REG NASA-LLIS-2257-2009 Lessons Learned Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) Launch Vehicle Mishap Investigation Results.pdf
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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 2257Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 2257a71 Lesson Date: 2009-11-10a71 Submitting Organization: JPLa71 Submitted by: David Oberhettingera71 POC Name: Arthur F. Obenschain (OCO MIB Chair); Ralph Basilioa71 POC Email: arthur.f.obenschainnasa.gov; ralph.r.basiliojpl.nasa.gova71 PO
2、C Phone: 818-354-3228 (R. Basilio)Subject: Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) Launch Vehicle Mishap Investigation Results Abstract: The February 2009 OCO mission failed to attain orbit aboard a Taurus launch vehicle, and the OCO satellite payload was lost. A mishap investigation board identified four
3、 potential causes that could have led to the failure: (1) failure of the Frangible Joint Subsystem, (2) insufficient electrical current to initiate the ordnance devices, (3) insufficient pressure supplied by the fairing pneumatic system, and (4) snagging of the Flexible Confined Detonating Cord. The
4、 board provided 11 related recommendations.Description of Driving Event: The Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO), an Earth orbiting satellite mission managed by the NASA/Caltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory, was designed to make precise, time-dependent, global measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide (
5、CO2). On February 24, 2009, OCO failed to reach orbit aboard a Taurus launch vehicle, and the OCO payload and mission were lost. The proximate cause of the mishap was the failure of the Taurus payload fairing (Figure 1) to separate during ascent (Reference (1). A standard component of expendable lau
6、nch vehicles, a payload fairing is a clamshell-shaped cover that encloses and protects a payload on the pad and during early flight. The fairing is jettisoned when the launch vehicle has achieved an altitude where aeroheating of the payload is no longer a factor. The fairing should have been jettiso
7、ned shortly after Stage 2 ignition, but it remained attached for the remainder of the flight. Failure to shed the fairing mass prevented the satellite from attaining the orbital velocity needed to reach its planned orbit, Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without l
8、icense from IHS-,-,-resulting in atmospheric reentry and loss of the $260 million mission. Figure 1. Taurus Launch VehicleReferences: 1. “Overview of the Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO) Mishap Investigation Results For Public Release,“ MyNASA, July 16, 2009, http:/www.nasa.gov/pdf/369037main_OCOex
9、ecutivesummary_71609.pdf.Lesson(s) Learned: See “Recommendations“Recommendation(s): The findings of the NASA Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) for OCO that were not restricted as proprietary information, or as International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)-sensitive, were released as Reference (1).
10、 Although no flight hardware from the OCO mission was recoverable for examination, the MIB identified four potential causes that could have led to the failure, along with related recommendations: 1. Frangible Joint Subsystem failure caused fairing not to separate. It could not be determined if the f
11、rangible joint base ring fractured completely as designed. An incomplete fracture could have resulted in the fairing not separating. The MIB looked at the materials Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-used and their characteristics and re
12、commended: 1-1. Verify that the Taurus launch vehicle frangible joint extrusions have a traceable pedigree on future NASA missions. If pedigree cannot be verified, remove and replace the assigned hardware with frangible joints that have a complete pedigree. 1-2. Establish a single heat treat lot req
13、uirement for aluminum used to manufacture extrusion and perform sub-scale tests on the lot. 1-3. Institute permanent marking (which cannot be removed during processing) along the length of the extrusion at intervals to ensure traceability. 1-4. Implement a common procurement and assembly process for
14、 frangible joints used on the launch vehicle. 2. Electrical Subsystem failure caused fairing not to separate. It could not be determined if the transient bus supplied sufficient electrical current to initiate the required ordnance devices. Insufficient current could have resulted in an insufficient
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