ITU-T SERIES K SUPP 5-2016 ITU-T K 81 C Estimation examples of the high-power electromagnetic threat and vulnerability for telecommunication systems (Study Group 5).pdf

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1、 I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n ITU-T Series K TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU Supplement 5 (04/2016) SERIES K: PROTECTION AGAINST INTERFERENCE ITU-T K.81 Estimation examples of the high-power electromagnetic threat and vulnerability for telecom

2、munication systems ITU-T K-series Recommendations Supplement 5 K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) i Supplement 5 to ITU-T K-series Recommendations ITU-T K.81 Estimation examples of the high-power electromagnetic threat and vulnerability for telecommunication systems Summary When information security is

3、 managed, it is necessary to evaluate and mitigate the threat to either the equipment or the site. This threat is related to “vulnerability“ and “confidentiality“ in information security management system (ISMS). Supplement 5 to ITU-T K-series Recommendations presents evaluation and calculation exam

4、ples for the threat of an intentional high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HPEM) attack. The HPEM sources considered are those presented in IEC 61000-2-13, as well as some additional sources that have emerged more recently. This Supplement also provides information on the vulnerability of telecom eq

5、uipment, and presents the example of vulnerability. It is desirable that the equipment meets the immunity requirements presented in Recommendation ITU-T K.48 and relevant resistibility requirements, such as those described in Recommendations ITU-T K.20, ITU-T K.21 and ITU-T K.45. History Edition Rec

6、ommendation Approval Study Group Unique ID* 1.0 ITU-T K Suppl. 5 2016-04-27 5 11.1002/1000/12965 Keywords Electromagnetic security, electrostatic discharge, high-altitude electromagnetic pulse, HPEM, IEMI, immunity, resistibility. * To access the Recommendation, type the URL http:/handle.itu.int/ in

7、 the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendations unique ID. For example, http:/handle.itu.int/11.1002/1000/ 11830-en. ii K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) FOREWORD The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommun

8、ications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunic

9、ations on a worldwide basis. The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedur

10、e laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-Ts purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. NOTE In this publication, the expression “Administration“ is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommuni

11、cation administration and a recognized operating agency. Compliance with this publication is voluntary. However, the publication may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the publication is achieved when all of these mandatory p

12、rovisions are met. The words “shall“ or some other obligatory language such as “must“ and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the publication is required of any party. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTSITU draws attention t

13、o the possibility that the practice or implementation of this publication may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside

14、of the publication development process. As of the date of approval of this publication, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this publication. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest informat

15、ion and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at http:/www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/. ITU 2016 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU. K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) iii Table of Con

16、tents Page 1 Scope . 1 2 References . 1 3 Definitions 1 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere 1 3.2 Terms defined in this Supplement 2 4 Abbreviations and acronyms 2 5 Conventions 3 6 Calculating HPEM threat 3 6.1 Impulse radiating antenna (IRA) and JOLT . 3 6.2 Commercial radar . 7 6.3 Navigation radar . 8 6

17、.4 Magnetron generator 9 6.5 Illegal citizen band radio 11 6.6 Amateur radio . 12 6.7 Stun gun 14 6.8 Lightning-surge generator 16 6.9 CW generator 17 6.10 Commercial power supply 18 7 Vulnerability of IT equipment 18 7.1 Vulnerability to an electromagnetic wave attack . 18 7.2 Vulnerability evaluat

18、ion of a sample device 21 7.3 Vulnerability to electrostatic discharge 24 Bibliography. 25 iv K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) Introduction In order to establish the sufficient mitigation to HPEM attacks, it is extremely important that the threat level (electric field strength) and the vulnerability

19、of telecom equipment are adequately estimated. This Supplement provides the calculation examples of threat level from various sources presented in IEC 61000-2-13. The vulnerability examples of telecom equipment are also provided. K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) 1 Supplement 5 to ITU-T K-series Recom

20、mendations ITU-T K.81 Estimation examples of the high-power electromagnetic threat and vulnerability for telecommunication systems 1 Scope This document is a supplement to ITU-T K.81. This Supplement presents evaluation and calculation examples for the threat of an intentional HPEM attack. 2 Referen

21、ces ITU-T K.20 Recommendation ITU-T K.20 (2016), Resistibility of telecommunication equipment installed in a telecommunications centre to overvoltages and overcurrents. ITU-T K.21 Recommendation ITU-T K.21 (2016), Resistibility of telecommunication equipment installed in customer premises to overvol

22、tages and overcurrents. ITU-T K.43 Recommendation ITU-T K.43 (2009), Immunity requirements for telecommunication network equipment. ITU-T K.45 Recommendation ITU-T K.45 (2016), Resistibility of telecommunication equipment installed in the access and trunk networks to overvoltages and overcurrents. I

23、TU-T K.48 Recommendation ITU-T K.48 (2006), EMC requirements for telecommunication equipment Product family Recommendation. ITU-T K.81 Recommendation ITU-T K.81 (2016), High-power electromagnetic immunity guide for telecommunication systems. IEC 61000-2-13 IEC 61000-2-13 (2005), Electromagnetic comp

24、atibility (EMC) Part 2-13: Environment High-power electromagnetic (HPEM) environments Radiated and conducted. IEC CISPR 24 CISPR 24 (2010), Information technology equipment Immunity characteristics Limits and methods of measurement. 3 Definitions 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere This Supplement uses the

25、following terms defined elsewhere: 3.1.1 availability b-ISO/IEC 27002: Ensuring that authorized users have access to information and associated assets when required. 3.1.2 confidentiality ITU-T K.81: Ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized to have access. Information leakage

26、 due to insufficient electromagnetic emanations security (EMSEC) is a risk to this confidentiality. In this Recommendation, if the equipment cannot be EM mitigated itself, the emission values of existing electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) requirements indicate the level of this confidentiality. 3.1

27、.3 emanation b-IETF RFC 2828: A signal (electromagnetic, acoustic, or other medium) that is emitted by a system (through radiation or conductance) as a consequence (i.e., by-product) of its operation, and that may contain information. (See: TEMPEST.). 2 K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) 3.1.4 EM mitig

28、ation ITU-T K.81: The preparations made to avoid either: a malfunction due to a vulnerability caused by high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP) or high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) emissions, or a lack of confidentiality due to an insufficient electromagnetic emanations security (EMSEC). The lev

29、el of the EM mitigation of the equipment can be calculated from the threat level and the vulnerability level. 3.1.5 electromagnetic emanations security ITU-T K.81: Physical constraints to prevent information compromise through signals emanated by a system, particularly the application of TEMPEST tec

30、hnology to block electromagnetic radiation. 3.1.6 threat: A potential security violation that arises from taking advantage of a vulnerability caused by high-altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP) or high-power electromagnetic (HPEM) emissions, and which could lead to a lack of confidentiality due to

31、 insufficient electromagnetic emanations security (EMSEC). The level of a HPEM threat is defined by the intrusion area, the portability and the availability but also by the strength of the electromagnetic field. 3.1.7 vulnerability ITU-T K.81: The possibility that the equipment does not function cor

32、rectly when exposed to HEMP or HPEM. 3.2 Terms defined in this Supplement None. 4 Abbreviations and acronyms This Supplement uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: AM Amplitude Modulation CB Citizen Band CW Continuous Wave DC Direct Current EM Electromagnetic EMC Electromagnetic Compatibilit

33、y EMSEC EM emanations Security FET Field Effect Transistor FM Frequency Modulation FTP File Transfer Protocol GTEM Gigahertz Transverse Electromagnetic HEMP High-altitude EM Pulse HF High Frequency HPEM High Power EM IGBT Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistor IP Internet Protocol IRA Impulse Radiating A

34、ntenna ISMS Information Security Management System K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) 3 ISP Internet Service Provider IT Information Technology LAN Local Area Network NEBS Network Equipment Building Systems PC Personal Computer SE Shield Effect TCP Transfer Control Protocol VSWR Voltage Standing Wave R

35、atio 5 Conventions None. 6 Calculating HPEM threat 6.1 Impulse radiating antenna (IRA) and JOLT IRA is one example of a method, described in Annex B of IEC 61000-2-13, of electromagnetic wave radiation with a high-tech level that causes a high-voltage pulse to be generated in a device at the focus o

36、f a parabolic reflector. An image of a parabolic reflector is shown in Figure 1. Annex B of IEC 61000-2-13 also provides detailed examples of IRA, and examples of the electromagnetic field strengths that are generated. Of the examples provided, the one with the strongest electric field strength is “

37、prototype USA“ and Figure 2 shows the relationship between the peak electric field strength and the associated protection distance. In the case of “prototype USA“, the parabolic reflector diameter is 3.66 m, so the portability level is evaluated as being PIV (see Table 1 in ITU-T K.81). Therefore, t

38、he intrusion area on the attack side becomes Zone 0. In the case of Zone 0, the minimum protection distance is taken to be 100 m, so the maximum peak electric field strength is found to be approximately 12.8 kV/m. Figure 1 Image of an IRA 4 K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) Figure 2 Relationship betwe

39、en the IRA peak electric field strength and the protection distance (Pulse voltage: 60 kV, parabolic reflector diameter: 3.66 m) Figure 3 shows the example of measured basic characteristics of IRA. The IRA-3M (Farr Research, Inc.) is used for the measurement. The IRA-3M parabolic reflector is 46 cm

40、in diameter and has a focal length of 23 cm. Figure 3(a) shows the frequency dependence of the antenna gain. The antenna gain has an almost flat level, at about 22 dBi, from 4 GHz to 15 GHz. Figure 3(b) shows the return loss (S11 parameter) and the voltage standing wave ratio (VSWR) characteristics

41、of the same IRA. Figure 3 Basic characteristics of the IRA (Farr Research, Inc.; IRA-3M) Figure 4 shows an example of performance of the HPEM pulse propagation of the same IRA. The waveform and frequency spectrum (FFT of the waveform) of the HPEM pulse used in this measurement are shown in Figures 4

42、(a) and 4(c), respectively. The HPEM pulse source (Grant Applied Physics) was used to generate this pulse. The time dependence of electric field strength of the radiated pulse, measured at 3 m away from the IRA on boresight, is shown in Figure 4(b), and its frequency spectrum is shown in Figure 4(d)

43、. The main frequency spectrum of the HPEM pulse expands to above 2 GHz and the IRA has the potential to radiate almost the whole spectrum range of this pulse (except for the direct current (DC) component). The peak electric field strength was about 270 V/m in this case. K series Supplement 5 (04/201

44、6) 5 Figure 4 Performance of the high-power electromagnetic pulse propagation of the IRA The JOLT system is composed of an IRA antenna with a repetitive high impulse generator. Figure 5 shows an overview of the JOLT system. The radiated field has a fairly flat spectrum from about 50 MHz to about 2 G

45、Hz. The pulsed power system is centred on a very compact resonant transformer capable of generating over 1 MV at a pulse-repetition frequency of 600 Hz. This is switched, via an integrated transfer capacitor and an oil peaking switch onto an 85-ohm half-impulse radiating antenna. This unique system

46、will deliver a far radiated field with a full-width at half-maximum on the order of 100 ps, and a field-range product (rEfar) of 5.3 MV, exceeding all previously reported results. Figure 5 Overview of the JOLT system The dependence between far-field electric field strength and the distance r is deri

47、ved from Equation (1). The far-field distance r is derived from Equation (2). 6 K series Supplement 5 (04/2016) (1) (2) where: geometric impedance factor fg is the ratio of the antenna input impedance Zc to the characteristic impedance of free space Z0, or fg = (Zc/Z0); D is the diameter of IRA; is

48、the assumed maximum rate of rise. The values are shown in Table 1; the symbol c is the speed of light in the vacuum; and tmr is the maximum rate of the rise of the voltage the same as dV/dt. Table 1 Achievable peak values of (rEfar) for assumed maximum rate of rise Case Assumptions about the maximum

49、 rate of rise of the voltage wave-form launched on to the reflector Peak value of (rEfar) from Equation (1) 1.08 109 (dV/dt)max “Gain“ (rEfar)/Vp 1 Vp 800 kV; tmr 200 ps (dV/dt) max 4 1015 V/s 4.32 MV 5.4 2 Vp 800 kV; tmr 160 ps (dV/dt) max 5 1015 V/s 5.40 MV 6.75 3 Vp 1 MV; tmr 200 ps (dV/dt) max 5 1015 V/s 5.40 MV 5.4 4 Vp 1 MV; tmr 180 ps (dV/dt) max 5.556 1015 V/s 6.0 MV 6.0 5 Vp 1 MV; tmr 150 ps (dV/dt) max 6.667 10