BS EN 419251-1-2013 Security requirements for device for authentication Protection profile for core functionality《鉴定设备安全需求 核心功能性的防护性配置文件》.pdf

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1、raising standards worldwideNO COPYING WITHOUT BSI PERMISSION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY COPYRIGHT LAWBSI Standards PublicationBS EN 419251-1:2013Security requirements for device for authenticationPart 1: Protection profile for core functionalityBS EN 419251-1:2013 BRITISH STANDARDNational forewordThis B

2、ritish Standard is the UK implementation of EN 419251-1:2013. The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to T e c h n i c a l Committee IST/17, Cards and personal identification.A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary.This publicat

3、ion does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Users are responsible for its correct application. The British Standards Institution 2013. Published by BSI Standards Limited 2013.ISBN 978 0 580 74076 3 ICS 35.240.15 Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunit

4、yfrom legal obligations.This British Standard was published under the authority of the Standards Policy and Strategy Committee on 30 April 2013.Amendments issued since publicationDate T e x t a f f e c t e dBS EN 419251-1:2013EUROPEAN STANDARD NORME EUROPENNE EUROPISCHE NORM EN 419251-1 March 2013 I

5、CS 35.240.15 English Version Security requirements for device for authentication - Part 1: Protection profile for core functionality Profils de protection pour dispositif dauthentification - Partie 1: Dispositif avec import de cls Sicherheitsanforderungen fr Gerte zur Authentisierung - Teil 1: Schut

6、zprofil fr Kernfunktionalitten This European Standard was approved by CEN on 7 December 2012. CEN members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration. Up-to-dat

7、e lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre or to any CEN member. This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation

8、under the responsibility of a CEN member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the same status as the official versions. CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Form

9、er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION COMIT

10、EUROPEN DE NORMALISATION EUROPISCHES KOMITEE FR NORMUNG Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels 2013 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members. Ref. No. EN 419251-1:2013: EBS EN 419251-1:2013EN 419251-1:2013 (E) 2 Contents Pa

11、ge Foreword . 5 1 Scope 6 2 Normative references . 6 3 Conformance 6 3.1 CC Conformance Claim . 6 3.2 PP Claim . 6 3.3 Package Claim 6 3.4 Conformance Rationale . 6 3.5 Conformance Statement 6 4 Terms and definitions 7 5 Symbols and abbreviations . 9 6 Overview of the target of evaluation . 9 6.1 TO

12、E Type 9 6.2 TOE Usage 9 6.3 Security Features of the TOE . 9 6.4 Examples of applications. 10 6.4.1 E-government . 10 6.4.2 Multiple applications 11 6.5 Required non-TOE Hardware and Software 11 6.6 Protection Profile Usage 11 7 TOE Environment . 12 7.1 Overall view 12 7.2 Personalisation applicati

13、on . 13 7.2.1 General . 13 7.2.2 Functionalities 13 7.2.3 Communication 13 7.3 Authentication application . 14 7.3.1 General . 14 7.3.2 Functionalities 14 7.3.3 Communication 14 7.4 Verifier 15 7.4.1 Functionalities 15 7.4.2 Communication 15 7.5 Key Generator 15 7.5.1 Functionalities 15 7.5.2 Commun

14、ication 15 7.6 Certification Authority Functionalities 15 8 Life Cycle 16 8.1 Overview . 16 8.2 Pre-Personalisation phase . 17 8.3 Personalisation phase . 18 8.3.1 General . 18 8.3.2 Personalisation application . 18 8.4 Usage phase Authentication application 18 8.4.1 General . 18 8.4.2 Verifier 19 9

15、 Security problem definition . 19 BS EN 419251-1:2013EN 419251-1:2013 (E) 3 9.1 Assets . 19 9.1.1 General . 19 9.1.2 Assets protected by the TOE . 19 9.1.3 Sensitive assets of the TOE . 19 9.2 Users . 20 9.3 Threats 21 9.4 Organisational security policies 22 9.4.1 Provided services . 22 9.4.2 Other

16、services 22 9.5 Assumptions 23 10 Security objectives . 24 10.1 General . 24 10.2 Security objectives for the TOE . 24 10.2.1 Provided service . 24 10.2.2 Authentication to the TOE 24 10.2.3 TOE management . 24 10.3 Security objectives for the operational environment 25 10.4 Rationale for Security o

17、bjectives . 26 11 Extended component definition. 30 12 Security requirements 30 12.1 General . 30 12.2 Introduction 31 12.2.1 Subjects Objects and security attributes 31 12.2.2 Operations 31 12.3 Security functional requirements 32 12.3.1 General . 32 12.3.2 Core 32 12.3.3 KeyImp 40 12.4 Security as

18、surance requirements 43 12.5 SFR / Security objectives . 43 12.6 SFR Dependencies . 46 12.7 Rationale for the Assurance Requirements 48 12.7.1 EAL.4 methodically designed, tested, and reviewed 48 12.7.2 AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis 48 12.7.3 ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security

19、measures 48 Bibliography 49 Index 50 Figures Figure 1 TOE Security Features 12 Figure 2 Personalisation application environment 13 Figure 3 Authentication application environment 14 Figure 4 TOE Life Cycle 16 Tables Table 1 Protection of sensitive data . 24 Table 2 Security objectives vs problem def

20、inition rationale . 27 Table 3 Security attributes . 31 Table 4 Core security attributes . 35 Table 5 Core operations 35 Table 6 Core security attributes - Operation . 36 BS EN 419251-1:2013EN 419251-1:2013 (E) 4 Table 7 Core security attributes - Initial value 37 Table 8 Core security attributes up

21、dates 38 Table 9 TSF data Updates . 38 Table 10 KeyImp security attributes 40 Table 11 KeyImp security attributes - operations . 41 Table 12 KeyImp security attributes update authorised roles 42 Table 13 KeyImp security attributes Update values 43 Table 14 SFR vs Security objectives retionale 44 Tab

22、le 15 SFR dependencies 46 BS EN 419251-1:2013EN 419251-1:2013 (E) 5 Foreword This document (EN 419251-1:2013) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 224 “Personal identification, electronic signature and cards and their related systems and operations”, the secretariat of which is held by AF

23、NOR. This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by September 2013, and conflicting national standards shall be withdrawn at the latest by September 2013. Attention is drawn to the possibility th

24、at some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN and/or CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. EN 419251 contains the following parts: EN 419251-1, Security requirements for device for authentication Part 1: Protection pr

25、ofile for core functionality (the present document); EN 419251-2, Security requirements for device for authentication Part 2: Protection profile for extension for trusted channel to certificate generation application; EN 419251-3, Security requirements for device for authentication Part 3: Additiona

26、l functionality for security targets. The present document was submitted to the Enquiry under the reference prEN 16248-1. According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the following countries are bound to implement this European Standard: Austria, Belgium

27、, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerla

28、nd, Turkey and the United Kingdom. BS EN 419251-1:2013EN 419251-1:2013 (E) 6 1 Scope This European Standard is a Protection Profile that defines the security requirements for an authentication device. 2 Normative references The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in

29、this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies. ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996, Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Security

30、frameworks for open systems: Authentication framework ISO/IEC 15408-1:20091), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 1: Introduction and general model ISO/IEC 15408-21), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 2

31、: Security functional components ISO/IEC 15408-31), Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 3: Security assurance components ISO/IEC 18045, Information technology Security techniques Methodology for IT security evaluation 3 Conformance 3.1 CC Conformance C

32、laim This Protection Profile (PP) is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant and written according to ISO/IEC 15408-1, -2, -3 and ISO/IEC 18045. 3.2 PP Claim This PP does not claim conformance to any other Protection Profile. 3.3 Package Claim The evaluation assurance level for this PP is EAL4-a

33、ugmented with the assurance components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2. 3.4 Conformance Rationale Since this PP is not claiming conformance to any other protection profile, no rationale is necessary here. 3.5 Conformance Statement The conformance required by this PP is the demonstrable-PP conformance. This

34、would facilitate conformance claim to both the PP “Authentication device” and other PPs for Security Target (ST) authors. 1) ISO/IEC 15408-1, -2 and -3 respectively correspond to Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts 1, 2 and 3. BS EN 419251-1:2013EN 419251-1:2013 (E)

35、 7 4 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. 4.1 Authentication Protocol sensitive data data used in the process of authentication of the TOE by the external entity Note 1 to entry: These data are linked to the Authentication private key, e

36、.g. Authentication Certificate or APuK. Note 2 to entry: Authentication Protocol sensitive data may be empty if the environment is trusted, and the holder public key known to the system. 4.2 Certificate electronic attestation, which links the APuK to a person and confirms the identity of that person

37、 (as defined in the Directive 8, Article 2, Clause 9) 4.3 Certificate Info information associated with an Authentication key pair that consists of either: a signers public key certificate; or one or more hash values of a signers public key certificate together the identifier of the hash function use

38、d to compute these hash values, and some information which allows the signer to disambiguate between several signers certificates 4.4 Configuration set of groups Note 1 to entry: Each configuration corresponds to one PP. It has its own rationale. See 2. 4.5 Group set Assets, threats, objectives, and

39、 Requirements, addressing a specific function Note 1 to entry: See 2. 4.6 Holder legitimate holder of the authentication device Note 1 to entry: See 9.2 for more details. 4.7 Issuer user of the authentication device during personalisation Note 1 to entry: See 9.2 for more details. 4.8 Protection Pro

40、file PP implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, Clause 4 “Terms and definitions“, modified in ISO/IEC 15408-1, the protection profile refers to a TOE type instead of a TOE in this document BS EN 419251-1:2013EN 419251-1:2013 (E) 8 4.9 PP collect

41、ion document defining groups and configurations 4.10 Reference Authentication Data usually called RAD, data stored inside the TOE and used as a reference to which the VAD will be compared Note 1 to entry: This RAD can be biometrics data, a PIN, or a symmetric key. It can also be a combination of the

42、se factors. The RAD is not an Asset, it is TSF data. 4.11 Trusted channel means by which a TSF and a remote trusted IT product can communicate with necessary confidence SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, Clause 4 “Terms and definitions“ 4.12 Trusted Environment environment that ensures the protection of

43、sensitive data transfers between the TOE and a remote trusted IT product (resp. a user) Note 1 to entry: A trusted (or untrusted) environment relates to the whole communication channel between the TOE and the remote trusted IT product (resp. the user). 4.13 Untrusted Environment environment that doe

44、s not ensure the protection of sensitive data transfers between the TOE and a remote trusted IT product (resp. a user) Note 1 to entry: An untrusted (or trusted) environment relates to the whole communication channel between the TOE and the remote trusted IT product (resp. the user). 4.14 User curre

45、nt User of the TOE Note 1 to entry: The User can be the Issuer or the Holder. 4.15 Verifier entity which is or represents the entity requiring an authenticated identity Note 1 to entry: A verifier includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication exchanges. SOURCE: ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996

46、, modified the full sentence at the end of the definition in the ISO/IEC has been turned into the present Note 1 to entry 4.16 Verification Authentication Data usually called VAD, data entered into the TOE and checked against the RAD as a means of authentication Note 1 to entry: As the RAD, the VAD

47、is not an Asset, it is TSF data. BS EN 419251-1:2013EN 419251-1:2013 (E) 9 5 Symbols and abbreviations APSD Authentication Protocol Sensitive Data APrK Authentication Private Key APuK Authentication Public Key CA Certificate Authority CC Common Criteria OBKG On-Board Key Generation PIN Personal Iden

48、tification Number PC Personal Computer PP Protection Profile RAD Reference Authentication Data SSCD Secure Signature Creation Device ST Security Target TOE Target of Evaluation VAD Verification Authentication Data 6 Overview of the target of evaluation 6.1 TOE Type The aimed objective is to define s

49、ecurity requirements that an authentication device shall conform to in the perspective of a security evaluation. The Target of Evaluation (TOE 2) considered in this PP corresponds to a hardware device (such as, for example, a smart card or USB token) allowing its legitimate holder to authenticate himself when accessing an on-line service or to guarantee the origin authentication of data sent by the User to a distant agent 3). This PP has been constructed such as to