REG NASA-LLIS-1555-2005 Lessons Learned - External Relations Customers Tech Transfer.pdf

《REG NASA-LLIS-1555-2005 Lessons Learned - External Relations Customers Tech Transfer.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《REG NASA-LLIS-1555-2005 Lessons Learned - External Relations Customers Tech Transfer.pdf（5页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1555Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1555a71 Lesson Date: 2005-01-01a71 Submitting Organization: ARCa71 Submitted by: Donald R. Mendozaa71 Authored by: Ronald C WinterlinSubject: External Relations, Customers, Tech Transfer Abstract: Most all projects in todays environment invar

2、iably require the cooperation and support of multiple organizations both in development and acceptance of project deliverables (including multiple government agencies, the projects customers, educational institutions and potential industry stakeholders and users). With resources scarce at all levels

3、 and close oversight and scrutiny (both internally and externally), the importance of the inevitable matrix organizations established to carry out programs and projects from formulation through implementation cannot be overemphasized. The AATT Project made a significant effort in communicating and d

4、eveloping agreements with key partners such as the FAA, as a primary receiver/user of the Projects products. A multitude of Memorandum of Understanding/Agreements, etc, were established and utilized during the life of this project. Clearly, the partnership with the FAA proved to be the Projects grea

5、test challenge. With continuous management and organizational changes at all levels, policy and procedure changes, etc., AATT experienced problems, as grouped and summarized below: A. Interacting with, and learning to work with an entirely different federal agency such as the FAA: It took much time

6、and resources to experience and understand key cultural and organizational differences involving everything from policy, procedures, politics, and communication processes in both technical and administrative/management domains. Comments at all levels across the AATT Project demonstrate that this was

7、 one of the most significant ongoing challenges. The FAA failed for a number of reasons to provide consistent single points of contact (POC) for any appreciable length of time. One manager reports that “the average life” of an FAA POC has been less than 2 years”. Also, unexpected union issues and co

8、ncerns ensued with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) and the Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS), which were increased since AATT had a presence at more than one FAA facility. To further complicate things, Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking

9、permitted without license from IHS-,-,-continual shifts and/orreorganizations within the FAA resulted in AATT technology being moved from organization to organization constantly requiring NASA managers and researchers to educate and establish relationships with new FAA personnel. B. Resource Support

10、: As the AATT Project matured, FAA commitments to provide joint support funding, personnel and/or facilities declined for a number of reasons. AATT learned the high risk this really is from the start and how it can lead to de-scoping, schedule delays or tradeoffs not originally foreseen. C. Technica

11、l Transfer of Project Products: AATT invested much time and energy in working with a number of FAA POCs at various levels to establish an agreed upon process and understanding of technologies to be passed on for further development and implementation into the National Airspace System (NAS). The FAA

12、has stated that they are often unprepared for the research NASA develops that they are then expected to further develop and implement into the operational environment. The AATT tailored TRL (Technology Readiness Level) process has been used for these purposes. An ongoing problem AATT has experienced

13、 is the FAAs desire and need to know how a newly developed NASA technology being handed over, will fit into the evolving NAS. D. External Agreements and Management Support: As indicated above, the AATT Project was subjected to much instability and organizational dynamics in its relationship to the F

14、AA. Formal agreements that were made and in place between the FAA and the AATT Project regarding technologies to be prototyped, demonstrated, and transferred in support of stakeholder requirements were ignored. In light of this, it is crucial to gain long-term top-level management support from any a

15、nd all key participating organizations including necessary resource commitments. Description of Driving Event: N/ALesson(s) Learned: For all of the above listed examples, the importance of establishing strong up-front relationships and communications between all levels of management authority down t

16、o working collaborations cannot be overemphasized. This is especially important when two large federal agencies are involved that must work successfully together to research and develop complex technical concepts and tools that must be passed from one to the other for implementation into the operati

17、onal systems of the real world. Recommendation(s): A. A strong partnership with the FAA that includes the FAA Air Traffic organization buy-in and support is necessary for NASA to be successful in air traffic management research and technology demonstration. Access to FAA controllers and facilities i

18、s a critical element and impacts resulting Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-from FAA Labor Management problems/issues must be limited. It is important to continue whatever positive relationships and interactions are formed with FAA per

19、sonnel regardless of their direct connection to FAA/NASA formal organizational relationships. Some in AATT have suggested that an FAA “champion” be identified for technical advocacy of each tool or concept NASA is developing and planning to hand over and that specific funding to support this advocac

20、y be set aside. This “champion” must know the technology and be highly supportive of its potential benefits. B. Future projects and programs should not make assumptions regarding resource commitments and ensure that the realistic possibility that these may not come through is included in the project

21、s risk management and mitigation plans. FAA personnel (both civil service and contractor) should work in NASA ATM Labs to ensure and facilitate the technical understanding and working relationships. Of course, withdrawal of resources and/or deliverables promised due to management/organizational prio

22、rity or political changes should be held to a minimum. This includes not just funding, but also personnel, expertise, management, administrative support and facilities. NASA requires a consistent and stable relationship with key customer organizations like the FAA and this relationship should be ref

23、lected in top level policies, procedures and resultant agreements across all involved agencies. Related to the above, when project milestone success criteria have external dependencies, such as FAA resources and approval for controller evaluations, they are extremely vulnerable. NASA should not esta

24、blish program level milestone criteria that are dependent on FAA schedules. As an example, almost half of the AATT Project was completed before a process stabilized for requesting and obtaining controllers for tests and simulations or access to FAA facilities. To mitigate these situations when they

25、do occur, the AATT Project recommends setting milestone and success criteria such that should an external dependency fail to come through, the milestone can still be met with resources under the projects control. C. A clear understanding of the engineering rationale for design decisions would make t

26、he FAA better equipped to plan the deployment process, evaluate deployment sites, establish guidelines for evaluation, manage controller expectations, and address new technical challenges. In turn, the FAA must clearly define the metrics by which a system will be evaluated and adhere to them as deve

27、lopment progresses. The operational concept should be clearly communicated to all deployment sites so that they understand what kind of functionality was developed and for what reasons. In the future, NASA will have to become more involved in defining how to integrate our new system tools into the N

28、AS and work more closely with FAA personnel to understand the NAS and plans for its evolution. We need to insist on being involved in understanding current FAA systems and development efforts in order to ensure that our products get fielded and used operationally. This will require that all partners

29、 agree on which technology to develop and transfer and FAA acceptance should not be limited to controllers at just one site. Additionally, NASA needs to ensure it is delivering everything the FAA needs for their Joint Research Council (JRC), including documentation. D. Top level management support a

30、nd the resulting agreements must be documented and signed by Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-individuals with appropriate responsibility and authority to assure commitment and delivery by all parties throughout the life of the project

31、. A single executive POC within the FAA responsible for identifying and resolving any issues or problems with an appropriate time metric for resolution is desirable. AATT could also have benefited from more advocacy and support at the Program and NASA Headquarters levels especially in coordinating a

32、nd negotiating with the FAA. AATT found that the Interagency ATM Integrated Product Team (IAIPT) was not very effective in making or enforcing the critical connections, negotiations and agreements. Resultant joint agreements must be continuously communicated downward to all participants/contributors

33、 and honored for the life of the project. If NASA is to be successful in influencing the modernization and transformation of the NAS, a process for air traffic management research transfer must be developed and agreed to at the highest levels in NASA and the FAA and subsequently adhered to throughou

34、t the life of each program/project. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Sciencea71 Aeronautics Researcha71 Space OperationsAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Policy & Planninga71 Program and Project Managementa71 Research & DevelopmentAdditional Info: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Organization: ARCProvided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-