SAE JP-ABOUT-002-2016 Automotive Cybersecurity From Perceived Threat to Stark Reality (To Purchase Call 1-800-854-7179 USA Canada or 303-397-7956 Worldwide).pdf

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1、Automotive CybersecurityFrom perceived threat to stark realityABOUT AUTOMOTIVE ABOUABOUT STYLE ABOUT SABOUT FOOD ABOUTABOUT DRINK ABABOUT AUTOMOTIVE ABOUABOUT STYLE ABOUTABOUT FOOD ABOUTABOUT DRINK ABABABOUTPublishing GroupSHAMIK GHOSHJuly 2016Automotive CybersecurityFrom perceived threat to stark r

2、ealityShamik GhoshABOUT AUTOMOTIVE ABOUABOUT STYLE ABOUT SABOUT FOOD ABOUTABOUT DRINK ABABOUT AUTOMOTIVE ABOUABOUT STYLE ABOUTABOUT FOOD ABOUTABOUT DRINK ABABABOUTPublishing Group400 Commonwealth DriveWarrendale, PA 15096-0001 USAE-mail: CustomerServicesae.orgPhone: 877-606-7323 (inside USA and Cana

3、da)724-776-4970 (outside USA)Fax: 724-776-0790Copyright 2016 SAE International. All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, distributed, or transmitted, in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of SAE International. For per

4、mission and licensing requests, contact SAE Permissions, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-0001 USA; email: copyrightsae.org; phone: 724-772-4028; fax: 724-772-9765.Library of Congress Catalog Number 2016947251SAE Order Number JP-ABOUT-002http:/dx.doi.org/10.4271/jp-about-002Information c

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7、ance of an appropriate professional should be sought.ISBN-PDF 978-0-7680-8377-4To purchase bulk quantities, please contact:SAE Customer ServiceE-mail: CustomerServicesae.orgPhone: 877-606-7323 (inside USA and Canada)724-776-4970 (outside USA)Fax: 724-776-0790Visit the SAE International Bookstore atb

8、ooks.sae.orgFront cover image courtesy TowersecABOUT AutomotiveSince 2002, our exclusive network of industry specialists has ensured an unrivalled resource to bring you comprehensive coverage of the automotive supplier industry. Each report gathers individual perspectives from within the industry, a

9、nd formulates ABOUT Automotives own definitive forecasts, generally to a 57 year horizon.All ABOUT Automotive authors have a proven track record, having written for leading management consultancies, financial institutions and publishers. ABOUT Automotive reports are used by the major automotive supp

10、liers, as well as the leading vehicle manufacturers. They are also used by banks and management consultants, as well as academic institutions.SAE InternationalSAE International is a global professional society that provides technical resources for the ground vehicle and aerospace engineering communi

11、ty. Since 1905, SAE has connected engineers and the technical content needed to provide the solutions to improve vehicle technology and advance the mobility industry.SAE International sets the standards for vehicle engineering and delivers a lifetime of learning. By uniting over 128,000 engineering

12、professionals and technical experts world-wide through a comprehensive collection of programs, products, and services, SAE International drives both expertise and knowledge to the vehicle engineering community.The AuthorShamik Ghosh is an experienced professional with a diverse knowledge of the auto

13、motive industry. He has swiftly acquired a thorough understanding of the disruptive trends in automotive technology like autonomous driving, connected cars, IoT and smart mobility. Shamik has written over 2,000 articles and is also a frequent participant in major industry studies, and has advised nu

14、merous clients on strategy and competitive issues.vContents1. The automotive cybersecurity conundrum 11.1 Introduction 11.2 What needs to be done? 32. Nuts and bolts of cyberattacks 52.1 Why would one hack a vehicle? 52.2 Hackers motivational factors 52.3 CAN the holy grail for hackers 72.4 Who is r

15、esponsible if a vehicle is hacked? 93. Remote attack surfaces in modern vehicles 103.1 If its CONNECTED; its HACKABLE 103.2 In-vehicle Infotainment units 113.3 OBD-II dongles 123.4 Bluetooth (Paired devices) 143.5 In-car Wi-Fi 143.6 Tyre Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) 143.7 Remote Keyless Entry

16、(RKE) 153.8 In-car apps/content 163.9 External links (V2X communications) 173.10 EV charging 184. Perspective: the vehicle manufacturers take on cybersecurity 194.1 Is security a priority for the automotive industry? 194.2 Automotive industry investing in cybersecurity, but ROI? 204.3 Security by de

17、sign: From reactive to pre-emptive 224.4 Security it will have profound eects across the major functional areas of autonomous driving, vehicle to everything (V2X), cooperative ITS, infotainment and smart mobility services.The technologies that are making our modern vehicles highly connected, intuiti

18、ve, personalized, and automated are also the ones that render them vulnerable to serious security risks (i.e. car hacking). Hackers who are able to infiltrate the car network can enable digital features and force the consumers to pay for it. Criminals could steal cars remotely by disabling the immob

19、ilizer and ordering the vehicle to drive away. They could also steal sensitive information by eavesdropping the vehicles Bluetooth or Wi-Fi interface with the consumers smartphone. At a more sinister level, organized criminal gangs could track locations of VIPs for a planned attack or hack the auton

20、omous driving systems to cause an accident.This is an existential threat for vehicle manufacturers who will be the first ones to bear the repercussions of cyber attacks. However, although we have yet to see an attack of this magnitude in the real world, the threat is intensifying and could possibly

21、damage consumers trust which is the ultimate measure of success of any technology.1.2emspaceWhat needs to be done?The concern around automotive cybersecurity is considerable, and has risen over the past couple of years. Just a quick scan of recent media reports reveals the severity of the current cy

22、bersecurity threat landscape within the automotive sector.The litany of publicized white-hat hacks over the last 18 months (especially Miller and Valasek), not to mention lesser-known (or unreported) actual black-hat attacks, oers a number of important lessons to vehicle manufacturers and their tech

23、nology partners.The automotive cybersecurity conundrum 4Automotive CybersecurityIn short, vehicle manufacturers need to invest in cyber research. They cannot sit back and allow the bad guys to be one step ahead of them. There are a number of reasons why this is the correct time for the automotive in

24、dustry to focus intently on cybersecurity.First, any vehicle connected directly or indirectly to the Internet is a potential cybercrime target. In times before widespread external connectivity solutions for cars, it was not a problem since one had to have physical access to a vehicles intra-networki

25、ng systems i.e. the CAN bus.Secondly, the industry has been complacent (or worse, ignorant) in its view of the threat. This a serious subject and vehicle manufacturers must keep it high on their agenda, the same way they are aggressively pushing their connectivity oerings in the market. It seems no

26、longer appropriate for the automotive community to dismiss security threats by arguments like, “The cars are hacked in strict academic conditions”, “ Only the white-hat hackers are doing this”, “ Hacking cars requires a lot of investment and time versus the returns”.Finally, the cybersecurity commun

27、ity is now engaged in investigating just how insecure some of these vehicle systems are, and ways to patch the security loopholes, should any attack be instigated. However, the current whack-a-mole approach to remediation is inadequate to address the myriad attack surfaces and vulnerabilities that a

28、re prevailing in the connected car market.This report analyses the areas of automotive cybersecurity threats that are gaining attention worldwide and how dierent industries seem to be responding to them. It will also talk about the much needed security by design approach that automakers need to adop

29、t as a long-term strategy to fend o cybercriminals.Nuts and bolts of cyberattacks 52.emspaceNuts and bolts of cyberattacks2.1emspaceWhy would one hack a vehicle?The industry has long since been dodging cybersecurity questions, stating there is no clear ROI for black-hat hackers to mount serious atta

30、cks on vehicles. While there is no clear answer as to why a criminal would attack a vehicle, the same question can be asked about people that spread computer viruses. Some attackers just want to prove their capabilities, and see a challenge in attacking a new domain.The automotive sector claims to b

31、e concerned about security, but it does not appear to comprehend the threat or have learned from the experiences of its peers in other industries. Taking an analogy from the banking industry, we did not begin to see Internet phishing and hacking until credit card and other financial information bega

32、n to be transmitted online.Today, it is a very real threat. According to the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), more than 5,000 users fell victim to online fraud in 2015. What is worse is that the average loss was GBP 13,000 per user and 70% of victims did not get a single penny back in their account.3Si

33、milarly, hackers may not become interested in connected cars until people begin transacting in them or transmitting valuable data (although to some degree it is already happening).However, that is no reason to underestimate the abilities of cybercriminals to pose formidable challenges on the existin

34、g security landscape. It is true that no real life car hacking incidents have ever been reported so far. But if the automotive industry does not take adequate steps now, then cybersecurity will manifest itself from a mere perceived threat to a stark reality.But the question still remains. What would

35、 motivate black-hats and cyber criminals, and why do they try to hack into cars in the first place, when the cost/eort vs. returns are seemingly low for them?2.2emspaceHackers motivational factorsThe initial wave of motivation within the cybercriminal world will be the financial gain. A cyber attack

36、 against automotive systems could potentially provide criminals Nuts and bolts of cyberattacks 6Automotive Cybersecuritywith a repeatable, remotely exploitable mechanism for breaking into vehicles for theft of vehicle contents and/or the vehicle itself. On a more sinister level, should criminals be

37、keen on impacting the safety of a victims vehicle in some way then this might be achievable through cyber attack. Other criminal activity might just relate to hackers, where no financial gain is sought but merely the ability to demonstrate technical prowess through remotely attacking and controlling

38、 automotive systems. The objective is to find the weakest links between systems until the original target is successfully controlled. Infotainment systems are often the ideal target as they are nowadays based on highly complex and modern operating systems.And finally, there is potential motivation f

39、or terrorism. Sadly, there are many organizations around the globe that would love to block modern economies with impenetrable trac jams. Some extreme organizations may plan a terror attack on V2X network to cause a large-scale tragedy. Some attackers may gain unfair road usage, for example, by masq

40、uerading as an emergency vehicle.The following table summarizes the types of attacking groups and their relative end-objectives/motives:Table 1emspaceCar hacking value chain analysisAttack type Attack goals/motivations Attacker groupFinancial profit-oriented Vehicle theft; Goods theft (in case of co

41、mmercial fleets); General personal identification information (PII) i.e. credit cards, social media accounts; Denial of service of vehicles, which could be re-enabled after the owner pays a ransom; Vehicle identity re-assignment (for stolen vehicles); and Premises security and burglary vehicle data

42、that reveals which businesses and homes are unoccupied.Organized criminal gangsIndustrial espionage Theft of Intellectual property of an OEM such as sensitive algorithms in vehicle ECUs developed to increase fuel eciency or stability control. This will lead to loss of customers.Competitor, 3rd parti

43、esReputation damage/challenge motivated Causing damage to the reputation of an OEM by some kind of denial of service attack.Disgruntled ex-employeesActivist motivated/mass attacks Denial of service to create mass disruption on the roads; Manipulation of cyber-physical systems to cause harm to the oc

44、cupants; Abuse of infotainment systems for the distribution of propaganda material; and Tracking of VIP locations.Terrorists/hacktivistsResearch and Sabotage or degrading of vehicle and connected system performance.White-hat hackers/academicsPersonal gain Enabling features via software to avoid payi

45、ng for expensive vehicle options; and Enhancing the performance by modifying the fuel-air map of the engine (re-mapping).Automotive enthusiasts/Script KiddiesSource: Author/ABOUT AutomotiveNuts and bolts of cyberattacks 7Automotive Cybersecurity2.3emspaceCAN the holy grail for hackersFrom the first

46、BMW 8 series in 1988 to the BMW 7 series of 2016, CAN has been the most dominating networking protocol of modern times. When CAN became the de facto in-vehicle networking standard in 1986, the design choices were greatly influenced by factors like low latency, low weight, high bandwidth and cybersec

47、urity was barely considered. At that point in time, the automotive industry clearly did not envision the security implications that would arise three decades later.And the regulators that once mandated CAN could not possibly have foreseen its inherently insecure nature.Following the predominance of

48、CAN, several other networking protocols have been launched, overcoming some of the shortcomings of CAN. Table 2 contains the partial list of currently used in-vehicle networking schemes and their features.Table 2emspaceAvailable intra-vehicle networking protocolsNetwork name Physical layer Network t

49、opology Typical usageCAN (Controller Area Network)Twisted pair, 9-pin D-Sub Point to point Body systems, engine management, transmission, etc.LIN (Local Interconnect Network)Single wire Single master to multiple slave (up to 16 slaves)Door locks, climate control, seat belts, sunroof, lighting, window lift, mirror controlFlexRay Electrical, optical Single and dual channel Drive by wire, brake by wire, steer by wire, stability control, etc.MOST (Media Oriented Systems Transport)Optical Ring (up to 64 MOST devices)Infotainment dataBYTEFLI