SAE ARP 5580-2001 Recommended Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Practices for Non-Automobile Applications《针对非汽车应用推荐的失效模式及影响分析(FMEA)实践》.pdf

《SAE ARP 5580-2001 Recommended Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Practices for Non-Automobile Applications《针对非汽车应用推荐的失效模式及影响分析(FMEA)实践》.pdf》由会员分享，可在线阅读，更多相关《SAE ARP 5580-2001 Recommended Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Practices for Non-Automobile Applications《针对非汽车应用推荐的失效模式及影响分析(FMEA)实践》.pdf（58页珍藏版）》请在麦多课文档分享上搜索。

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5、nded Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Practices for Non-Automobile Applications RATIONALE ARP5580 has been reaffirmed to comply with the SAE five-year review policy. SAE ARP5580 Page 2 of 58 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. SCOPE .4 1.1 Purpose . .4 2. REFERENCES .4 2.1 SAE Publications .4 2.2 U.S. Gov

6、ernment Publications . 5 2.3 Applicable References . 5 2.4 Definitions 6 3. INTRODUCTION 13 3.1 Overview of the Process 14 3.1.1 Functional FMEA . 16 3.1.2 Interface FMEA 17 3.1.3 Detailed FMEA . 18 3.1.4 FMEA Verification 19 3.1.5 Documentation . 19 3.2 FMEA Applications . 19 3.2.1 Product Design H

7、ardware FMEA . 20 3.2.2 Product Design Software FMEA 21 3.2.3 Process Design FMEA . 24 3.3 Cautions . 24 4. FMEA PLANNING . 25 4.1 FMEA Ground Rules and Assumptions . 26 4.2 Analysis Tailoring . 27 4.2.1 Depth of Analysis . 28 4.3 Supplier/Subcontractor lntegration . 28 4.4 Analysis Maintenance 30 4

8、.4.1 FMEA Repeatability . 30 4.4.2 FMEA Traceability 30 4.4.3 FMEA Coding . 31 4.5 Analysis Libraries . 31 5. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 32 5.1 Requirements Analysis 33 5.2 Requirements Allocation 34 SAE ARP5580 Page 3 of 58 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 6. FMEA TASKS . 34 6.1 Postulate Failur

9、e Modes 35 6.1.1 Failure Mode Modeling . 36 6.1.2 Failure Mode Ratios . 39 6.2 Identify Failure Consequences .40 6.2.1 Identify Failure Effects .41 6.2.2 Identify Severity .42 6.2.3 Detecting Monitors .42 6.2.4 Corrective Action Recommendations .45 6.2.5 Identify Compensating Provisions . .46 6.3 Id

10、entify Failure Mode Equivalence .46 6.4 Assess Failure Frequency of Occurrence . .48 6.4.1 Constant Failure Rate 49 6.4.2 Process Variation . 50 6.4.3 Qualitative Assessment. . 52 6.5 Failure Latency Analysis 52 7. FMEA DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTING 53 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4.1 7.4.2 7.4.3 7.4.4 7.4.5 7.4

11、.6 7.4.7 7.4.8 7.4.9 7.4.1 0 7.4.11 7.4.12 7.4.13 7.5 System or End-Item Description 53 Block Diagrams 53 FMEA Ground Rules and Assumptions . 54 Analysis Worksheets 54 Version/Date 54 Analyst . 54 End-item/Process Identifier 54 Subsystem/Subprocessor Identifier . 54 Item/Function/Action Name 54 Item

12、/Function/Action Identifier . 55 Failure Mode 55 Failure Mode Identifier . 55 Failure Mode Probability 58 Fault Equivalence ldentifier 56 Operating Mode(s) . 58 Operating Mode identifier . 56 Remarks . 57 Summarize Analysis Results 57 SAE ARP5580 Page 4 of 58 1. SCOPE: Recommended Failure Modes and

13、Effects Analysis (FMEA) Practices For Non-Automobile Applications describes the basic procedures for performing a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). It encompasses functional, interface, and detailed FMEA, as well as certain pre-analysis activities (FMEA planning and functional requirements

14、analysis), post-analysis activities (failure latency analysis, FMEA verification, and documentation), and applications to hardware, software, and process design. It is intended for use by organizations whose product development processes use FMEA as a tool for assessing the safety and reliability of

15、 system elements, or as part of their product improvement processes. A separate, Surface Vehicle Recommended Practice, J1739, is intended for use in automobile applications. 1 .1 Purpose: In developing this procedure the subcommittee has endeavored to develop a procedure that reflects the best curre

16、nt commercial practices. This procedure was developed in recognition of todays intense and competitive market demands for high reliability, affordability, and speed to market. The subcommittee had several objectives in defining the FMEA process: 1. Define a basic methodology to include functional, i

17、nterface, and detailed FMEA. This will facilitate performing the analysis throughout the design process, from early in the conceptual stage to implementation and production. 2. Extend the methodology to include both product and process FMEAs. The methodology can be applied to the many technologies (

18、e.g., mechanical, electrical, software, etc.) used in the development of a product. This helps to facilitate communications between all the parties involved in the development of a system and is useful in a concurrent engineering environment. 3. Provide simple techniques for ranking failure modes fo

19、r corrective actions and for identifying fault equivalencies. 4. Define the types of information needed for the FMEA in electronic databases, thus facilitating semi-automation of the analysis. 5. Provide procedures for managing the FMEA and for getting the most benefit from the analysis. 2. REFERENC

20、ES: The following publications are provided for information purposes only and are not a required part of this SAE Technical Report. 2.1 SAE Publications: Available from SAE, 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-0001. 2.1.1 “Fault/Failure Analysis Procedure“, Society of Automotive Engineers,

21、Aerospace Recommended Practice, ARP926, Sept. 15, 1967, ARP926A, Nov. 15, 1979. SAE ARP5580 Page 5 of 58 2.1.2 “Fault/Failure Analysis For Digital Systems and Equipment“, Society of Automotive Engineers, Aerospace Recommended Practice, ARP1834, Aug. 1986. 2.1.3 Reliability, Maintainability, and Supp

22、ortability Guidebook, SAE International RMS Committee (G-11), 2nd Ed. Society of Automotive Engineers, 1992. 2.1.4 “Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis In Design (Design FMEA) and Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis In Manufacturing and Assembly Processes (Process FMEA) Reference Man

23、ual“, Society of Automotive Engineers, Surface Vehicle Recommended Practice, J1739, July 1994. 2.1.5 Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment“, Society of Automotive Engineers, Aerospace Recommended Practice, ARP4761, December 1996.

24、2.2 U.S. Government Publications: Available from DODSSP, Subscription Services Desk, Building 4D, 700 robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094. 2.2.1 “Electronic Reliability Design Handbook“, MIL-HDBK-338-1, Volume I, Oct. 12, 1988. 2.2.2 “Procedures For Performing A Failure Mode Effects and Crit

25、icality Analysis“, US MIL-STD-1629 (ships) Nov. 1, 1974; US MIL-STD-1629A, Nov. 24, 1980; US MIL-STD-1629A/Notice 2, Nov. 28, 1984. 2.2.3 “Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment“, MIL-HDBK-217F, Dec. 10, 1993. 2.2.4 “System Design and Analysis“, Advisory Circular 25.1309-1A, Federal Aviation

26、 Administration (FAA), June 1988. 2.2.5 “Fault Tree Handbook“, NUREG-0492, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Jan. 1981. 2.3 Applicable References: 2.3.1 J. S. Coutinho, “Failure-Effect Analysis“, Trans. New York Academy of Sciences, 1964, pp. 564-584. 2.3.2 “Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality

27、Analysis (FMECA)“, CRTA-FMECA, Reliability Analysis Center, Rome, NY, 1993. 2.3.3 “Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data -1995“, NPRD-95, Reliability Analysis Center, Rome NY, 1995. 2.3.4 “Failure Mode/Mechanism Distributions 1997“, FMD-97, 1997, Reliability Analysis Center. SAE ARP5580 Page 6 of 58

28、2.3.5 “Analysis Techniques for system reliability- Procedure for failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)“, International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC Standard Pub. 812, 1985. 2.3.6 “Failure Mode and Effect Analyses“, Electronic Industries Association G-41 Committee on Reliability, Reliability B

29、ulletin No. 9, November 1971. 2.3.7 “Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis In Design (Design FMEA) and For Manufacturing and Assembly Processes (Process FMEA) Instruction Manual“, Ford Motor Company, Sept 1988. 2.3.8 “Reliability Prediction Procedure for Electronic Equipment“, Bellcore, TR-TSY

30、-332, Issue 5, December 1995. 2.3.9 “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification“, Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA/D0-178B, Dec. 1992. 2.3.1 0 C. S. Spangler, “Systems Engineering- The Fault Analysis Process For Commercial Avionics Application,“ Proceedin

31、gs of the Third Annual International Symposium of the National Council on Systems Engineering, 1993. 2.3.11 C. S. Spangler, “Equivalence Relations within the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis“. Proc. Ann. Reliability and Maintainability Symp. (Washington, DC), 1999, pp. 352-357. 2.3.12 P. L. Goddard

32、, “Validating The Safety Of Embedded Real-Time Control Systems Using FMEA“, Proc. Ann. Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, January 1993, pp. 227-230. 2.3.13 M.A. Friedman, P. Y. Tran, and P. L. Goddard, Reliability of Software Intensive Systems, Noyes Data Corporation, ISBN: 0-8155-1361-5, 19

33、95. 2.3.14 M.A. Friedman, J. Voas, Software Assessment: Reliability, Safety, Testability, John Wiley, ISBN: 0-4710-1009-X, 1995. 2.3.15 R. S. Carson, “A Set Theory Model for Anomaly Handling in System Requirements Analysis“, Proceedings of the Fifth Annual International Symposium of the National Cou

34、ncil on Systems Engineering, 1995. 2.3.16 P. D. T. OConnor, Practical Reliability Engineering, 3rd revised Ed., John Wiley, 1995. 2.4 Definitions: ALLOCATION: The results of the process of assigning an identified portion of a functional requirement to a specific item of hardware or software, a facil

35、ity, or to personnel. BUlL T-IN-TEST (BIT): Diagnostic tests included as part of the system design. BOTTOM-UP ANALYSIS: Analysis of a component, part or subsystem which starts with the failure modes of the lowest indenture level items of the system and successively iterates through the next higher l

36、evels ending at the system level. SAE ARP5580 Page 7 of 58 2.4 (Continued): CIRCUIT: A description of the task, action, or operation performed by a group of parts at the lowest indenture level. COMPENSATING PROVISIONS: Design provisions, or operator actions, which circumvent or mitigate the effects

37、of a failure. Compensating design provisions are features at any indenture level that will nullify the effects of a malfunction or failure but do not prevent its occurrence. COMPONENT TYPE: Classification of a piece-part based on its characteristics and the ways in which it typically fails. Examples

38、: digital integrated circuits; resistors; capacitors; transformers; valves; actuators; air conditioners; batteries; condensers; compressors; filters; fans; fuses; hoses; springs; regulators; relays; seals; pumps; switches; transistors; etc. Piece-part failure modes are postulated based on the “Compo

39、nent Type“. COMPUTER SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION ITEM (CSCI): An aggregation of software that satisfies an end-use function and is intended for separate configuration management by the acquirer. CSCis are selected based on tradeoffs among software function, size, host, or target computers, developer, sup

40、port concept, plans for reuse, criticality, interface considerations, need to be separately documented and controlled, and other factors. COMPUTER SOFTWARE COMPONENT (CSC): An aggregation of software which is part of a CSCI that satisfies one or more end-use functions. A CSC is generally composed of

41、 more than one software unit. CSCs are selected based on tradeoffs among software function, size, host, or target computers, developer, plans for reuse, criticality, interface considerations, need to be separately documented and controlled, and other factors. CORRECTIVE ACTION: A documented design,

42、process, procedure or materials change implemented and validated to eliminate design deficiencies or mitigate failure consequences. CRITICALITY: A relative measure of the impact of a failure mode on the mission objective. Criticality combines the frequency of occurrence and the level of severity of

43、a failure mode. CRITICALITY ANALYSIS: A procedure by which each potential failure mode is ranked according to the combined influence of its severity and probability of occurrence. DETAILED FAILURE MODE and (2) a maintenance crew by some diagnostic action. END EFFECT: See End Level Effect. END-ITEM:

44、The highest level item in a hierarchical analysis of a system. See Item. END LEVEL EFFECT: The impact or consequence of a failure mode on the operation, function, or status of the end-item. This is derived from analyzing the effects of a failure mode on the major subsystems that make up the complete

45、 system. See Mission Impact. EXPOSURE TIME: The period (in clock time or cycles) during which an item is exposed to a failure. The period is measured from when the function was verified to be functioning to when it is verified again. FAILURE: The inability of an item to perform its required function

46、 within previously specified limits. FAILURE ANALYSIS: The logical, systematic examination of an item or its diagrams to identify and analyze the probability, causes, and consequences of potential and real failures. FAILURE CAUSE: The physical or chemical processes, design defects, quality defects,

47、part misapplication, or other processes which are the basic reason for failure, or which initiate the process which leads to failure. Failure cause answers the question “Why does the part fail?“ FAILURE EFFECT: The consequences of a failure mode on the operation, function, or status of an item. Fail

48、ure effects are classified as local effect, next higher level effect, and end effect. FAILURE MECHANISM: The process involved in the cause of failure. Failure Mechanism answers the question “What is the failure process?“ FAILURE MODE: The manner in which an item fails. Failure Mode answers the quest

49、ion “How does the part fail?“ FAILURE MODE RATIO: The fraction of item failures apportioned to the failure mode under consideration. FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA): A procedure by which each potential failure mode or fault of a system is analyzed to determine the consequences or effects thereof on the system, to classify each potential failure mode according to its severity, and to recommend actions to eliminate, or compensate for,