REG NASA-LLIS-2616-2010 Lessons Learned Performance Driven Space Shuttle Lacks Design for Operations.pdf

《REG NASA-LLIS-2616-2010 Lessons Learned Performance Driven Space Shuttle Lacks Design for Operations.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《REG NASA-LLIS-2616-2010 Lessons Learned Performance Driven Space Shuttle Lacks Design for Operations.pdf（2页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、Public Lessons Learned Entry: 2616 Lesson Info: Lesson Number: 2616 Lesson Date: 2010-04-12 Submitting Organization: KSC Submitted by: Annette Pitt Subject: Performance Driven Space Shuttle Lacks Design for Operations Abstract: Design decisions made early in a programs development can significantly

2、affect the operational efficiency of the delivered vehicle. There seems to have been a lack of appreciation of this fact within the space launch vehicle design community in the past, and specifically from the performance-oriented design disciplines. There is a need to define the operational implicat

3、ions of top-level design choices on operationally driven Figures of Merit (FOM) in the conceptual or Pre-Phase A/Phase A stage of design. At this critical stage, top-level parameters are being traded against each other in order to achieve an initial converged (and possibly optimized) design point. B

4、y doing this, it may be possible to incorporate considerations from lessons learned from operational experience into future designs. Specific Design for Operations approaches for future reusable launch systems are included in the attached paper. Description of Driving Event: The Space Shuttle orbite

5、r is an intricate machine, with various embedded subsystems in proximity to one another that need careful scrutiny when being refurbished for the next flight. As such, it requires extensive processing during turnaround. This causes a proportional increase in manpower and physical resources that has

6、a direct affect on the recurring cost of the Space Shuttle. Lesson(s) Learned: Processing requirements that increased the cost of the Space Shuttle Program can be directly traced to the selection of subsystems in the architecture. Because choices were made without sufficient consideration given to h

7、ow a particular design approach could improve the operability of the launch system, the optimistic predictions for the Shuttles flight rate and processing requirements did not materialize. Recommendation(s): To improve the operability of any new space vehicle, the architecture should be designed fro

8、m the outset to be more efficient. The operational effect of design approaches should be defined, quantified, and traded against performance enhancements early in the development cycle. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/A Documents Related to Lesson: Click here to download communicatio

9、n document. Mission Directorate(s): Mission and systems trade studies Long-term sustainability and maintenance planning Systems analysis cost analysis Engineering design and project processes and standards Ground support systems Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Additional Key Phrase(s): N/A Additional Info: Project: Space Shuttle Program Approval Info: Approval Date: 2010-06-22 Approval Name: mbell Approval Organization: HQ Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-