ETSI TR 135 909-2018 Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) LTE 3G Security Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set an example algorithm set for the 3GPP authenticat.pdf

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1、 ETSI TR 135 909 V15.0.0 (2018-07) Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 3G Security; Specification of the MILENAGE algorithm set: an example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 5: Summary and results of d

2、esign and evaluation (3GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Release 15) TECHNICAL REPORT ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V15.0.0 (2018-07)13GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Release 15Reference RTR/TSGS-0335909vf00 Keywords LTE,SECURITY,UMTS ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE Tel.: +33 4 92

3、 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16 Siret N 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C Association but non lucratif enregistre la Sous-Prfecture de Grasse (06) N 7803/88 Important notice The present document can be downloaded from: http:/www.etsi.org/standards-search The present document may be made available in el

4、ectronic versions and/or in print. The content of any electronic and/or print versions of the present document shall not be modified without the prior written authorization of ETSI. In case of any existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions and/or in print, the only prevailing

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6、ments is available at https:/portal.etsi.org/TB/ETSIDeliverableStatus.aspx If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services: https:/portal.etsi.org/People/CommiteeSupportStaff.aspx Copyright Notification No part may be reproduced or utilized in an

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8、n in all media. ETSI 2018. All rights reserved. DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTMand the ETSI logo are trademarks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM and LTETMare trademarks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. oneM2M logo is prot

9、ected for the benefit of its Members. GSMand the GSM logo are trademarks registered and owned by the GSM Association. ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V15.0.0 (2018-07)23GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Release 15Intellectual Property Rights Essential patents IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative del

10、iverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found in ETSI SR 000 314: “Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in respe

11、ct of ETSI standards“, which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web server (https:/ipr.etsi.org/). Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee can be given as to the existence of o

12、ther IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document. Trademarks The present document may include trademarks and/or tradenames which are asserted and/or registered by their owners. ETSI claims no ow

13、nership of these except for any which are indicated as being the property of ETSI, and conveys no right to use or reproduce any trademark and/or tradename. Mention of those trademarks in the present document does not constitute an endorsement by ETSI of products, services or organizations associated

14、 with those trademarks. Foreword This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities, UMTS identities or GSM identities. These should be interpreted as being

15、references to the corresponding ETSI deliverables. The cross reference between GSM, UMTS, 3GPP and ETSI identities can be found under http:/webapp.etsi.org/key/queryform.asp. Modal verbs terminology In the present document “should“, “should not“, “may“, “need not“, “will“, “will not“, “can“ and “can

16、not“ are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions). “must“ and “must not“ are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation. ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V15.0.0 (2018-07)33GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Relea

17、se 15Contents Intellectual Property Rights 2g3Foreword . 2g3Modal verbs terminology 2g3Foreword . 5g3Introduction 5g31 Scope 6g32 References 6g33 Abbreviations . 7g34 Structure of this report 8g35 Background to the design and evaluation work . 8g36 Summary of algorithm requirements 9g36.1 General re

18、quirements for 3GPP cryptographic functions and algorithms 9g36.2 Authentication and key agreement functions . 9g36.2.1 Implementation and operational considerations 9g36.2.2 Type of algorithm . 9g36.2.2.1 f1 . 9g36.2.2.2 f1* . 10g36.2.2.3 f2 . 10g36.2.2.4 f3 . 10g36.2.2.5 f4 . 10g36.2.2.6 f5 . 10g3

19、6.2.2.7 f5* . 10g37 Design criteria 11g37.1 Cryptographic Criteria 11g37.2 Implementation Criteria . 11g37.3 The need for an Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field . 11g37.4 Criteria for the cryptographic kernel 11g37.4.1 Implementation and operational considerations 12g37.4.2 Functional req

20、uirements . 12g37.4.3 Types and parameters for the kernel . 12g38 The 3GPP MILENAGE algorithms . 13g39 Rationale for the chosen design 13g39.1 Block ciphers vs. hash functions 13g39.2 The choice of Rijndael . 14g39.3 The MILENAGE architecture 15g39.3.1 Use of OP 15g39.3.2 Rotations and constants 15g

21、39.3.3 Protection against side-channel attacks . 15g39.3.4 The number of kernel operations 15g39.3.5 Mode of operation . 15g310 Evaluation . 16g310.1 Evaluation criteria 16g310.2 Operational Context . 17g310.3 Analysis 17g310.3.1 A formal proof of the soundness of the f2-f5* construction . 17g310.3.

22、2 On the f1-f1* construction and its separation from f2-f5* 19g310.3.2.1 Soundness of the f1-f1* construction 19g310.3.2.2 Separation between f1-f1* and f2-f5* . 19g310.3.3 Investigation of forgery or distinguishing attacks with 264queries . 20g310.3.3.1 An internal collision attack against f1 (or f

23、1*) . 20g3ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V15.0.0 (2018-07)43GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Release 1510.3.3.2 Forgery or distinguishing attacks against combinations of several modes 20g310.3.3.2.1 Attacks against combinations of f2-f5 . 21g310.3.3.2.2 Attacks against combinations of f1-f1* and f2-f5* . 21g310.3

24、.3.3 Conclusion about the identified forgery or distinguishing attacks 21g310.4 Statistical evaluation. 22g310.5 Published attacks on Rijndael . 22g310.6 Complexity evaluation . 23g310.6.1 Complexity of draft Rijndael implementation 23g310.6.2 Estimate complexity of modes . 23g310.6.3 Estimate of to

25、tal MILENAGE 23g310.6.4 SPA/DPA, Timing attack countermeasures 23g310.6.5 Conclusion on algorithm complexity 24g310.7 External complexity evaluations 24g310.8 Evaluation of side channel attacks 25g310.8.1 Evaluation of the kernel algorithm . 25g310.8.1.1 Timing Attacks 25g310.8.1.2 Simple Power Anal

26、ysis . 25g310.8.1.3 Differential Power Analysis 25g310.8.1.4 Other side channels . 26g310.8.2 Evaluation of the f1-f5 modes. 26g310.8.2.1 Operator Constants (OP or OPc) . 26g310.8.2.2 Rotations and constants . 26g310.8.3 Conclusion on side channel attacks 26g311 Conclusions 26g3Annex A (informative)

27、: Change history . 28g3History 29g3ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V15.0.0 (2018-07)53GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Release 15Foreword This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by the 3rdGeneration Partnership Project (3GPP). The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG

28、and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: Version x.y.z where: x the first digit: 1 presented to TSG for informat

29、ion; 2 presented to TSG for approval; 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control. y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been inco

30、rporated in the document. Introduction This Report has been produced by ETSI SAGE Task Force 172 on the design of an example set for 3GPP Authentication and Key Generation Algorithms. The work described in this report was undertaken in response to a request made by 3GPP TSG SA. SAGE Version 1.0 of t

31、his report was submitted to the 3GPP SA WG3 group in December 2000. Version 1.1 (with updated C-code in Annex 4) was approved by TSG SA#10 in December 2000. ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V15.0.0 (2018-07)63GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Release 151 Scope This report contains a detailed summary of the work perf

32、ormed during the design and evaluation of the 3GPP Authentication Functions denoted as the MILENAGE algorithm set. It contains all results and findings from this work and should be read as a supplement to the specifications of the algorithms in ref. 3 and the general project report, ref. 4. 2 Refere

33、nces The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. - References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. - For a specific reference, subsequent rev

34、isions do not apply. - For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document. 1 3G TS 33. 102 V

35、3.5.0 (2000-07) 3rdGeneration Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture. 2 3G TS 33. 105 V 3.4.0 (2000-07) 3rdGeneration Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Cryptographic

36、 Algorithm Requirements. (Release 1999) 3 ETSI/SAGE Specification. Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set: an Example Algorithm Set for the 3GPP Authentication and Key generation Functions, f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*; Document 1: Algorithm Specification. Version: 1.0; Date: 22ndNovember 20

37、00. 4 ETSI/SAGE Report. Report on the Design and Evaluation of the 3GPP Authentication and Key generation Functions; Version: 1.0; Date: 22ndNovember 2000. 5 Wassenaar Arrangement, December 1998. http:/www.wassenaar.org. 6 P. C. Kocher, Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS,

38、and Other Systems, CRYPTO96, LNCS 1109, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp. 104-113. 7 J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, C. Hall, Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers, ESORICS98, LNCS 1485, Springer-Verlag, 1998, pp. 97-110. 8 L. Goubin, J. Patarin, DES and differential power analysis, CHES99, LNCS

39、 1717, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 158-172 9 P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun, Differential Power Analysis, CRYPTO99, LNCS 1666, Springer-Verlag, 1999, pp. 388-397. 10 T. S. Messerges, Securing the AES finalists against Power Analysis Attacks, FSE00, LNCS, Springer-Verlag, to appear. 11 L. Goubin, J.-S. C

40、oron, On boolean and arithmetic masking against differential power analysis, CHES00, LNCS, Springer-Verlag, to appear. 12 Nechvatal, Barker, Bassham, Burr, Dworkin, Foti and Roback, Report on the Development of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), NIST, October 2, 2000. 13 F. Sano, M. Koike, S. K

41、awamura and M. Shiba, Performance evaluation of AES Finalists on the High-End Smart Card, The Third AES Candidate Conference, New York, April 2000. 14 M. Bellare, J. Kilian, P. Rogaway, The Security of Cipher Block Chaining, proceedings of Crypto94, Springer Verlag, pp341-358. ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V

42、15.0.0 (2018-07)73GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Release 1515 J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, AES Proposal: Rijndael, AES algorithm submission. September 3, 1999, available at http:/www.nist.gov/aes. 16 H. Gilbert and M. Minier, A collision attack on 7 rounds of Rijndael, in The Third AES Candidate Conferenc

43、e, printed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 13-14, 2000, pp. 230-241. 17 S. Lucks, Attacking Seven Rounds of Rijndael Under 192-bit and 256-bit Keys, in The Third AES Candidate Conference, printed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, April 13-14, 2000, p

44、p. 215-229. 18 N. Ferguson, et al., Improved Cryptanalysis of Rijndael, in the preproceedings of the Fast Software Encryption Workshop 2000, April 10-12, 2000. 3 Abbreviations For the purposes of the present report, the following abbreviations apply: AES Advanced Encryption Standard AMF Authenticati

45、on Management Field AK Anonymity Key AuC Authentication Centre CBC Cipher Block Chaining CK Cipher Key DES Data Encryption Standard DPA Differential Power AnalysisEEPROM Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory GF(q) The finite field of q elements 3GPP 3rdGeneration Partnership Project

46、IPA Inferential Power Analysis IK Integrity Key IV Initialisation Vector K Subscriber KeyMAC Message Authentication Code MAC-A Network Authentication CodeMAC-S Resynchronisation Authentication Code OFB Output feedback mode OP a 128-bit Operator Variant Algorithm Configuration Field that is a compone

47、nt of the functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5* OPC a 128-bit value derived from OP and K and used within the computations of the functions f1, f1*, f2, f3, f4, f5 and f5*. RAM Random Access Memory RES Response to ChallengeRNC Radio Network Controller ROM Read Only Memory SAGE Security Algorithm

48、s Group of Experts SPA Simple Power Analysis SQN Sequence Number TA Timing Attack UE User EquipmentUMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System USIM User Services Identity Module XRAM Extended RAM XRES Expected User Response ETSI ETSI TR 135 909 V15.0.0 (2018-07)83GPP TR 35.909 version 15.0.0 Rel

49、ease 154 Structure of this report The material presented in this report is organised in the subsequent clauses, as follows: - Clause 5 provides background information to the design work of the example set for 3GPP Authentication and Key generation Functions; - Clause 6 provides a summary of the algorithm requirements; - Clause 7 describes the design criteria used for the work; - Clause 8 consists of a brief presentation of the actual designs; - Clause 9 provides some background information on the chosen design; -