BS PD CEN TR 16670-2014 Information technology RFID threat and vulnerability analysis《信息技术 射频识别威胁和脆弱性分析》.pdf

《BS PD CEN TR 16670-2014 Information technology RFID threat and vulnerability analysis《信息技术 射频识别威胁和脆弱性分析》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《BS PD CEN TR 16670-2014 Information technology RFID threat and vulnerability analysis《信息技术 射频识别威胁和脆弱性分析》.pdf（74页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

1、BSI Standards Publication PD CEN/TR 16670:2014 Information technology RFID threat and vulnerability analysisPD CEN/TR 16670:2014 PUBLISHED DOCUMENT National foreword This Published Document is the UK implementation of CEN/TR 16670:2014. The UK participation in its preparation was entrusted to Techni

2、cal Committee IST/34, Automatic identification and data capture techniques. A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary. This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Users are responsible for its correc

3、t application. The British Standards Institution 2014. Published by BSI Standards Limited 2014 ISBN 978 0 580 83895 8 ICS 35.240.60 Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity from legal obligations. This Published Document was published under the authority of the Standards Policy and

4、Strategy Committee on 30 June 2014. Amendments/corrigenda issued since publication Date T e x t a f f e c t e dPD CEN/TR 16670:2014TECHNICAL REPORT RAPPORT TECHNIQUE TECHNISCHER BERICHT CEN/TR 16670 June 2014 ICS 35.240.60 English Version Information technology - RFID threat and vulnerability analys

5、is Technologies de linformation - RFID, analyse vulnrabilit et de menace Informationstechnik - Analyse zur Bedrohung und Verletzlichkeit durch beziehungsweise von RFID This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 20 January 2014. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 225. CEN member

6、s are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal

7、, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION COMIT EUROPEN DE NORMALISATION EUROPISCHES KOMITEE FR NORMUNG CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels 2014 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form

8、and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members. Ref. No. CEN/TR 16670:2014 EPD CEN/TR 16670:2014 CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E) 2 Contents Page Foreword 4 Introduction .5 1 Scope 6 2 Terms and definitions .6 3 Symbols and abbreviations 9 4 Threats and Attack scenarios 10 4.1 Introduction . 10 4

9、.2 Attacks to an RFID System with a Fake Reader 11 4.3 Attacks to a RFID system with a Fake Tag . 12 4.4 Attacks to a RFID system with a Fake Reader and a Fake Tag 12 4.5 Attack to a Real Tag with a Fake Reader and a Fake Tag 13 4.6 Attack to a Real Tag with a Fake Reader 13 4.7 Attack to a Real Rea

10、der with a Fake Tag 13 5 Vulnerabilities . 14 5.1 Introduction . 14 5.2 Denial of service . 14 5.3 Eavesdropping 14 5.4 Man in the Middle 15 6 Mitigation measures . 15 6.1 Introduction . 15 6.2 Mitigation measures for secured RFID Devices 15 6.2.1 Mitigation measures for tags . 15 6.2.2 Mitigation m

11、easures for readers . 15 6.2.3 Mitigation measures for the Air Interface Protocol . 15 6.3 Mitigation measures against attacks 15 6.3.1 Introduction . 15 6.3.2 Eavesdropping 15 6.3.3 Skimming . 15 6.3.4 Relay attack . 16 6.3.5 Denial of Service . 16 7 Conclusions 16 Annex A (informative) Attack scen

12、arios 18 A.1 Amusement parks takes visitors to RFID-land 18 A.1.1 Introduction . 18 A.1.2 Threat scenarios . 18 A.1.3 DPP objectives of relevance 19 A.1.4 Security objectives of relevance . 19 A.1.5 Privacy objectives of relevance 20 A.2 Purpose of Use and Consent . 20 A.2.1 Purpose 1 . 20 A.2.2 Pur

13、pose 2 (with explicit consent) 21 A.2.3 Purpose 3 (with no explicit consent . 21 A.3 Multi-tag and purpose RFID environment for Healthcare . 22 A.3.1 Scenario description - Emergency 22 A.3.2 The hospital RFID environment . 22 A.3.3 Arrival at the hospital . 23 A.3.4 Treatment at the hospital . 24 A

14、.3.5 The value of the drug prescribed 24 A.3.6 Returning home 24 A.3.7 The home RFID environment . 24 PD CEN/TR 16670:2014 CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E) 3 A.3.8 Drug repeat prescription and out of date drug recycling 25 Annex B Original Test Set ups and Results 26 B.1 Test Area 26 B.2 Equipment 26 B.3 Overv

15、iew of the Tests . 27 B.3.1 Introduction 27 B.3.2 Range tests 27 B.3.3 Write Tests . 27 B.3.4 Illicit Reading . 27 B.3.5 Eavesdropping . 28 B.3.6 Detection inside buildings 28 B.3.7 Combined EAS/RFID systems 28 B.4 Test procedures and results 28 B.4.1 General . 28 B.4.2 Reading range 30 B.4.3 Write

16、range . 37 B.4.4 Illicit reading 41 B.4.5 Eavesdropping . 46 B.4.6 Detection inside buildings 47 B.4.7 Combined EAS/RFID system 48 B.5 Analysis of results . 48 B.6 Conclusions . 49 Annex C Additional Test Set ups and Results 50 C.1 Introduction 50 C.2 Scope of tests 50 C.3 Documenting the results 50

17、 C.4 Equipment required for additional tests . 50 C.5 Description of tests . 51 C.5.1 Activation distance for HF system 51 C.5.2 Activation distance for UHF system 52 C.5.3 Eavesdropping tests for HF system 53 C.5.4 Eavesdropping tests for UHF system . 55 C.6 Test results 56 C.6.1 Equipment utilised

18、 during the tests 56 C.6.2 Description of Tests 56 Bibliography 70 PD CEN/TR 16670:2014 CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E) 4 Foreword This document (CEN/TR 16670:2014) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 225 “AIDC Technologies”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN. Attention is drawn to the possi

19、bility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN and/or CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. This Technical Report is one of a series of related deliverables, which comprise mandate 436 Phase 2. The other deliv

20、erables are: EN 16570, Information technology Notification of RFID The information sign and additional information to be provided by operators of RFID application systems EN 16571, Information technology RFID privacy impact assessment process EN 16656, Information technology - Radio frequency identi

21、fication for item management - RFID Emblem (ISO/IEC 29160:2012, modified) CEN/TR 16684, Information technology Notification of RFID Additional information to be provided by operators CEN/TS 16685, Information technology Notification of RFID The information sign to be displayed in areas where RFID in

22、terrogators are deployed CEN/TR 16669, Information technology Device interface to support ISO/IEC 18000-3 CEN/TR 16671, Information technology Authorisation of mobile phones when used as RFID interrogators CEN/TR 16672, Information technology Privacy capability features of current RFID technologies

23、CEN/TR 16673, Information technology RFID privacy impact assessment analysis for specific sectors CEN/TR 16674, Information technology Analysis of privacy impact assessment methodologies relevant to RFID PD CEN/TR 16670:2014 CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E) 5 Introduction In response to the growing deployment

24、of RFID systems in Europe, the European Commission published in 2007 the Communication COM(2007) 96 RFID in Europesteps towards a policy framework. This Communication proposed steps which needed to be taken to reduce barriers to adoption of RFID whilst respecting the basic legal framework safeguardi

25、ng fundamental values such as health, environment, data protection, privacy and security. In December 2008, the European Commission addressed Mandate M/436 to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the field of ICT as applied to RFID systems. The Mandate M/436 was accepted by the ESOs in the first months of 2009.

26、 The Mandate addresses the data protection, privacy and information aspects of RFID, and is being executed in two phases. Phase 1, completed in May 2011, identified the work needed to produce a complete framework of future RFID standards. The Phase 1 results are contained in the ETSI Technical Repor

27、t TR 187 020, which was published in May 2011. Phase 2 is concerned with the execution of the standardization work programme identified in the first phase. This document will provide the additional information of the RFID application that will need to be provided to a citizen by accessing the source

28、 identified on the sign where the RFID application is operating. This information will be aligned with the details set out in the Recommendation, but some of this might not be available at the outset, a Technical Report is the preferred form of initial delivery to establish basic requirements. PD CE

29、N/TR 16670:2014 CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E) 6 1 Scope The scope of the Technical Report is to consider the threats and vulnerabilities associated with specific characteristics of RFID technology in a system comprising: the air interface protocol covering all the common frequencies; the tag including model

30、 variants within a technology; the interrogator features for processing the air interface; the interrogator interface to the application. The Technical Report addresses specific RFID technologies as defined by their air interface specifications. The threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigating methods a

31、re presented as a toolkit, enabling the specific characteristics of the RFID technology being used in an application to be taken into consideration. While the focus is on specifications that are standardized, the feature analysis can also be applied to proprietary RFID technologies. This should be p

32、ossible because some features are common to more than one standardized technology, and it should be possible to map these to proprietary technologies. Although this Technical Report may be used by any operator, even for a small system, the technical details are better considered by others. In partic

33、ular the document should be a tool used by RFID system integrators, to improve security aspects using a privacy by design approach. As such it is also highly relevant to operators that are not SMEs, and to industry bodies representing SME members. 2 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this doc

34、ument, the following terms and definitions apply. 2.1 blocker tag tag forcing the reader to enter in its singulation algorithm Note 1 to entry: The idea of the blocker tag that looks like a tag that we can have in our pocket, is to emit both 0 and 1 creating a collision and forcing the reader to ent

35、er in its singulation algorithm. If the blocker tag emits simultaneously 0 and 1 (that requires two antennas), the reader may never complete its algorithm. The blocker tag should be seen as a hacker device that is able to generate a denial of service in a legitimate system. We can even assess that a

36、 blocker tag has always a malicious behaviour since it cannot be selective and forbids the reading of one tag whereas it authorises the reading of the others. Moreover, the blocker tag works like a tag in a passive mode. So, it requires being in the reader field and it will protect only a small volu

37、me around itself. So a blocker tag can be considered as a malicious tag, which prevents a legal system to read legal tags or as a mitigation technique preventing an illegal reader to read a legal tag. 2.2 blocking another way to produce a denial of service is to interfere during the anti-collision s

38、equence Note 1 to entry: Different devices have been developed. 2.3 cloning impersonation technique that is used to duplicate data from one tag to another Note 1 to entry: Data acquired from the tag by whatever means is written to another tag. Unless the technology and application require the interr

39、ogator to authenticate the RFID tag, cloning is possible. Cloning the unique chip ID presents a significantly bigger challenge for the attacker, but some researchers claim that this is possible. There is also a special case of cloning that needs to be considered where the application accepts multipl

40、e AIDC technologies. Cloning data from an RFID-enabled card can be replicated in magnetic stripe. In some payment card systems, information that might be PD CEN/TR 16670:2014 CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E) 7 cloned from an AIDC card could be used in payment situations known as cardholder not present for purc

41、hases made on the Internet or by telephone. In this case, the clone is virtual and requires no encoding on another RFID tag. 2.4 denial of service preventing communication between the interrogator and the tags Note 1 to entry: There are two main ways to accomplish a “denial of service“. The first on

42、e is to create electromagnetic interferences, the second one is to insert a blocker tag in the communication. 2.5 destruction making the tag definitively unusable without using a logical kill function whenever such a function exist in the rfid protocol Note 1 to entry: Destruction may refer to the r

43、eader too. Although this attack threats RFID system availability, its different from deny of service because it cant reactivate and repair it. Destruction is considered as an attack when its practiced without holders knowledge. Two destruction types can be distinguished1) Hardware-and 2) Software de

44、struction. While this can be seen as a security threat to the RFID operator, there are also situations where it might affect the individual. For example, if a public transport tag is accidentally damaged, then the individuals rights associated with it can be lost. In a similar manner as for tag remo

45、val, tag destruction can be used as a control to protect the privacy 2.6 eavesdropping passive attack, which consists in remotely listening to transactions between a Real Reader and a Real Tag 2.7 guardian special device developed by Melanie Rieback from a Dutch University to help citizens to commun

46、icate with their own contactless smartcards Note 1 to entry: As an active device it can be turned into a blocking tag preventing an attacker to access such contactless cards. Thus, it can blur any pervasive reading by actively emitting a jamming signal in the sidebands of a typical RFID tag. Such a

47、mechanism enables multiple functionalities: information can be sent to the reader or to the tag for secret key management, authentication, access control; monitoring of the RFID environment to warn of possible unsolicited reading; creation of collisions to prevent from the possible inquisitive readi

48、ng. As a consequence, the RFID guardian is a useful tool to ensure the privacy but it is also an efficient device to create denials of service. Whereas the blocker tag is designed to carry out a simple load modulation, the RFID guardian is an active device that requires batteries and that is able to

49、 emit is own signal. As a consequence, the distance of use is much larger. 2.8 jamming creating a signal in the same range as used by the reader in order to prevent tags from communicating with the reader Note 1 to entry: Because the RFID air interface protocol depends on radio signals, an attacker can exploit any such signals within the range of the communication between interrogator and tag 2.9 man in the middle object or person interfering in the communication between a real reader and a real tag