting it to the needs of different missions. With continuous AMMOS use from decade to decade, its MOS capabilities have continued to expand to meet the needs of new missions (see Figure 2). Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networ

6、king permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Figure 1. Typical decomposition of an MOS into functional elements, tools, and services, indicating elements that can be provided from the AMMOS. The desire by projects to maximize spacecraft and instrument capabilities may tempt them to develop unique MOS

7、 hardware and software instead of maximizing the use of AMMOS resources. However, use of a multi-mission MOS (MMOS) like AMMOS offers the opportunity for reduced development and operations costs. Almost all deep space (and some Earth orbital) missions make use of AMMOS tools and services (Figure 2)

8、maintained by the JPL Multimission Ground Systems and Services Office (MGSS), although the extent of use varies. Table 1 illustrates the percentage of AMMOS software that was used by several JPL projects in developing their Ground Data System (GDS), the software and hardware elements of the MOS. Onl

9、y 68 percent of Mars Exploration Rovers (MERs) GDS software was obtained from AMMOS because MER had unique rover surface navigation and control needs. In contrast, Dawn is a recent project with a non-planetary mission that was able to take advantage of increasing AMMOS maturity to make extensive use

10、 of it. In addition to the software development cost savings, an AMMOS-derived GDS may feature lower recurring operations costs and risk because many anomalies that would have occurred during flight operations have already been fixed and because personnel have gained prior experience using the syste

11、m. AMMOS use also promises a shorter development cycle because AMMOS adaptation takes less time than development of a unique MOS. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Figure 2. List of current MGSS customers (Reference (1). The yellow high

12、lighted projects are JPL-managed. For heavy AMMOS users, much of the projects MOS development cost may involve the cost of customizing AMMOS capabilities: it is mostly AMMOS hardware and software that needs to be customized by a project. The Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) project w

13、as able to customize a GDS by adapting AMMOS software at minimal cost, whereas developing a unique GDS instead would have required development of up to 10 million source lines of new code (MSLOC) at a cost of at least ten-fold. Even with the maximum use of AMMOS capabilities, however, projects still

14、 need to develop some project-specific MOS elements or tools. For example, it would not be practical for AMMOS to supply instrument-specific science data analysis software because it would have to be so heavily customized to meet the needs of the particular instrument. The recent GRAIL (Reference (2

15、), Stardust/NExT (New Exploration of Comet Tempel 1) (Reference (3), and EPOXI (Extrasolar Planet Observation and Deep Impact Extended Investigation) projects were very successful in containing MOS development costs and experienced few performance problems during the mission because they tailored th

16、eir MOS needs to the established AMMOS capabilities. Despite the cost, schedule, and risk mitigation benefits, adapting an MOS to a project presents some challenges. AMMOS must provide mission operations engineering tools and services that can support a wide and increasing range of deep space missio

17、n types (e.g., orbiters, landers, rovers, penetrators, balloons). Reference (4) provides an example of the complexity of the operations and science data return planning process for a Mars rover. Novel hardware on a spacecraft may necessitate operating software, tools, and processes that are not in t

18、he AMMOS inventory. However, the present AMMOS bears little resemblance to the AMMOS of the 1980s: with each additional spaceflight project it has served, AMMOS capabilities have expanded to allow a new project to select more AMMOS elements for adaptation to their MOS. Without AMMOS, it would cost N

19、ASA approximately an additional $300M over 10 years to design and implement an MOS for each project. References: 1. Terry D. (Dave) Linick, “NASAs Advanced Multimission Operations System (AMMOS),“ Presentation to the NASA Director of Science and Robotic Exploration, revised November 28, 2011. 2. Cha

20、rles E. Bell, “GRAIL Project Lessons Learned (Initial Release),“ NASA Structure Management (NSM) No. 408256, October 7, 2011, Paragraph MOS-5. 3. Don Sweetnam, NExT Lessons Learned Project Document, July 5, 2011, Paragraph GDS-4. 4. “Managing Rover-Orbiter Relay Link Prediction Variability,“ LLIS #1

21、765, NASA Engineering Network, October 6, 2006. http:/www.nasa.gov/offices/oce/llis/imported_content/lesson_1765.html Lesson(s) Learned: The NASA engineering culture prizes MOS development plans that offer to maximize the performance achievable by ground and flight systems. Nevertheless, NASA projec

22、ts have saved significant MOS development costs and mitigated risk by adapting existing AMMOS capabilities to the new mission, instead of developing a new MOS, to the maximum extent feasible. Rather than constraining innovation, the use of proven AMMOS Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or

23、 networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-capabilities may provide projects with more freedom to innovate because most of the risks have been mitigated by fixing anomalies on previous projects. Recommendation(s): Spaceflight projects may derive significant benefits from being AMMOS “capabil

24、ity-driven,” matching their MOS needs to the established AMMOS capabilities instead of selecting only those AMMOS elements that precisely match mission needs. They should perform a review of the AMMOS system to determine which AMMOS software, tools, and services can be customized to match their miss

25、ion characteristics, and which project MOS needs are unique and truly require new MOS development. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: JPL has referenced this lesson learned as additional rationale and guidance supporting Paragraph 5.2.3 (“Management Practices: Planning”) in the Jet Propul

26、sion Laboratory standard “Flight Project Practices, Rev. 7,” JPL DocID 58032, September 30, 2008. Documents Related to Lesson: N/A Mission Directorate(s): Space Operations Additional Key Phrase(s): Missions and Systems Requirements Definition.Requirements critical to costing and cost credibility Sys

27、tems Engineering and Analysis.Engineering design and project processes and standards Systems Engineering and Analysis.Long term sustainability and maintenance planning Systems Engineering and Analysis.Mission and systems trade studies Engineering Design (Phase C/D).Software Engineering Additional Ca

28、tegories.Software Additional Categories.Ground Operations Mission Operations and Ground Support Systems.Mission operations systems Mission Operations and Ground Support Systems.Mission control Planning Mission Operations and Ground Support Systems.Ground support systems Engineering Design (Phase C/D

29、).Spacecraft and Spacecraft Instruments Missions and Systems Requirements Definition.Mission concepts and life-cycle planning Additional Categories.Standard Additional Categories.Spacecraft Additional Info: Project: Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL), Stardust/NExT (New Exploration of

30、Tempel 1), Extrasolar Planet Observation and Deep Impact Extended Investigation (EPOXI), Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, and others Approval Info: Approval Date: 2012-11-01 Approval Name: mbell Approval Organization: HQ Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-