ITU-T K 84-2011 Test methods and guide against information leaks through unintentional electromagnetic emissions (Study Group 5)《(预发布)通过无意识的电磁放射阻止信息泄露的测试方法及指导》.pdf

《ITU-T K 84-2011 Test methods and guide against information leaks through unintentional electromagnetic emissions (Study Group 5)《(预发布)通过无意识的电磁放射阻止信息泄露的测试方法及指导》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《ITU-T K 84-2011 Test methods and guide against information leaks through unintentional electromagnetic emissions (Study Group 5)《(预发布)通过无意识的电磁放射阻止信息泄露的测试方法及指导》.pdf（36页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、 International Telecommunication Union ITU-T K.84TELECOMMUNICATION STANDARDIZATION SECTOR OF ITU (01/2011) SERIES K: PROTECTION AGAINST INTERFERENCE Test methods and guide against information leaks through unintentional electromagnetic emissions Recommendation ITU-T K.84 Rec. ITU-T K.84 (01/2011) i

2、Recommendation ITU-T K.84 Test methods and guide against information leaks through unintentional electromagnetic emissions Summary In an information security management system (ISMS), based on Recommendation ITU-T X.1051 and ISO/IEC Standards 27001 and 27002, physical security is a key issue. When s

3、ecurity is managed taking the above references into consideration, we should evaluate the threats and mitigate their impact against equipment or sites. Threats are related to confidentiality in the ISMS. Recommendation ITU-T K.84 describes threats from information leakage due to unintentional electr

4、omagnetic emanations, and the two approaches of mitigation, i.e., reduction of emission from equipment and the level of site shielding are described. Information leakage test methods for conducted and radiated emission are presented. History Edition Recommendation Approval Study Group 1.0 ITU-T K.84

5、 2011-01-13 5 Keywords Emanation, EMC, emission, ISMS, security, shield. ii Rec. ITU-T K.84 (01/2011) FOREWORD The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telec

6、ommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. The World Telecommunication Standardization A

7、ssembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. In some areas of information technology

8、which fall within ITU-Ts purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. NOTE In this Recommendation, the expression “Administration“ is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. Compliance wit

9、h this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words “shall“ or some other obligatory

10、language such as “must“ and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of t

11、his Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process. As of the da

12、te of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consul

13、t the TSB patent database at http:/www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr/. ITU 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU. Rec. ITU-T K.84 (01/2011) iii Table of Contents Page 1 Scope 1 2 References. 1 3 Definitions 2

14、 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere 2 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation . 2 4 Abbreviations 3 5 Test method and guide for EMSEC 3 5.1 Threats against EMSEC . 3 5.2 Security management approach 4 5.3 EMSEC requirements for radiation 5 5.4 EMSEC requirements for conducted emission . 7 Annex A Methods

15、of testing for radiation in EMSEC 9 A.1 Overview 9 A.2 General requirements for measurement 9 A.3 Method of testing for radiation leakage (Wideband method) 10 A.4 Method of testing for radiation leakage (Narrow-band method) 11 Annex B Methods of testing for conductive coupling in EMSEC 14 B.1 Overvi

16、ew 14 B.2 General requirements for measurement 14 B.3 Method of testing for conducted leakage . 14 Appendix I Threat of EMSEC 16 I.1 Electromagnetic wave leakage . 16 I.2 Method of estimating possible distance for information leakage . 17 Appendix II Confidentiality of IT equipment . 20 Appendix III

17、 Example of wideband measurement . 22 Appendix IV Example of narrow-band measurement 24 Bibliography. 26 iv Rec. ITU-T K.84 (01/2011) Introduction Radio waves are unintentionally emitted from information technology equipment, and there have been cases where information has been reproduced by electro

18、magnetic waves being received. Information leakage due to unintentional electromagnetic radiation from equipment is related to physical security in adopting the information security management system (ISMS) based on ITU-T X.1051, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002 and b-IEC 17799. This phenomenon is refer

19、red to as EMSEC (emanation security or Electromagnetic emanation security) in this Recommendation. It is important to prevent a lack of confidentiality due to unintentional electromagnetic radiation, particularly in equipment that is handling important information. This Recommendation describes thre

20、ats and confidentiality related to EMSEC, and two approaches to mitigation methods. The first approach involves emission requirements for equipment and the second involves shielding requirements for sites, when equipment that is examined with existing EMC emission standards such as ITU-T K.48 and CI

21、SPR 22 is installed at a site. Rec. ITU-T K.84 (01/2011) 1 Recommendation ITU-T K.84 Test methods and guide against information leaks through unintentional electromagnetic emissions 1 Scope It is the purpose of this Recommendation to prevent information leakage due to unintentional electromagnetic r

22、adiation from telecommunication equipment handling important information, when the telecommunication equipment or sites are managed by ISMS. This Recommendation gives guidance to reduce the threats from information leakage due to unintentional electromagnetic emanation from information equipment at

23、telecommunication centres. Information is transmitted through electromagnetic waves unintentionally radiated from many kinds of equipment such as personal computers, data servers, laser printers, keyboards, and cryptographic modules. Amongst them, this Recommendation treats only information leakage

24、from equipment including raster scan video signal. Further study is needed on issues involving other kinds of leaked signals. Two approaches to protect against threats are given in this Recommendation. The first approach is: Emission requirements and methods of examining equipment are applied when t

25、he equipment cannot be installed in the shielding site, which should reduce the emission of the equipment. The second approach is: Shielding requirements for sites such as buildings are applied when the equipment can be installed at secure sites. 2 References The following ITU-T Recommendations and

26、other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encoura

27、ged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone docum

28、ent, the status of a Recommendation. ITU-T K.42 Recommendation ITU-T K.42 (1998), Preparation of emission and immunity requirements for telecommunication equipment General principles. ITU-T K.48 Recommendation ITU-T K.48 (2006), EMC requirements for telecommunication equipment Product family Recomme

29、ndations. ITU-T K.78 Recommendation ITU-T K.78 (2009), High altitude electromagnetic pulse immunity guide for telecommunication centres. ITU-T K.81 Recommendation ITU-T K.81 (2009), High-power electromagnetic immunity guide for telecommunication systems. ITU-T X.1051 Recommendation ITU-T X.1051 (200

30、8) | ISO/IEC 27011:2008, Information technology Security techniques Information security management guidelines for telecommunications organizations based on ISO/IEC 27002. 2 Rec. ITU-T K.84 (01/2011) CISPR 16-1 CISPR 16-1 (All parts), Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measuring appara

31、tus. CISPR 16-2 CISPR 16-2 (All parts), Specification for radio disturbance and immunity measuring apparatus and methods. CISPR 22 CISPR 22 ed 5.2 (2006), Information technology equipment Radio disturbance characteristics Limits and methods of measurement. ISO/IEC 27001 ISO/IEC 27001:2005, Informati

32、on technology Security techniques Information security management systems Requirements. ISO/IEC 27002 ISO/IEC 27002:2005, Information technology Security techniques Code of practice for information security management. 3 Definitions 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere This Recommendation uses the following

33、terms defined elsewhere: 3.1.1 availability ISO/IEC 27002: Ensuring that authorized users have access to information and associated assets when required. 3.1.2 emanation b-IETF RFC 2828: A signal (electromagnetic, acoustic, or other medium) that is emitted by a system (through radiation or conductan

34、ce) as a consequence (i.e., by-product) of its operation, and that may contain information. (See: TEMPEST.) 3.1.3 integrity ISO/IEC 27002: Safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and processing methods. 3.1.4 TEMPEST b-IETF RFC 2828: A nickname for specifications and standards for

35、limiting the strength of electromagnetic emanations from electrical and electronic equipment and thus reducing vulnerability to eavesdropping. 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation This Recommendation defines the following terms: 3.2.1 confidentiality: Ensuring that information is accessible only

36、 to those authorized to have access. EMSEC is a threat to this confidentiality. In this Recommendation, if the equipment cannot be mitigated itself, the emission values of existing electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) requirement show the level of this confidentiality. The details are described in Ap

37、pendix II. 3.2.2 electromagnetic emanations security (EMSEC): Physical constraints to prevent information compromised through signals emanated by a system, particularly by the application of TEMPEST technology to block electromagnetic radiation. In this Recommendation, the term EMSEC is used only fo

38、r information leakage due to unintentional electromagnetic emission. 3.2.3 threat: A potential security violation which could lead to a lack of confidentiality due to an insufficient electromagnetic emanation security (EMSEC). Examples of threats are described in clause 5. 3.2.4 time varying stripe:

39、 A vertical stripe pattern whose vertical lines vary. The number of stripes on the VSP increases from 1 to half the number of horizontal pixels over time. 3.2.5 vertical stripe pattern: White vertical lines on a black screen on VDU of the equipment under test (EUT). The width of the white and black

40、lines are the same. 3.2.6 vulnerability: The possibility that equipment will function falsely with EMSEC. Rec. ITU-T K.84 (01/2011) 3 4 Abbreviations This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations: AMN Artificial Mains Network BPF Band Pass Filter EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility EMSEC Emanat

41、ion security or Electromagnetic emanation security EUT Equipment Under Test ISMS Information Security Management System LM Level Meter NEBS Network Equipment Building Systems NF Noise Figure RBW Resolution Bandwidth SN Signal to Noise ratio TVS Time Varying Stripe (pattern) VBW Video Bandwidth VDU V

42、ideo Display Unit/Visual Display Unit VESA Video Electronics Standards Association VSP Vertical Stripe Pattern 5 Test method and guide for EMSEC 5.1 Threats against EMSEC EMSEC threats are determined according to comparisons of the confidentiality and threat levels as given in clause 5 of ITU-T K.81

43、. The threat level is determined by intrusion range, portability and availability of the threat devices. The threat of EMSEC is described in Appendix I. The confidentiality level of the equipment, which is evaluated with existing EMC standards, is presented in Appendix II. Examples of threats agains

44、t EMSEC are summarized in Table 5.1-1. Definitions of threat related to portability levels and threat availability levels are presented in Tables 5.1-2 and 5.1-3. The availability level shall be thought of as a measure of both the cost and the technological sophistication of the threat devices such

45、as receivers, antennas and so on. 4 Rec. ITU-T K.84 (01/2011) Table 5.1-1 Examples of threats related to information leakage Types of threats Examples of receiver Possible distance for EMSEC Threat level Threat number Confidentiality level class A Confidentiality level class B Intrusion range on att

46、ack side Portability Availability EMSEC Special receiver 330 ma)105 ma)Zone 0 PIII AIV K4-1 Special receiver 330 ma)105 ma)Zone 1 PIII AIV K4-2 General-purpose EMC receiver 59 ma)263 m 19 ma)83 m Zone 1 PII AIII K4-3 General-purpose EMC receiver 59 ma)263 m 19 ma)83 m Zone 2 PII AIII K4-4 Amateur re

47、ceiver 33 ma)148 m 11 ma)47 m Zone 1 PII AII K4-5 Amateur receiver 33 ma)148 m 11 ma)47 m Zone 2 PII AII K4-6 Amateur receiver 33 ma)148 m 11 ma)47 m Zone 3 PII AII K4-7 a)Assumed to have reinforced concrete walls as 13 dB attenuation. Table 5.1-2 Definitions of threat portability levels Threat port

48、ability level Definition PI Pocket-sized or body-worn (Note 1) PII Briefcase or backpack sized (Note 2) PIII Motor-vehicle sized (Note 3) PIV Trailer-sized (Note 4) NOTE 1 This portability level applies to threat devices that can be hidden in the human body or in clothing. NOTE 2 This portability le

49、vel applies to threat devices that are too large to be hidden in the human body or in clothing, but is still small enough to be carried by a person (such as in a briefcase or a backpack). NOTE 3 This portability level applies to threat devices that are too large to be easily carried by a person, but large enough to be hidden in a typical consumer motor vehicle. NOTE 4 This portability level applies to threat devices that are too large to be either easily carried by a person or hidden i