CEN TR 16968-2016 Electronic Fee Collection - Assessment of security measures for applications using Dedicated Short-Range Communication.pdf

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1、PD CEN/TR 16968:2016Electronic Fee Collection Assessment of securitymeasures for applicationsusing Dedicated Short-RangeCommunicationBSI Standards PublicationWB11885_BSI_StandardCovs_2013_AW.indd 1 15/05/2013 15:06PD CEN/TR 16968:2016 PUBLISHED DOCUMENTNational forewordThis Published Document is the

2、 UK implementation of CEN/TR16968:2016.The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to TechnicalCommittee EPL/278, Intelligent transport systems.A list of organizations represented on this committee can beobtained on request to its secretary.This publication does not purport to include all

3、the necessaryprovisions of a contract. Users are responsible for its correctapplication. The British Standards Institution 2016. Published by BSI StandardsLimited 2016ISBN 978 0 580 92597 9ICS 35.240.60Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity fromlegal obligations.This Published Doc

4、ument was published under the authority of theStandards Policy and Strategy Committee on 31 May 2016.Amendments issued since publicationDate Text affectedPD CEN/TR 16968:2016TECHNICAL REPORT RAPPORT TECHNIQUE TECHNISCHER BERICHT CEN/TR 16968 May 2016 ICS 35.240.60 English Version Electronic Fee Coll

5、ection - Assessment of security measures for applications using Dedicated Short-Range Communication Elektronische Gebhrenerhebung - Beurteilung von Sicherheitsmanahmen fr Anwendungen mit dedizierter Nahbereichskommunikation This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 11 April 2016. It has been draw

6、n up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 278. CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Lu

7、xembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey andUnited Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION COMIT EUROPEN DE NORMALISATION EUROPISCHES KOMITEE FR NORMUNG CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brus

8、sels 2016 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members. Ref. No. CEN/TR 16968:2016 EPD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 2 Contents Page European foreword . 4 Introduction 5 1 Scope 6 2 Terms and definitions . 6 3 Abbreviations . 9 4 Me

9、thod . 10 5 Security Objectives and Functional Requirements 13 5.1 Target of evaluation 13 5.2 Security objectives . 14 5.2.1 Introduction . 14 5.2.2 Confidentiality . 14 5.2.3 Availability . 14 5.2.4 Accountability . 14 5.2.5 Data integrity . 14 5.3 Functional security requirements . 15 5.3.1 Intro

10、duction . 15 5.3.2 Confidentiality . 15 5.3.3 Availability . 17 5.3.4 Accountability . 18 5.3.5 Data integrity . 20 5.4 Inventory of assets . 21 5.4.1 Functional Assets . 21 5.4.2 Data Assets 22 6 Threat analysis 22 7 Qualitative risk analysis 24 7.1 Introduction . 24 7.1.1 General . 24 7.1.2 Likeli

11、hood of a threat . 24 7.1.3 Impact of a threat . 25 7.1.4 Classification of Risk . 26 7.2 Risk determination 26 7.2.1 Definition of high and low risk context 26 7.2.2 Threat T1: Access Credentials keys can be obtained 27 7.2.3 Threat T2: Authentication keys can be obtained . 27 7.2.4 Threat T3: OBU

12、can be cloned . 28 7.2.5 Threat T4: OBU can be faked 28 7.2.6 Threat T5: Authentication of OBU data can be repudiated . 29 7.2.7 Threat T6: Application data can be modified after the transaction 29 7.2.8 Threat T7: Data in the VST is not secure 30 7.2.9 Threat T8: DSRC Communication can be eavesdrop

13、ped 30 7.2.10 Threat T9: Correctness of application data are repudiated . 31 7.2.11 Threat T10: Master keys may be obtained from RSE 31 7.3 Summary . 31 PD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 3 8 Proposals for new security measures . 32 8.1 Introduction 32 8.2 Security measures to counter risks r

14、elated to key recovery 32 8.3 Recommended countermeasures . 34 8.4 Qualitative cost benefit analysis . 35 9 Impact of proposed countermeasures 35 9.1 Current situation and level of fraud in existing EFC systems using CEN DSRC link 35 9.2 EETS legislation . 36 9.3 Analysis of effects on existing EFC

15、systems . 36 9.3.1 Affected roles . 36 9.3.2 The CEN DSRC equipment Manufacturers . 36 9.3.3 The Toll Service Providers 37 9.3.4 The Toll Chargers . 37 10 Recommendations 38 10.1 Add security levels and procedures to EN ISO 14906 38 10.2 Recommendation for other EFC standards . 39 10.3 New standards

16、 . 39 Annex A (informative) Current status of the DEA cryptographic algorithm 40 A.1 Overview 40 A.2 ISO/IEC 9797-1 (MAC Algorithm 1) 40 A.3 FIPS 46 (DEA Specification DES) 40 A.4 ENISA recommendations . 41 Annex B (informative) Security considerations regarding DSRC in EFC Standards 42 B.1 Security

17、 vulnerabilities in EN 15509 and EN ISO 14906 42 B.2 Security vulnerabilities in EN ISO 12813 (CCC) . 42 B.3 Security vulnerabilities in EN ISO 13141 (LAC) . 43 B.4 Security vulnerabilities in CEN/TS 16702-1 (SM-CC) 43 Bibliography . 44 PD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 4 European foreword T

18、his document (CEN/TR 16968:2016) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 278 “Intelligent transport systems”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN. Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN and/or CENELEC shal

19、l not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. PD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 5 Introduction Security for dedicated short-range communication (DSRC) applications in the context of electronic fee collection (EFC) has a long history in standardization. Currently th

20、e area is covered by several standards and technical specifications, successively developed over time: EN ISO 14906 (Electronic fee collection - Application interface definition for dedicated short-range communication) provides a toolbox of functions and security measures which can be used for DSRC

21、application. CEN ISO/TS 19299 (Electronic fee collection - Security framework) analyzes the threats to an EFC system as a whole, and not specifically for the DSRC technology. EN ISO 12813 (Electronic fee collection - Compliance check communication for autonomous systems) and EN ISO 13141 (Electronic

22、 fee collection - Localisation augmentation communication for autonomous systems) mirrors the best-practice security measures of EN 15509. CEN/TS 16702-1 (Electronic fee collection - Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems - Part 1: Compliance checking) provides an EFC enforcement concept, par

23、tially dependent on a DSRC application. EN 15509 (Electronic fee collection - Interoperability application profile for DSRC) defines an interoperable application profile which comprises a selection of such measures with a definition of security algorithms associated to it. It is based on the experie

24、nce of many EU projects related to DSRC-EFC. As the security domain has evolved, it is now necessary to analyze again the threats, vulnerabilities and risks of using the CEN DSRC technology in all DSRC-based applications related to EFC. Technological advances and proliferation of cryptographic tools

25、 and knowledge has made an attack on the security procedures of DSRC more likely. This technical report (TR) identifies context dependent risks on the DSRC link and proposes security measures to counter them and the points out what new standard deliverables that are needed. PD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/T

26、R 16968:2016 (E) 6 1 Scope This Technical Report includes a threat analysis, based on CEN ISO/TS 19299 (EFC - Security Framework), of the CEN DSRC link as used in EFC applications according to the following Standards and Technical Specification EN 15509:2014, EN ISO 12813:2015, EN ISO 13141:2015, CE

27、N/TS 16702-1:2014. This Technical Report contains: a qualitative risk analysis in relation to the context (local tolling system, interoperable tolling environment, EETS); an assessment of the current recommended or defined security algorithms and measures to identify existing and possible future sec

28、urity leaks; an outline of potential security measures which might be added to those already defined for DSRC; an analysis of effects on existing EFC systems and interoperability clusters; a set of recommendations on how to revise the current standards, or proposal for new work items, with already m

29、ade implementations taken into account. The security analysis in this Technical Report applies only to Security level 1, with Access Credentials and Message authentication code, as defined in EN 15509:2014. It is outside the scope of this Technical Report to examine Non DSRC (wired or wireless) inte

30、rfaces to the OBE and RSE. 2 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. 2.1 access credentials trusted attestation or secure module that establishes the claimed identity of an object or application SOURCE: EN 15509:2014, 3.1 2.2 accountability

31、 property that ensures that the actions of an entity may be traced uniquely to that entity SOURCE: ISO 7498-2:1989, 3.3.3, modified PD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 7 2.3 asset anything that has value to a stakeholder SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.3 2.4 attack attempt to destroy, expose,

32、 alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use of an asset SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.4 2.5 attribute addressable package of data consisting of a single data element or structured sequences of data elements SOURCE: EN ISO 17575-1:2016, 3.2 2.6 authentication sec

33、urity mechanism allowing verification of the provided identity SOURCE: EN 301 175 2.7 authenticator data, possibly encrypted, that is used for authentication SOURCE: EN 15509:2014, 3.3 2.8 confidentiality prevention of information leakage to non-authenticated individuals, parties and/or processes SO

34、URCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.11 2.9 data integrity property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.28 2.10 hacker person who attempts or succeeds to gain unauthorized access to protected resources SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.19 P

35、D CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 8 2.11 key management generation, distribution, storage, application and revocation of encryption keys SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 17574:2009, 3.13 modified 2.12 message authentication code MAC string of bits which is the output of a MAC algorithm SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9797

36、-1:2011, 3.9 2.13 non-repudiation ability to prove the occurrence of a claimed event or action and its originating entities SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.27 2.14 on-board equipment OBE all required equipment on-board a vehicle for performing required EFC functions and communication services 2.15

37、on-board unit OBU single electronic unit on-board a vehicle for performing specific EFC functions and for communication with external systems Note 1 to entry: An OBU always includes, in this context, at least the support of the DSRC interface 2.16 reliability ability of a device or a system to perfo

38、rm its intended function under given conditions of use for a specified period of time or number of cycles SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 14907-1:2015, 3.17 2.17 roadside equipment RSE equipment located along the road, either fixed or mobile SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 14907-1:2015, 3.17 2.18 security target set of secur

39、ity requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 17574:2009, 3.25 PD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 9 2.19 target of evaluation TOE set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance SOURCE: ISO/IEC 154

40、08-1:2009, 3.1.70 2.20 threat potential cause of an unwanted information security incident, which may result in harm SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.39 2.21 threat agent entity that has the intention to act adversely on an asset SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.40 2.22 threat analysis systematic de

41、tection, identification, and evaluation of threats SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.41 2.23 toll charger TC entity which levies toll for the use of vehicles in a toll domain SOURCE: ISO 17573:2010, 3.16 modified 2.24 toll service provider TSP entity providing toll services in one or more toll domain

42、s SOURCE: ISO 17573:2010, 3.23 modified 2.25 transaction counter data value in the on-board unit that is incremented by the roadside equipment at each transaction SOURCE: EN 15509:2014, 3.23 2.26 vulnerability weakness of an asset or control that can be exploited by an attacker SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19

43、299:2015, 3.51 3 Abbreviations For the purposes of this document, the following symbols and abbreviations apply. PD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 10 AES Advanced Encryption Standard CCC Compliance check communication (EN ISO 12813) COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf DEA Data Encryption Algorithm

44、 DES Data Encryption Standard DSRC Dedicated Short-Range Communication (EN ISO 14906) EETS European Electronic Toll Service IAP Interoperable Application Profile LAC Localisation augmentation communication (EN ISO 13141) MAC Message authentication code NIST National Institute of Standards and Techno

45、logy OBE On-board Equipment OBU On-board Unit RSE Roadside Equipment SM-CC Secure Monitoring Compliance Check (CEN/TS 167021:2014) TOE Target Of Evaluation TVRA Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis VST Vehicle Service Table 4 Method The method in this technical report is based on the method of ET

46、SI/TS 102 165-1 which defines a 10 step method which in turn is based on ISO/IEC 15408 and is especially adapted to communication interfaces. This approach is also used in ETSI/TR 102 893. The 10 steps are listed below: 1) Identification of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) resulting in a high-level de

47、scription of the main assets of the TOE and the TOE environment and a specification of the goal, purpose and scope of the Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis (TVRA). See 5.1. 2) Identification of the objectives resulting in a high-level statement of the security aims and issues to be resolved. S

48、ee 5.2. 3) Identification of the functional security requirements, derived from the objectives from step 2. See 5.3. 4) Inventory of the assets as refinements of the high-level asset descriptions from step 1 and additional assets as a result of steps 2 and 3. See 5.4. 5) Identification and classific

49、ation of the vulnerabilities in the system, the threats that can exploit them, and the unwanted incidents that may result. See Clause 6. 6) Quantifying the occurrence likelihood and impact of the threats. See 7.1. 7) Establishment of the risks. See 7.2. PD CEN/TR 16968:2016CEN/TR 16968:2016 (E) 11 8) Identification of countermeasures framework (conceptual) resulting in a list of alternative security services and capabilities needed to reduce the risk. See 8.2. 9) Countermeasure cost-benefit analysis (