REG NASA-LLIS-0917-2000 Lessons Learned Inadequate Project Line Interaction Throughout Mars Climate Orbiter-s Project Life Cycle (1999).pdf

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1、Lessons Learned Entry: 0917Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 0917a71 Lesson Date: 2000-04-14a71 Submitting Organization: JPLa71 Submitted by: D. OberhettingerSubject: Inadequate Project/Line Interaction Throughout Mars Climate Orbiters Project Life Cycle (1999) Abstract: MCOs emphasis on lean, fast res

2、ponding, project teams led to less oversight by the technical line organizations that might have detected the omissions and errors that led to mission loss. Early in the formulation phase of each project, appropriate individual project/line organization work agreements should be established and impl

3、emented throughout the project life cycle. Appropriate technical expertise external to flight project teams should be available to the projects for problem solving and peer review. Employees should be trained on all aspects of project/line organization interactions.Description of Driving Event: The

4、JPL requirement for concurrent development of many small spaceflight missions has led to the emergence of lean, fast responding project teams. To accommodate these many projects, JPL has created a process called “soft projectization“ (Reference 3) which tends to blur the roles and responsibilities o

5、f the traditional JPL matrixed project/line organizations. This process can result in far less oversight by the technical line organizations. In addition, constrained project resources and schedule pressures may lead to problems being quickly prioritized and dispositioned without recourse to JPL exp

6、ertise external to these teams. This lack of interaction with management and technical experts within JPL line organizations increases the risk of omissions and the potential for errors. For the Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) mission operations, the timely involvement of the highly experienced experts i

7、n the JPL navigation line organization would likely have revealed the erroneous delta-Vs generated by the software that compensated for small forces effects. (These errors were identified by the JPL and NASA Review Boards as the direct result of a file incompatibility that was the root cause of the

8、MCO mission failure (References 1 and 2). Such involvement would at least have recognized the large targeting uncertainty, which could have been corrected prior to Mars Encounter. In addition, the “soft projectization“ approach led to the Project perception that line Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo

9、reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-organization involvement would be intrusive, disruptive, and of little value. Similarly, some line managers tended to “wash their hands“ of traditional technical responsibilities to the Project.Reference(s):1. “Report on the Loss of t

10、he Mars Climate Orbiter Mission,“ JPL D-18441, JPL Special Review Board, November 11, 19992. “Phase I Report,“ (NASA) Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board, November 10, 19993. “Soft Projectization,“ JPL document D-12547, Rev. 0, January 1, 19984. “Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation

11、 Board - Phase I Report“, Lesson Learned Number 0641, December 1, 19995. Corrective Action Notice No. Z66275, MCO-JPL/SRB Finding 4.10: “Project-Line Interaction“Additional Key Words: Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) projects; organizational interfaces; communications; industrial partners; technical re

12、views; design reviews; training; project implementation planLesson(s) Learned: Lack of a culture that encourages and facilitates the use of appropriate technical expertise/resources to supplement small, cost constrained, tightly scheduled flight project teams can lead to mission failure.Recommendati

13、on(s): 1. Technical line organization participation in flight project development and operations should be clearly defined and established as institutional policy. Early in the formulation phase of each project, appropriate individual project/line organization work agreements should be established a

14、nd implemented throughout the project life cycle (see Lesson No. 0641, Recommendation #9).2. The institution should assure that appropriate technical expertise external to flight project teams are available to the projects for problem solving and peer review.3. Employees should be trained on all asp

15、ects of project/line organization interactions.Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: A JPL Corrective Action Notice was assigned and practices will be modified as appropriate.Documents Related to Lesson: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license fro

16、m IHS-,-,-N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Administration/Organizationa71 Flight Operationsa71 Human Resources & Educationa71 Policy & Planninga71 Risk Management/Assessmenta71 Safety & Mission Assurancea71 SpacecraftAdditional Info: Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2000-10-20a71 Approval Name: Eric Raynora71 Approval Organization: QSa71 Approval Phone Number: 202-358-4738Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-