REG NASA-LLIS-1526--2004 Lessons Learned - Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT) Credible Independent Cost Estimates are Needed Early in a Project.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1526Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1526a71 Lesson Date: 2004-07-01a71 Submitting Organization: MSFCa71 Submitted by: Donald DugalSubject: Next Generation Launch Technology (NGLT)/Credible, Independent Cost Estimates are Needed Early in a Project Abstract: The X-43C Project dev

2、eloped an internal cost effort using X-43A actual cost data and heritage United States Air Force (USAF) engine cost data. Two independent cost estimates were performed that were within 10% of the project estimate. Contract proposal estimates came in more than 50% over these estimates. This created s

3、ignificant problems for NASA and the USAF, ultimately contributing to its cancellation. The Agency should possess the ability to perform credible, independent cost estimates. Description of Driving Event: The X-43C Project was a complex hypersonic flight demonstration. Three flight elements were lin

4、ked to perform the mission. This scenario was similar to the Hyper-X (X-43A) Program, with the exception of the DV propulsion system. The X-43C Project developed an internal cost effort using X-43A actual cost data and heritage United States Air Force (USAF) engine cost data. Two independent cost es

5、timates were performed that were within 10% of the project estimate. Contract proposal estimates came in more than 50% over these estimates. This created significant problems for NASA and the USAF, ultimately contributing to its cancellation.Lesson(s) Learned: Inaccurate cost estimates place project

6、 and program continuity in peril. Project staffs do not have cost-estimating experience and NASA independent cost estimates are lacking. Contributing factors to poor cost estimates are immature understanding of complex requirements, transition to a full-cost environment, “never-been-done-before” con

7、tent and insufficient time for program formulation. Badly under-predicted costs wreak havoc on projects, resulting in slipped schedules, de-scope of Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-content, and, potentially, cancellation.Recommendatio

8、n(s): The Agency should possess the ability to perform credible, independent cost estimates. This expertise could be externally procured from DoD or industry contractors. Major procurements should not be awarded before such a cost assessment is accomplished. NASA should implement multi-phase procure

9、ments, with options for major development in later phases and/or competitive awards of a separate conceptual design/ cost development contract prior to competition for major hardware development contracts. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Direc

10、torate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Space Operationsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Administration/Organizationa71 NASA Standardsa71 Policy & Planninga71 Program and Project Managementa71 Research & DevelopmentAdditional Info: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2005-07-12a71 Approval Name: Lisa Carra71 Approval Organization: MSFCa71 Approval Phone Number: 256-544-2544Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-