REG NASA-LLIS-1466-2003 Lessons Learned Accident Investigations Software Tool Selection.pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1466Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1466a71 Lesson Date: 2003-08-31a71 Submitting Organization: JSCa71 Submitted by: David LengyelSubject: Accident Investigations/Software Tool Selection Abstract: Difficulties with the single software tool selected to support the Columbia accid

2、ent investigation point to a need for a functional requirements analysis by a team experienced in the IT requirements of a large-scale mishap investigation prior to tool selection.Description of Driving Event: The main driver for software tool selection to support the Columbia Accident Investigation

3、 Board (CAIB) was the requirement for a single tool with remote access capability and strong security to protect sensitive mishap investigation data. Without defining a clear set of functional requirements in advance, one tool was chosen to be all things to all people collaborative environment (i.e.

4、, portal for group calendar & file sharing, announcements, links, etc.), action tracking database, library management, data archive). As a result, after significant start up investment was made to get off the ground with the selected tool, subsequent unidentified requirements required custom softwar

5、e engineering, causing delays in functional capability and frustrations for investigation staff members. In addition, the selected tool was set up in an untested environment involving additional layers of network security that interfered with the normal operation of the tool and complicated/delayed

6、fixing problems that arose.Lesson(s) Learned: A functional requirements analysis should be performed prior to software tool selection, and this analysis needs to be performed by a team of people experienced in the IT requirements of a large-scale mishap investigation. In addition, clear IT security

7、requirements need to be identified in advance of tool selection to ensure appropriate safeguarding of sensitive data.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Recommendation(s): a71 Integrate a set of individual tools into a CAP system that is

8、vetted and available prior to the start of the investigation. Widespread, long-term buy-in and use by the investigation and support teams of a single on-line software solution for configuration management, electronic library capability, action tracking database, and document search & retrieval may n

9、ot be attainable.a71 Avoid tools that would not be familiar to investigation staff ahead of time, or tools that would be overly complex requiring steep learning curves. The tools should be easy to use and easy to learn. By vetting the CAP system of tools in advance, problems with IT availability, ac

10、cess control, and security issues can be avoided. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: TBD NASA ResponseDocuments Related to Lesson: Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight OperationsMission Directorate(s): a71 Space Operationsa71 Exploration SystemsAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Acc

11、ident Investigationa71 Administration/Organizationa71 Computersa71 Configuration Managementa71 Information Technology/Systemsa71 NASA Standardsa71 Policy & Planninga71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 SecurityAdditional Info: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2004-06-16a71 Approval Name: Ronald Montaguea71 Approval Organization: JSCa71 Approval Phone Number: 281-483-8576Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-