IELTS(雅思)10及答案解析.doc

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1、IELTS(雅思)10 及答案解析(总分：10.00，做题时间：120 分钟)一、Listening Module(总题数：4，分数：4.00)Only about (31) 1of people over 65 become senile. A much more common problem is in fact caused by: (32) 2. (33) 3. Nearly (34) 4of people over 65 has at least one serious illness. Maybe about 15% of older people suffer from (35)

2、 5. When people become old, there are changes in metabolism, lungs, the senses, (36) 6and (37) 7. （分数：1.00）填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_It was announced that there will be no (11) 1in the near future in a speech in the city of (12) 2last night. (13) 3people d

3、ie in an earthquake in central Italy. Gas pipes were broken, windows shattered and (14) 4onto the streets. Three masked men thieved almost (15) 5after a security van was ambushed in central London early this morning and escaped in (16) 6near-by. （分数：1.00）填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项

4、 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_According to the speaker, much of the news in British newspapers only print because it is guaranteed to (31) 1, (32) 2or cause a chuckle. He thinks a real newspaper should include: (33) 3. accurate reports of what has been happening in (34) 4of the world, the latest news fro

5、m the (35) 5, full coverage of (36) 6, (37) 7with leading personalities. （分数：1.00）填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_A.B.C.D.填空项 1:_A.B.C.D.E.F.Christopher Columbus arrived in America (11) 1. The Indians taught the early settlers about the local crops like (12) 2, corn and (13) 3; they

6、 introduced the Europeans to (14) 4 and to the turkey. （分数：1.00）填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_A.the Europeans did business with themB.the settlers wanted bigger farms and more land for themselves and their familiesC.they thought it was impossible for one man to own the landA.too coldB.too tryC.too mou

7、ntainousD.all the items above填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_二、Reading Module(总题数：3，分数：3.00)Whats good for the poor is good for America Part 1 Although its prosperity depends on a worldwide network of trade, finance and technology, the United States currently treats the rest of the world, and especially

8、 the developing world, as if it barely exists. Much of the poorer world is in turmoil, caught in a vicious circle of disease, poverty and political instability. Large-scale financial and scientific help from the rich nations is an investment worth making, not only for humanitarian reasons, but also

9、because even remote countries in turmoil become outposts of disorder for the rest of the world. The biggest priority of next weeks Genoa Summit should be for the rich countries, above all the United States, to get serious about contributing to global economic development. The principal goal of forei

10、gn policy is now almost containments opposite: helping to ensure that all parts of the world, including the poorest, are integrated into global economic and ecological networks in mutually beneficial ways. Unfortunately, American presidents in recent times have not acknowledged that this goal requir

11、es massive foreign-policy investments. Americas foreign aid is 0.1% of GDP, a derisory shadow of what it used to be, and roughly one-third of the European level. Following Americas lead, most of the large economies have allowed their own foreign-assistance programmes to shrink since the end of the c

12、old war. Even when the United States reaped a peace dividend of more than 2% of GDP in reduced defence spending after 1990, it cut, rather than increased, foreign-assistance spending as a share of national income. Part 2 The Bush administration and Congress must find their way to a renewal of Americ

13、an foreign policy and the sensible international investments that will be needed to back it up. The presidents core team knows the world and its risks. Last years Meltzer Commission, on which I served, demonstrated that there could be a bipartisan consensus on the need for much more American help fo

14、r the poorest countries. The new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden, is ideally suited by knowledge and temperament to help lead a bipartisan foreign-policy effort with the Bush administration. Here are some guidelines for investing in foreign policy in todays global ec

15、onomy. First, we must identify the areas where money can really make a difference. Keenest attention should be paid to the worlds poorest regions, the ones most likely to fall prey to the vicious circle of poverty, disease and state collapse. Remarkably, only around one-sixth of American aid is curr

16、ently directed to the 48 least-developed countries, most of which are in Africa. Help for these countries should come in two ways: as direct support for national programmes to fight disease, malnutrition and illiteracy, when those programmes make sense and are honestly administered; and through prog

17、rammes to develop new technologies to overcome barriers to long-term economic development. Second, the United States should end its decade-long war against the United Nations agencies. Specialised organisations such as the World Health Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Consult

18、ative Group on International Agricultural Research, UNAIDS and the United Nations Development Programme need to be bolstered with more money and administrative reforms, not squeezed financially to the point of collapse. These agencies would be greatly strengthened by closer and properly financed lin

19、ks with Americas own top-rank institutions, such as the National Institutes of Health and the Centres for Disease Control. Third, and surely most important, the Bush administration must explain to Americans that a big increase in budgetary outlays on behalf of economic development in the worlds poor

20、est and most unstable regions is an investment in core American interests and values. All serious professional estimates show that the fight against AIDS in the developing countries will require at least $ 2 billion-3 billion a year from the United States government for the global fund-rather more t

21、han the $ 200 million so far promised. External assistance for Africa will require not the current miserly $ 1 billion from America, but a several-fold increase, if profound problems have a chance of being overcome. Sub-Saharan Africa, neglected by the United States, has routinely received a sum equ

22、ivalent to around one-sixth of the American aid given to the Middle East. Part 3 Fifty years ago a soldier-statesman, General George Marshall, then secretary of state, explained to Americans that urgent financial support for Europe would stabilize societies destroyed by the second world war and the

23、post-war economic crises. Such aid would unleash Europes potential for recovery to everyones mutual benefit. His vision was exactly on the mark. Winston Churchill called the resulting Marshall Plan “the most unsordid act in history“. The United States once again has a soldier-statesman, Colin Powell

24、, as secretary of state. A new Powell Plan to mobilize American technology and finances, both public and private, on behalf of the economic development of the worlds poor countries would be a fitting follow-up to the Marshall Plan. The world, and America, would be enormously safer and more prosperou

25、s as a Result. Questions 31 - 33 Below is a list of headings, choose the most suitable choices for parts (1-4) and write the appropriate numbers (i-iv) on your answer sheet. Note: There are more headings than you need so you will not use all of them and you may use any heading more than once. List o

26、f heading i. Jeffrey Sachs on where Uncle Sam should be more generous, and the reason ii. the United States should end its decade-long war against the United Nations agencies iii. Re-inventing foreign aid v. A Powell Plan （分数：1.00）(1).Part1（分数：0.10）填空项 1:_(2).Part2（分数：0.10）填空项 1:_(3).Part3（分数：0.10）填

27、空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_The lessons of state failure Traditional diplomacy deals with risks of conflict between nation-states. These risks are of course still present, but a more pervasive danger is that states will simply collapse. Of a dozen or so conflicts in Africa

28、 in recent years, few, if any, have involved cross-border aggression. Instead, bankrupt and impoverished states have imploded, the vacuum filled not by regimes with newly consolidated power but by brutal violence engulfing civilians. The disaster then fans out to neighboring countries, and eventuall

29、y much farther a field. A special “task force on state failure“ set up by Americas CIA has found that three variables are most predictive of state stability or instability: the openness of the economy; democracy; and infant mortality. In sub-Saharan Africa, where much of the population lives on the

30、edge of subsistence, poverty and slow economic growth, or outright decline, increased the likelihood of future state collapse, thereby trapping the countries in a vicious circle of poverty and political instability. Rich countries, on the other hand, tend to maintain political stability which, in tu

31、rn, promotes further economic development. When countries were classified in 1990 by their status in the United Nations Human Development Index (an index of income, literacy and health), high-development countries achieved robust and stable economic growth during 1990-98, with average growth rates o

32、f around 2. 3% a year and with 35 out of 36 countries enjoying rising living standards. Middle-development countries achieved a slightly lower growth rate, 1. 9% a year, but 7 out of 34 countries experienced outright declines in living standards. The poorest countries averaged no economic growth at

33、all, with 15 out of 39 experiencing falling living standards. The flip-side to the poverty trap, however, is that the gains of development tend to be sustained, once countries break through to sufficient levels of income, health and literacy. Conservatives in America often ask why it matters if an i

34、mpoverished country collapses. The answer is that, aside from humanitarian concerns, crises in such far away places often suck the United States into crisis as well. Since 1960, America has been dragged into military conflicts in Cuba, Thailand, Laos, Congo, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Cambodia

35、, Cyprus, Lebanon, Zaire, El Salvador, Libya, Lebanon, Honduras, Nicaragua, Chad, Liberia, Bosnia, Somalia and, more recently, Kosovo and Colombia. State failures, or even milder state instability, have also undermined American and global interests through globally transmitted financial crises, drug

36、-trafficking, money-laundering, terrorism, the spread of diseases such as AIDS and mass refugee flows. On the positive side, sustained economic development would create new and potentially large gains from trade, as well as much-needed cooperation in science and culture. Even when a problem is corre

37、ctly identified, there is a stunning disconnect between risk and action in Americas foreign economic policy. The global AIDS epidemic, for example, has recently and wisely been identified as a risk to the security of the United States. What action has been taken? President George Bush has called upo

38、n Americans to give just $ 200 million, or 70 cents each, to the new global fund to fight the disease. The failure to make even basic investments in foreign policy has been pervasive, and the examples are legion. Eleven years ago, the last prime minister of unified Yugoslavia, Ante Markovic, launche

39、d a last-ditch plan for economic stabilization. He appealed to Europe and the United States for a reduction in debt-servicing and other modest financial support, but was turned down by the creditor governments. Economic stabilisation was undermined, and this helped Slobodan Milosovic to get the uppe

40、r hand. The rest, as they say, is history. In the past two years America and European countries have made the same mistake in Nigeria, an impoverished and unstable country emerging from years of corrupt despotism. Although Nigerias oil earnings, net of production costs and income to foreign oil comp

41、anies, amount to around only $ 90 per Nigerian a year, the United States and Europe continue to prevaricate over urgently needed debt-reduction because the oil earnings are easy to squeeze for debt-service payments. The new democratic regime of President Olesegun Obasanjo is put at risk, and Libyas

42、leader, Muammar Qaddafi, does not miss a chance to inflame matters in Nigerias Islamic northern states. Area after area of neglect can be catalogued, from the strife-torn Andes to regions around the world undermined by climate change. Through all of it, the United States barely lifts a finger. It so

43、mehow thinks that sending the impoverished and unstable governments down Pennsylvania Avenue to get loans from the IMF and the World Bank will do the job, but even some staff of those organisations now publicly acknowledge that they have failed: making loans when grants are needed, imposing excessiv

44、e austerity by collecting rather than canceling debts, and failing to find partner-institutions with the scientific expertise to tackle underlying problems of disease, low food production, climatic stress and environmental degradation. （分数：1.04）(1).These risks are of course still present, but a more

45、 (1) danger is that states will simply collapse.（分数：0.08）填空项 1:_(2).High-development countries achieved robust and stable economic growth during 1990-98, with average growth rates of around(2) a year.（分数：0.08）填空项 1:_(3).Nigeria is an impoverished and unstable country emerging from years of corrupt (

46、3).（分数：0.08）填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_填空项 1:_A.TrueB.FalseC.NOT GIVENA.TrueB.FalseC.NOT GIVENA.TrueB.FalseC.NOT GIVENA.TrueB.FalseC.NOT GIVENA.TrueB.FalseC.NOT GIVENA.TrueB.FalseC.NOT GIVENA.TrueB.FalseC.NOT GIVENTake me out to the ballgame It is a strange coincidence that many popular sports played today with a ball, big or small, were first played in the latter half of the 19th century. Only cricket set its rules earlier, in 1788. Basketball was invented in 1891. Other sports had antecedents: soccer, rugby and American football were all formalised in the 1860s and 1870s from