ACCA考试P1专业会计师真题2015年6月及答案解析.doc

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1、ACCA考试 P1专业会计师真题 2015年 6月及答案解析(总分：124.97，做题时间：180 分钟)一、Section A This ONE(总题数：1，分数：50.00)1.Lysus surgical supplies was founded 20 years ago by entrepreneur Simon Mara who has been the companys chief executive since the outset. Incorporated as a private company, Lysus began by importing small surgica

2、l devices such as syringes and bandages, and selling them to hospitals, clinics and medical facilities. But the company began to grow rapidly when Mr Mara realised the potential of a growing market in knee and hip joint replacements as the population in many countries was rapidly ageing due to the w

3、ider availability of more effective, low cost medicines.Fifteen years ago, he began to manufacture the surgical hip and knee joints used for most joint replacement surgery.As a company operating in the surgical supplies industry, Lysus has always been subject to regulation and must complete complian

4、ce reports every year to declare that it is using surgical grade materials for its manufacturing and also that it maintains the requisite level of hygiene in its processes. These reports are a legal compliance matter and must be signed by two directors. Lysus surgical supplies has been a private fam

5、ily (or insider) company throughout its history. Owned jointly by Simon Mara, his wife and brother, Mr Mara owns 51% of the shares, his wife, 20% and his brother 29%. All three are directors of Lysus surgical supplies. As the company grew, they sought to employ members of the extended family as much

6、 as possible, partly to provide them with jobs and partly to give a feeling of family in the company. It was often described as a tight-knit culture with family members occupying the senior positions and with few appointments made from outside the company to important roles. When the company grew to

7、 a certain size, Mr Mara decided that he needed a qualified accountant on the board of directors to help with investment appraisals, costings, cash flow management, compliance issues and financial reporting. He eventually appointed Amy Tsang, a relatively inexperienced but ambitious person to the bo

8、ard. This was her first role as finance director. Simon Mara was known to be a strong and domineering person. Some former employees described him as a bully who was unable to discuss matters in a calm manner. He was described as quick to anger and capable of intimidating even his senior colleagues s

9、uch that they would feel unable to challenge him at all. This was also the case with Amy Tsang, the new finance director. She found him overbearing and impossible to challenge. She always did as he asked,even when she felt uncomfortable with what she was being asked to do. When the joint replacement

10、 industry became more competitive, Mr Mara had the idea that he could reduce the companys unit costs by switching some of the surgical-grade materials used in manufacture for a cheaper industrial grade instead. Such a switch would be undetectable to the surgeons using the artificial joints but did i

11、ncrease the risk of fracture and deterioration once the replacement joints were used in a patient. Mr Mara asked Amy Tsang, as an accountant and finance director, to produce detailed costing calculations for the switch and to forecast how this change would affect profits. She also calculated the cos

12、ts of retooling the factory to allow the industrial grade material to be used. Later, on Mr Maras instruction, she approved the investment and oversaw the changes in manufacturing and the purchasing processes, in the full knowledge that such changes were both illegal and unethical. Mr Mara assumed t

13、hat because many of the senior employees were family members, and that he could control Amy Tsang,that the switch to industrial grade material would go undetected. The problem came to the public attention some time later when joints made from the inferior material began to deteriorate and immobilise

14、 previously mobile patients. The industrial grade material used in the joints often caused infection in patients and some vulnerable patients died of the effects of the product failure. John Qua was the investigative journalist who brought the problems at Lysus to national attention. He thought that

15、 the problems arose as a result of a probity risk and that the probity or integrity failure was on the part of Mr Mara and Amy Tsang. Mr Quas mother had received a Lysus hip joint and subsequently experienced a great deal of pain and distress when the joint deteriorated, producing some unfortunate s

16、ide effects including blood poisoning. Although his mother was able to have the joint safely removed and replaced by a better quality artificial joint, John Qua researched further and found other patients who had not been so fortunate. It was John Quas investigations into Lysus which alerted the reg

17、ulatory authorities to the use of the inferior materials in the joints. It soon emerged that the cause of the increased failure of the implants was the use of the inferior industrial-grade material. When the regulator responsible for the safety of surgical supplies discovered, thanks to John Quas re

18、search, why the joints degraded, they investigated the use of the inferior materials. The legal officers investigating the case noted that two directors had signed the most recent compliance reports, certifying that the company was fully compliant with material usage and quality standards. These wer

19、e Simon Mara and Amy Tsang. John Qua was angry with Lysus surgical supplies, because of how his mother and others had suffered. He was particularly angry with Simon Mara and Amy Tsang. As a business journalist, he often wrote articles on the behaviour and performance of listed companies. He became c

20、onvinced that it was in the public interest for producers of surgical supplies, such as Lysus, to be subject to the regulatory requirements of listed companies. In a published article, he wrote: whenever I look at company failures such as that at Lysus, I become increasingly convinced that robust wa

21、ys of embedding risk awareness and risk management are essential in all companies and not just in listed companies. It was the fact that Mr Mara could get away with his offences that is most worrying. He bullied a young accountant,Miss Tsang, into highly unprofessional behaviour, and without the sys

22、tems in place to enable the offence to be challenged internally, he initially got away with it. Had a whistleblowing system been in place, or a separation of roles at the head of the company, Mr Mara could not have done this terrible thing. Someone would have challenged him and told him not to be so

23、 unethical and arrogant. The result is that, with such a high impact business risk having been realised, innocent people working for Lysus may lose their jobs whilst patients may have to suffer the effects of this for many years. Once the case came to the public attention, Mr Mara was arrested and p

24、rosecuted for the illegal sale of non-compliant surgical materials. Amy Tsang was also prosecuted and then investigated by her professional accounting body. After an appeal, she was struck off, thereby preventing her from working as an accountant in the future. The company itself was wound up after

25、sales declined, and all 130 employees lost their jobs. Patients continue to suffer the effects of the defective joint replacements and will do for several years into the future. Required:（分数：50.00）(1).(a) Distinguish between the governance of a family-owned company like Lysus and a publicly listed c

26、ompany,and explain how Mr Mara may not have committed the offences he did if Lysus had been a publicly listed company. (10 marks)（分数：12.50）_(2).(b) Criticise Amy Tsangs behaviour as the finance director and a qualified accountant, and explain how she acted against the public interest. (10 marks)（分数：

27、12.50）_(3).(c) Briefly explain why some risks vary by industry sector and discuss why legal risk might be more relevant to surgical suppliers like Lysus than in some other industry sectors. (8 marks)（分数：12.50）_(4).(d) Write an article for the specialist magazine Investors in Companies which covers t

28、he following points. You may assume that the magazine has an educated readership. (i) Discuss the potential benefits which an effective non-executive chairman could have brought to Lysus.(8 marks) (ii) Explain, in the context of the case, how risk awareness, including probity risk, might be embedded

29、 in a company like Lysus. (10 marks) Professional marks will be awarded in part (d) for tone, format, flow and persuasiveness of the article.(4 marks) （分数：12.50）_二、Section B TWO ques(总题数：3，分数：75.00)2.Rosey and Atkins (R one must win over the other. In any stakeholder situation, including those which

30、 are in conflict, the influence can be ascertained by the Mendelow matrix.This is one way of mapping the influence of stakeholders. Identified stakeholders are assessed according to their relative power and interest. Those stakeholders with the highest combination of these variables are those with t

31、he most influence over outcomes. The local government authority has a higher structural power than the university because of its ability to grant or withhold planning consent. This is a statutory power devolved to local government authorities from central government, although it is usually required

32、that local consultation be entered into before final approval is granted. It also has limited power as a shareholder of R&A and possibly some influence as an investor in R&As funds. As an external stakeholder being an authority interested in the construction of low cost housing and both a client and

33、 a shareholder of R&A, there are considerable conflict issues. It has a social obligation to see the development approved as this will allow lower cost housing to be built where most needed. The local government authoritys interest in the activities of R&A therefore derives from two sources: its int

34、erest in providing low cost housing and its concern for the profitability of the R&A company in which is holds shares. The university has less power over the planning decision because it has no statutory power, is not a shareholder in R&A directly and has a lesser investment in R&As funds than the l

35、ocal authority as an R&A client. It is likely that the views of such an important local institution would be taken into account, however, because a successful university is important in the development of Housteads as a town. The local government authority must balance the claims of a number of stak

36、eholders when taking decisions of this type, including the economic interests of R&A. The interest of the university is over the spoiled view from one of its buildings (sometimes referred to as a visual amenity). The university is of the opinion that the new houses will reduce the view over countrys

37、ide currently enjoyed. The weight given to the value of the view over and against the social value of the new housing development to the local government authority and the local community is an ethical matter and one which, in this case, seems to have been decided in favour of the development.)解析：3.

38、A major corporate governance code contains the following entry on audit committees. The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for considering how they should apply the corporate reporting and risk management and internal control principles and for maintaining an appropriate rela

39、tionship with the companys external auditors. The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two,independent non-executive directors. In smaller companies the company chairman may be a member of, but not chair, the committee in addition to the i

40、ndependent non-executive directors, provided he or she was considered independent on appointment as chairman. All audit committee members should be considered independent upon appointment to the committee. The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit committee has recent and

41、 relevant financial experience. When Hafnium Company floated on the stock exchange, it attempted to establish the audit committee required by the listing rules. It was unable to recruit a non-executive director with the requisite financial experience so it appointed experienced non-executive directo

42、r, Sophie Xu, as the committee chairman. Sophie Xu was a technical engineer. She was appointed to the board of Hafnium because of her expertise in the technology used by Hafnium and she understood the companys business model and its systems. But she did not understand financial matters. Sophie Xu to

43、ld colleagues that she did not understand much about the concept of independence. She said that in her own field of engineering, colleagues inside and outside a certain company often supported each other and that this was often encouraged. As a community of specialists, they often found that helping

44、 each other was an important part of professional life over the years. Accordingly, she said she did not really understand why independence was important for audit committee members. She also said that she did not understand much about the companys relationship with the external auditors. Required:（

45、分数：24.99）(1).(a) Define independence in the context of audit committees, and explain why audit committee members should be considered independent at the time of their appointment. (8 marks) （分数：8.33）_正确答案：(Define independence Independence is a quality possessed by individuals and refers to the avoid

46、ance of being unduly influenced by a vested interest. This freedom enables a more objective position to be taken on issues compared to those who consider vested interests or other loyalties. In the case of the independence of the members of an audit committee, it is important that members are not in

47、fluenced by the companys finance function or other members of the executive board. The independence of audit committee members can be threatened by over-familiarity with, for example, executive directors,which is why many corporate governance codes have measures in place to prevent over-familiarity.

48、 These include restrictions on share option schemes for non-executives directors (NEDs), time-limited appointments and bans on cross-directorships.Other restrictions, depending on jurisdiction and code, include salaries being set at an appropriate level for NEDs, a compulsory number of years after retirement from a company before being eligible for a NED role (if ever), and no close personal relationships between execu