ISO IWA 14-2-2013 Vehicle security barriers - Part 2 Application (First Edition Corrected Version 01 15 2014)《车辆安全屏障 第2部分 应用 (第一版 修正版本01 15 2014)》.pdf

《ISO IWA 14-2-2013 Vehicle security barriers - Part 2 Application (First Edition Corrected Version 01 15 2014)《车辆安全屏障 第2部分 应用 (第一版 修正版本01 15 2014)》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《ISO IWA 14-2-2013 Vehicle security barriers - Part 2 Application (First Edition Corrected Version 01 15 2014)《车辆安全屏障 第2部分 应用 (第一版 修正版本01 15 2014)》.pdf（68页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、 ISO 2013 Vehicle security barriers Part 2: Application Barrires de scurit de vhicule Partie 2: Applications INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP AGREEMENT IWA 14-2 Reference number IWA 14-2:2013(E) First edition 2013-11-15 Corrected version 2014-01-15 IWA 14-2:2013(E)ii ISO 2013 All rights reserved COPYRIGHT PRO

2、TECTED DOCUMENT ISO 2013 All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Pe

3、rmission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISOs member body in the country of the requester. ISO copyright office Case postale 56 CH-1211 Geneva 20 Tel. + 41 22 749 01 11 Fax + 41 22 749 09 47 E-mail copyrightiso.org Web www.iso.org Published in Switzerland IWA 14-2:2013(E) IS

4、O 2013 All rights reserved iii Contents Page Foreword v Introduction vi 1 Scope . 1 2 Introduction to hostile vehicle mitigation . 1 2.1 General . 1 2.2 Selection of a VSB 3 3 The threat 3 3.1 Identify and quantify the threat . 3 3.2 Duration of deployment 4 4 Assets 4 4.1 Identification of the crit

5、ical assets . 4 4.2 Identification of stakeholders 4 4.3 Consideration of collateral damage 5 5 Site assessment 5 5.1 Review of existing security arrangements 5 5.2 Site survey . 5 5.3 Civil works 6 5.4 Traffic survey 8 6 Site design 9 6.1 Traffic management 9 6.2 Aesthetics .10 7 VSB performance .1

6、0 7.1 Impact performance 10 7.2 Vehicle speed .11 7.3 Impact angle .12 7.4 Vehicle penetration distance and major debris distance/coordinates .12 7.5 Operational performance12 8 Procurement strategy 16 8.1 General 16 8.2 Availability and maintenance of the VSB .16 8.3 Quality .16 8.4 Cost .16 8.5 Co

7、mmissioning and handover 17 9 Deployment and removal .17 9.1 Highway/local authority approval 17 9.2 Logistics of deployment .17 9.3 Installation .17 9.4 Lifting and placement 18 9.5 Removal considerations .18 10 Types of VSB .18 10.1 General 18 10.2 Passive VSBs .18 10.3 Active VSBs 18 10.4 Example

8、s of passive VSBs .19 10.5 Examples of active VSBs .21 11 Active VSBs .25 11.1 General 25 11.2 Categories of active VSBs 26 11.3 Layout of active VSBs at VACPs 28 11.4 Safety issues .31 IWA 14-2:2013(E)iv ISO 2013 All rights reserved 11.5 Training 33 11.6 Maintenance, service and inspection 33 11.7

9、Control system34 12 Operational requirements 34 12.1 General 34 12.2 Level 2 OR proforma .37 Annex A (informative) Level 2 operational requirement (OR) proforma .38 Annex B (informative) Design method 53 Annex C (informative) Modifications to the VSB .56 Bibliography .57 IWA 14-2:2013(E) Foreword IS

10、O (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical co

11、mmittee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of electro

12、technical standardization. The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was dra

13、fted in accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives). Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent r

14、ights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents). Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not cons

15、titute an endorsement. For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISOs adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information Inte

16、rnational Workshop Agreement IWA 14 was sponsored by UK Governments Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) on behalf of the international community. The development of this IWA was facilitated by BSI Standards Limited. It came into effect on 15 November 2013. IWA 14 consists of

17、the following parts, under the general title Vehicle security barriers: Part 1: Performance requirement, vehicle impact test method and performance rating Part 2: Application This corrected version of IWA 14-2:2013 incorporates editorial modifications. ISO 2013 All rights reserved v IWA 14-2:2013(E)

18、 Introduction 0.1 Workshop contributors Acknowledgement is given to the following organizations that were involved in the development of this International Workshop Agreement: Allen Total Perimeter Security Limited APT Security Systems ATG Access Ltd BRE Global Limited Bristorm, Hill and Smith Ltd C

19、entre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) DELTA BLOC International GmbH GME Springs/Safetyflex Barriers Heald Limited HMS Nelson, Portsmouth Naval base Kirchdorfer Fertigteilholding GmbH L.I.E.R. Marshalls MFD International Limited Ministry of Commerce and Industry Director General

20、for Standards and Metrology (DGSM) (Sultanate of Oman) MIRA Ltd Norwegian Defence Estates Agency Perimeter Protection Group Perimeter Security Suppliers Association Rhino Engineering Ltd Royal Military Academy - Civil and Materials Engineering Department RSSI Barriers Slzer GmbH Scorpion Arresting S

21、ystems LTD Ministry of Home Affairs (Singapore) Sudanese Standard and Metrology Organization (SSMO) Syrian Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology (SASMO) Tallwang KVI PTY Ltd t/a AVS-ellivi ISO 2013 All rights reserved IWA 14-2:2013(E) Technical and Test Institute for Construction Pragu

22、e Texas A 2) attack method to be mitigated; 3) countermeasures; 4) response to increased threat conditions; 5) enforceable stand-off distance; b) business needs: 1) lifetime cost (training, manning levels, service, maintenance and replacement); 2) traffic management; 3) appearance; 4) internal and e

23、xternal stakeholder requirements; International Workshop Agreement IWA 14-2:2013(E) ISO 2013 All rights reserved 1 IWA 14-2:2013(E) 5) security risks induced by safety concerns or systems; c) engineering constraints: 1) architectural; 2) foundations; 3) buried services; 4) land ownership and availab

24、le space; 5) local authority planning restriction(s) (e.g. height/weight/noise restrictions of area of land, utilities). 2.1.3 It is important that a security operational requirement (OR) (see Clause 12) is developed in con- junction with a user requirement document (URD) and that all key stakeholde

25、rs are involved from the outset. 2.1.4 The considered elements (i.e. security ORs, user requirements) can adversely influence each other. Therefore early consideration of acceptable compromises should be made, particularly with re- gard to the security and safety aspects of the VSBs. 2.1.5 There is

26、likely to be a need to prevent unauthorized vehicle movement, to allow the safe, se- cure and timely transit of legitimate vehicles. Additionally, long-term security issues relating to system reliability and a change in threat level can also compromise the initial ORs. An unreliable VSB is unac- cep

27、table and has additional implications that may include costly compensatory measures to correct the condition. A change in threat can result in heightened security response levels and VSBs and procedures that cannot operate either safely or securely in that new environment. NOTE See Clause 12 for fur

28、ther information on ORs. 2.1.6 Risk assessments should be conducted for safety and security early in the project design phase of project planning and after final installation to ensure the level of risk acceptable to the site is estab- lished and maintained. These assessments should be shared with o

29、r jointly produced by the stakehold- ers (e.g. site owner, security and safety representatives, project manager, staff association). The early engagement with the stakeholders can facilitate the development of business cases and can help identify potential issues, associated costs and constraints. 2

30、.1.7 Often vehicular access has to be provided through the VSB line. The vehicles should be searched or be of known authenticity before arriving at the vehicle access control point (VACP). In this instance a single or multiple access point may be provided through the stand-off barrier line, e.g. ris

31、ing, swing or sliding gate barriers. Where the stand-off measure forms the site boundary or site secure perimeter, the VACP then typically becomes the first point of challenge for all vehicles. 2.1.8 Regardless of the type of active VSB installed, a secondary access control point should be consid- e

32、red. This is to ensure that where the VSBs fail or there is an incident at the main VACP , traffic can easily be diverted to the secondary location. This location should be able to accommodate the traffic volumes typical to the main VACP while maintaining the same level of operational security. 2.1.

33、9 Where an entrance has more than one VSB, for example a separate entry barrier and exit barrier, then each VSB should have independent drive and control systems. This is to prevent a cascade or nodal failure as a result of one VSB developing a fault. They may share the same user interface, hydrauli

34、c cir- cuits and electrical systems, but should be designed so that its failure does not disable all VACPs. Provi- sion of an uninterruptable power supply (UPS) or standby generator should also be considered.2 ISO 2013 All rights reserved IWA 14-2:2013(E) 2.2 Selection of a VSB 2.2.1 The selection o

35、f a VSB is dependent on a number of factors, including but not limited to: a) the threat (Clause 3); b) the assets to be protected (Clause 4); c) the site (Clauses 5 and 6); d) the required performance of the VSB (Clause 7); e) the procurement strategy (Clause 8); f) deployment and removal of the VS

36、B (Clause 9); g) the type of VSB required (Clauses 10 and 11). 2.2.2 The decision process for the selection of VSBs is illustrated in the flow diagrams in Clause 12, which covers ORs. 3 The threat 3.1 Identify and quantify the threat 3.1.1 Review any previous terrorist, criminal or malicious inciden

37、ts and consider their relevance to your site regarding the target and attack methods used. NOTE Contact your national, regional or local security force. 3.1.2 There are five main types of vehicle-borne threat. All can be deployed with or without the use of suicide operatives. a) Parked vehicles wher

38、e unscreened vehicles are parked adjacent to a site, in underground parking facilities or overlooking a site. b) Encroachment (exploiting gaps in defences) where a hostile vehicle is negotiated through an incomplete line of barriers or an incorrectly spaced line of barriers without the need to impac

39、t. An alternative form of encroachment attack is exploitation of an active barrier system at a vehicle access control point (VACP) by a hostile vehicle “tailgating” a legitimate vehicle. c) Penetrative attacks where the front or rear of the hostile vehicle is used as a ram. d) Deception techniques a

40、 “Trojan” vehicle (one whose model, livery or registration is familiar to the site), or where hostile occupants negotiating their way through by pretence or by using stolen (or cloned) access control or ID passes. Alternative scenarios include an unwitting “mule”, a driver unknowingly delivering an

41、Improvised Explosive Device (IED) surreptitiously planted in their vehicle by an attacker, or an “insider” bringing an IED in to their own work site. Deception techniques prey on human and operational weaknesses. e) Duress techniques the driver of a legitimate vehicle is forced to carry an IED or wh

42、ere a guard controlling a VACP is forced to allow a vehicle entry. These are perhaps the most difficult forms of vehicle borne threat to defend against. 3.1.3 Site design can also accommodate countermeasures for layered attack scenarios using one or more of the threat types given in 3.1.2 a) to e),

43、for instance, the use of a first hostile vehicle to create a gap by way of penetrative attack or blast which then allows a second to encroach through. ISO 2013 All rights reserved 3 IWA 14-2:2013(E) 3.1.4 Potential threats to be considered: a) whether the vehicle is parked outside or inside the secu

44、rity perimeter; b) size of vehicle (both largest and smallest); c) speed and direction of approach. 3.2 Duration of deployment 3.2.1 The period for which security measures is required (design life) should be defined. 3.2.2 Assess whether the security measures are to be operated continuously or occas

45、ionally. Decide whether a permanent, semi-permanent or temporary installation is required and identify the level of protection that the security measure is required to provide. Decide how and where the system is to be controlled from, i.e. controlled locally by guard, from a central control room or

46、through the use of auto- matic access control systems (AACS). 3.2.3 A permanent installation is a physical measure, which may require significant civil engineering works and is expected to remain for the life of the asset. 3.2.4 A temporary installation is a physical measure that may be deployed on

47、the basis that it remains in situ for a short period of time. The extent of the remedial measures required upon removal are kept to a minimum. 3.2.5 A semi-permanent installation is defined as a hybrid installation that incorporates some transi- tory elements that can be retracted or removed leaving

48、 any permanent foundation or anchorage in situ. 3.2.6 Assess and review at regular intervals whether the security measures need to be adapted to a change in the threat. 4 Assets 4.1 Identification of the critical assets 4.1.1 The assets to be protected should be identified, i.e. machinery, infrastru

49、cture, equipment, one or more buildings, an area, public event, or crowded place. 4.1.2 If more than one asset is identified, they should be prioritized. 4.1.3 It should be determined whether there is an existing defensible security perimeter and whether there is a need to establish a temporary or permanent perimeter security scheme. 4.1.4 The physical VSB strategy may be coordinated with adjacent interested parties. 4.2 Identification of stakeholders The contact informati