ARMY MIL-STD-1316 E CHG NOTICE 1-1999 FUZE DESIGN SAFETY CRITERIA FOR《引信设计的安全标准》.pdf

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1、NOT MEASUREMENT MIL-STD-1316E 10 JULY 1998 SUPERSEDING 9 APRIL 1991 MIL-STD-1316D DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DESIGN CRITERIA STANDARD FUZE DESIGN, SAFETY CRITERIA FOR AMSC N/A FSC 13GP DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reprod

2、uction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-CHANGE TO AL .L HO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DESIGN CRITERIA STANDARD FUZE DESIGN SAFETY CRITERIA FOR 1LDERS OF MIL-STD-1316E: NOT MEASUREMENT SENSITIVE MIL-STD-1316E NOTICE 1 14 JANUARY 1999 1. THE FOLLOWING PAGES OF MIL-STD-1316E HAVE BEEN RE

3、VISED AND SUPERSEDE THE PAGES LISTED: NEWPAGE 1 DATE SUPERSEDED DATE 11 PAGE 14 January 1999 10 July 1998 14 January 1999 1 O July 1998 16 10 July 1998 16 REPRINTED WITHOUT CHANGE 2. RETAIN THIS NOTICE AND INSERT BEFORE TABLE OF CONTENTS. 3. Holders of MIL-STD-1316E will verify that page changes and

4、 additions indicated above have been entered. This notice page will be retained as a check sheet. This issuance, together with appended pages, is a separate publication. Each notice is to be retained by stocking points until the military standard is completely revised or canceled. Custodians: Army -

5、 AR Navy - OS Air Force - 1 1 Review activities Army - MI Navy - AS Air Force - 99 Preparing activity: Army - AR (Project 13GP-0067) AMSC NIA FSC 13GP DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitte

6、d without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD- 13 16E , t FOREWORD 1. This Military Standard is approved for use by all Departments and Agencies ofthe Department of Defense. 2. Beneficial comments (recommendations, additions, deletions) and any pertinent data which may be of use in improving this document

7、shall be addressed to: Commander, US Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command Research and Development Center, ATTN: AMSTA-AR-QAW-E, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000, by using the self addressed Standardization Document Improvement Proposal (DD Form 1426) appearing at the end of this document or b

8、y letter. Comments should be forwarded through the designated Reviewing Activity listed for each Service in 4.9. 3. This standard establishes specific design safety criteria for fuzes. It applies primarily to the safety and arming functions performed by fuzes for use with munitions. The safety and a

9、rming requirements specified herein are mandatory fundamental elements of design, engineering, production and procurement of fuzes. Fuzes shall provide safety that is consistent with assembly, handling, storage, transportation, use, and disposal. 4. Munition fuzes historically have utilized sensitiv

10、e explosive elements whose output has been physically interrupted until arming. Control of the arming process in these fuzes was accomplished by mechanical means. The advent and rapid advancement in solid state electronics has furnished alternatives for fuze safety design. In recent years, advances

11、in explosive initiation elements have provided an option for eliminating the need for physical interruption of the explosive train. The application of these technology advances is addressed in the Current revision to these standards. Supersedes page ii of 10 July 1998 II Provided by IHSNot for Resal

12、eNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-1316E CONTENTS PARAGRAPH 1 . 1.1 1.2 1.3 2 . 2.1 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.2 3 . 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3 -6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.1 1 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 3.17 3.18 3.19 3.20 3.21 3.22 3.23 3.24 3.25 3.26 3.27 SCOPE Purpose Application

13、 . Excluded munitions APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS Government documents Specifications. standards and handbooks . Other Government documents. drawings and Order of precedence . publications DEFINITIONS . General . Armed Assembled fuze . Common mode failures . Credible environment Credible failure mode Dud .

14、 Enabling . Environment . Environmental stimdus . Explosive ordnance disposal Fail-safe feature . Firmware . Function . Fuze (Fuzing System) . Fuze installation . Fuze safety system . Independent safety feature. Initiator . Interrupted explosive train Launch cycle . Main charge Maximum No-Fire-Stimu

15、lus . Premature function Arming delay Booster and lead explosives . Explosive train . PAGE 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 iii Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,- MIL-STD-331bE 9977733 0502547 70

16、3 MIL-STD- 13 16E PARAGRAPH PAGE 3.28 Primary explosives . 7 3.29 Safe separation distance . 7 3.30 Safety and arming device 7 3.3 1 Safety feature . 7 3.32 Safety system failure . 7 3.33 Sensor, environmental 7 3.34 Sterilization 7 4 . 4.1 4.2 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.2.4 4.3 4.3.1 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6.1 4.6

17、.2 4.6.3 4.6.4 4.6.5 4.6.5.1 4.6.6 4.6.6.1 4.7 4.8 4.9 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS General . Fuze safety system Safety redundancy Arming delay Manualarming Electronic Logic Functions . Safety system failure . Analyses . Design approval . Design features . Storedenergy Compatibility of fuze elements Manuall

18、y enabled safety features Electrical firing energy Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) . Non-armed condition assurance options . Visual indication . Documentation . Electromagnetic environments . Reviewing authority . Design for quality control, inspection and maintenance . EOD reviewing authority 8 8

19、 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 13 5 . DETAILED REQUIREMENTS . 14 5.1 General . 14 5.2 Post-safe-separation safety 14 5.3.1 Explosive compositions 14 5.3.2 Explosive sensitivity of lead and booster explosives 14 5.3 Explosive materials and trains . 14 5.3.3 Explosive train inte

20、rruption 15 5.3.4 Non-interrupted explosive train control . 16 5.3.4.1 Electrical initiator sensitivity 16 iV Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-PARAGRAPH 5.4 5.4.1 5.5 5.6 5.7 6 . 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 TABLE I PAGE Sterilizati

21、on . 17 Sterilization of torpedoes and sea miles 17 Fail-safe design . 17 Self-destruction . 17 Fuzesetting 17 NOTES . 18 Intended use . 18 Additional Criteria 18 Issue of DODISS . 18 Custodian of service-approvals for lead and 18 Hazard analysis . 18 International Standardization Agreements . 18 Su

22、bject term (key word) listing 19 Changes from previous issue . 19 Booster explosives Approved explosives 15 V Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-1316E 1. SCOPE 1.1 Purpose. This standard establishes design safety criteria for fuz

23、es and Safety and Arming (S a fuze requiring no added components or parts to prepare it for installation into the munition in which it is to function. Assembling the fke is the process of putting the parts and components together. 3.5 Booster and lead explosives. Booster and lead explosives are comp

24、ounds or formulations, such as those explosives listed in Table I of 5.3.2, which are used to transmit and augment the detonation reaction. 3.6 Common mode failures. Multiple failures that result from, or are caused by, seemingly unrelated failures or an adverse environment. Examples include the fai

25、lure of two gates on a single digital integrated circuit due to loss of the ground lead to the chip or failure of two transistors due to exposure to a high temperature environment. 3.7 Credible environment. An environment that a device may be exposed to during its life cycle (manufacturing to tactic

26、al employment, or eventual demilitarization). These include extremes of temperature and humidity, electromagnetic effects, line voltages, etc. Combinations of environments that can be reasonably expected to occur must also be considered within the context of credible environments. 3.8 Credible failu

27、re mode. A failure mode resulting from the failure of either a single component or the combination of multiple components, that has a reasonable probability of occurring during a fuzing systems life cycle. 3.9 m. A munition which has failed to function, although functioning was intended. 5 Provided

28、by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,- MIL-STD-L3LbE U 9999911 0502554 943 MIL-STD-1316E 3.1 O Enabling. The act of removing or activating one or more safety features designed to prevent arming, thus permitting arming to occur subsequently. 3.1 1 En

29、vironment. A specific physical condition to which the fuze may be exposed. 3.12 Environmental stimulus. A specific stimulus obtained from an environment. 3.13 Exdosive ordnance disposal. The detection, identification, field evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of hazardous unexpl

30、oded explosive ordnance. 3.14 Explosive train, The detonation or deflagration train (i.e., transfer mechanism), beginning with the first explosive element (e.g., primer, detonator) and terminating in the main charge (e.g., munition functional mechanism, high explosive, pyrotechnic compound). 3.1 5 F

31、ail-safe design. A characteristic of a fuze system or part thereof designed to prevent fuze fnction when components fail. 3.16 Firmware. The combination of a hardware device and computer instructions or computer data that resides as read only software on the hardware device. The software cannot be r

32、eadily modified under program control. 3.17 Function. A fuze bctions when it produces an output capable of initiating a train of fire or detonation in an associated munition. 3.18 Fuze (Fuzing System). A physical system designed to sense a target or respond to one or more prescribed conditions, such

33、 as elapsed time, pressure, or command, and initiate a train of fire or detonation in a munition. Safety and arming are primary roles performed by a fuze to preclude ignition of the munition before the desired position or time. 3.19 Fuze installation. The act of installing or inserting the assembled

34、 fuze into the munition in which it is to function. 3.20 Fuze safely system The aggregate of devices (e.g., environment sensors, launch event sensors, command functioned devices, removable critical items, or logic networks, plus the initiation or explosive train interrupter, if applicable) included

35、in the fuze to prevent arming and functioning of the fuze until a valid launch environment has been sensed and the arming delay has been achieved. 3.21 Independent safety feature. A safety feature is independent if its integrity is not affected by the function or malfunction of other safety features

36、. 3.22 Initiator. A device capable of directly causing functioning of the fuze explosive train. 6 Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-13 1 6E 3.23 Interrupted explosive train. An explosive train in which the explosive path between

37、 the primary explosives and the lead and booster (secondary) explosives is functionally separated until arming. 3.24 Launch cvcle. The period between the time the munition is irreversibly committed to launch and the time it leaves the launcher. 3.25 Main charge. The explosive charge which is provide

38、d to accomplish the end result in the munition; e.g., bursting a casing to produce blast and fragmentation, splitting a canister to dispense submunitions, or producing other effects for which it may be designed. Main charge explosives are compounds or formulations such as TNT or Composition B, which

39、 are used as the final charge in any explosive application. These explosives, because of their relative insensitivity, ordinarily require initiation by a booster explosive. 3.26 Maximum No-Fire Stimulus (MNFS). The stimulus level at which the initiator will not fire or unsafely degrade with a probab

40、ility of 0.995 at a confidence level of 95 percent. Stimulus refers to the characteristic) such as current, rate of change of current (di/dt), power, voltage, or energy which is (are) most critical in defining the no-fire performance of the initiator. 3.27 Premature function. A fuze function before

41、completion of the arming delay. 3.28 Primary explosives. Primary explosives are sensitive materials, such as lead azide or lead styphngte, which are used to initiate detonation. They are used in primers or detonators, are sensitive to heat, impact or friction and undergo a rapid reaction upon initia

42、tion. 3.29 Safe separation distance. The minimum distance between the delivery system (or launcher) and the launched munition beyond which the hazards to the delivery system and its personnel resulting from the functioning of the munition are acceptable. 3.30 Safety and arming device. A device that

43、prevents fuze arming until an acceptable set of conditions has been achieved and subsequently effects arming and allows functioning. 3.3 1 Safety feature. An element or combination of elements that prevents unintentional arming or functioning. 3.32 Safety mstem failure. A failure of the fuze safety

44、system to prevent unintentional arming or functioning. 3.33 Sensor, environmental. A component or series of components designed to detect and respond to a specific environment. 3.34 Sterilization. A design feature which permanently prevents a fuze from functioning. 7 Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo

45、reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-MIL-STD-13 16E 4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS 4.1 General. The following general requirements apply to all fuzes and fuze components within the scope of this document. 4.2 Fuze safe system In order to preclude unintended fuze arming, the fuz

46、e safety system shall: a. not initiate the arming sequence except as a consequence of an intentional launch. b. not be susceptible to common-mode failures. c. not contain any single-point failure mode prior to or at the initiation of the arming cycle. d. reduce to a minimum single-point failure mode

47、s during the arming cycle. The time window associated with these single-point failures shall be reduced to a minimum and shall exist only at or near the expiration of the intended arming delay. In addition, the fuze design shall prohibit premature fuze arming or functioning if any or all electrical

48、safety or energy control features fail in any given state or credible mode. These failure modes include both random and induced failures which occur prior to, during, or after application of electrical power to the fuze. 4.2.1 Safety redundancy. The safety system of fuzes shall contain at least two

49、independent safety features, each of which shall prevent unintentional arming of the fuze. The stimuli enabling a minimum of two safety features shall be derived from different environments. Utilization in the fuze design of environments and levels of environmental stimuli to which the fuze may be exposed prior to initiation of the launch cycle shall be avoided. Operation of at least one of