1、UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) SECURITY ENGINEERING: PROCEDURES FOR DESIGNING AIRBORNE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION FOR BUILDINGS APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted
2、 without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC) SECURITY ENGINEERING: PROCEDURES FOR DESIGNING AIRBORNE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION FOR BUILDINGS Any copyrighted material included in this UFC is identified at its point of use. Use of th
3、e copyrighted material apart from this UFC must have the permission of the copyright holder. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Preparing Activity) NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT AGENCY Record of Changes (changes are indicated by 1 . /1/) Change No. Date Location Pr
4、ovided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 FOREWORD The Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) system is prescribed by MIL-STD 3007 and provides planning, design, construction, sustainment, restoration, and modernization crite
5、ria, and applies to the Military Departments, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities in accordance with USD (AT 3-5.4, Medium Level of Protection; and 3-5.5, High Level of Protection. Classes of overpressure are addressed in Paragraph 3-6.2, Overpressure Classification. 3-4.3 Protection
6、from Internal Release The most effective method to protect building personnel against an internal release is to prevent containers of hazardous materials from being brought into the building in the routine flow of people, mail, supplies, and other deliveries. An integrated building protection approa
7、ch is required to provide maximum protection. This approach includes access control, filtration of HVAC return air, and isolation of high-risk areas such as mailrooms, lobby areas, security screening areas, and supply delivery areas with separate ventilation systems as well as unscreened public acce
8、ss areas and any other general-access areas. The simplest way to respond to an internal release is to shut down the HVAC system to limit dispersion of CBR agents. Central air-handling filtration systems that are designed to remove specific CBR agents from recirculated air can help limit distribution
9、 Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 3-7of the CBR agent within the building through the HVAC system. However, such filtration systems do not protect the immediate area where the internal release occurred or poss
10、ibly even the adjacent area, and contaminated air in return air ducts or plenums may be spread to other parts of the facility. 3-4.3.1 Access Control All secured doors should have an electronic entry or manual lock system that only authorized personnel can activate. All maintenance personnel and the
11、ir equipment and authorized deliveries should be checked for hazardous materials. Screening personnel should be provided with specific operational procedures to detect the presence of hazardous material containers. 3-4.3.2 Security Screening Entry screening is a two-step process: (1) detecting a clo
12、sed container and (2) determining whether the contents of the container are hazardous or likely to be hazardous. Both steps should be established in coordination with the appropriate security personnel and in accordance with guidance in UFC 4-020-02 for the applicable level of protection. The first
13、step could involve the use of x-ray equipment; the use of a metal detector; or a manual search of briefcases, handbags, packages, letters, boxes of supplies, and deliveries of food and bottled beverages. The following are items to consider for further examination or exclusion: Aerosol cans or other
14、pressurized containers Manual or electric spray devices Containers of liquids or powders Bottled gases typically used for repair or maintenance within the building Pressurized dispensers containing irritating agents, including pepper spray, mace, and tear-producing agents The second step involves ex
15、amining the container, its contents, and labels and then determining whether the contents agree with the label. Liquid or powder in an unlabeled container is reason for prohibiting it from entering the building. This step also involves checking for alterations to the label. 3-4.3.3 Ventilation Syste
16、m Isolation To limit the spread of agents after an internal release, areas having a higher risk of a release should have a separate HVAC system, exhaust fan, sealed full-height boundary walls, and low-leakage doors and dampers. These areas also should be kept at a slight negative pressure relative t
17、o the other areas of the building. 3-4.3.4 Windows Fixed and forced-entry-resistant exterior window designs can prevent a container with a CBR agent from being thrown through a window. Refer to UFC 4-010-01 for minimum window requirements and to UFC 4-020-02 for any additional requirements. Provided
18、 by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 3-83-5 LEVELS OF PROTECTION The facility design requirements for each level of protection against varying CBR threats are discussed in Paragraphs 3-5.1 through 3-5.5, below. Levels of
19、protection are part of the design criteria established by a planning team during the project planning process. They are commonly based on asset value as established using a process in UFC 4-020-01 and should not be changed without consulting with the facility user or the planning team. The discussio
20、n of levels of protection in this UFC includes the following topics: Design requirements for the very low level of protection (Paragraph 3-5.1) Recommended measures to protect facilities regardless of the level of protection (Paragraph 3-5.2) Design considerations for the low level through the high
21、level of protection (Paragraphs 3-5.3 through 3-5.5) For a table summarizing the levels of protection, overpressure, and filtration system for each level, refer to Paragraph 3-7, Building Protection Summary. 3-5.1 Very Low Level of Protection The very low level of protection incorporates passive bui
22、lding component features at little or no additional cost when included in new facility designs and major retrofits. Protection measures that are recommended for all buildings and are required for new inhabited facility designs and major retrofits are a mass notification, public address, or alarm sys
23、tem; air distribution emergency shutoff; sealed mailrooms with separate, dedicated ventilation systems and exhaust fans; elevated outside air intakes; and restricted roof access. For additional information, refer to Paragraphs 3-5.1.1 through 3-5.1.3, below; Appendix D, Sheltering in Place; and UFC
24、4-010-01. 3-5.1.1 Mass Notification, Public Address, or Alarm System A mass notification, public address, or alarm system is critical to CBR protection. It is necessary to alert building occupants of a CBR release and to provide direction for evacuation. It indicates when to initiate evacuation proc
25、edures, put on protective masks, or employ ColPro. 3-5.1.2 Emergency Air Distribution Shutoff All new inhabited buildings must be provided with at least one emergency air distribution shutoff switch, and such switches are recommended for existing inhabited buildings undergoing major renovation. When
26、 the switch is activated, air distribution equipment throughout the building will be de-energized and low leakage motorized dampers will close to reduce the flow of airborne contaminants within the building and between the building and outdoors. Shutdown of the HVAC system for an area that has criti
27、cal heating or cooling needs is an operational decision that must be made by the facility operator depending on the current activities, Impact on mission, backup facilities available, type of agent, and other factors. It is also recommended that the emergency deactivation cause elevators, if in moti
28、on, to go to the next floor and stop (the doors may open and close, but the elevator is not to move). Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 3-9The shutdown of air handling systems must be performed in a controlled,
29、 sequenced manor to avoid damage to the systems. If a large fan and a normally closed damper are de-energized simultaneously, then the damper will close while the fan is still spinning causing the ductwork or air handling equipment to collapse. If due to threat conditions, it is determined that the
30、dampers must be closed immediately before the fan slows down, then the system, between the damper and the fan, must be designed to withstand the dead head static pressure of the fan. Figures 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 illustrate the emergency air distribution shutoff for the very low level of protection for
31、some typical air-handling systems. Figure 3-1 represents a central air-handling system that can be shut down during a CBR event. In the case of a local air-handling system that cannot be shut down due to critical heating or cooling needs, the recommended arrangement is a triple damper, as shown in F
32、igure 3-2. The AHU is placed in a recirculation mode, and the triple damper arrangement reduces the possibility of contaminated outside air leakage through the outside air damper. This arrangement provides two benefits: (1) it prevents the supply fan from creating a negative pressure on the AHU side
33、 of outside air damper D-1, which would increase outside air leakage through the damper and into the AHU, and (2) opening damper D-2 allows the air leakage through damper D-3 to come from the mechanical room through damper D-2. It should be noted that although the triple damper arrangement reduces t
34、he introduction of exterior airborne contaminants into the building, continuing to operate the AHU would distribute contaminants in the conditioned space. As a first response to an unknown release, it is recommended that the facility operate in the protection mode for a release outside of the critic
35、al conditioned area, with outside air dampers closed and fans operating. If the release is determined to be inside the critical conditioned area, the fans can be de-energized. Figure 3-3 illustrates a typical fan coil system with a central outside air intake that is ducted to the fan coil units. Pro
36、vided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 3-10Figure 3-1. Very Low Level of Protection Central Air-Handling System Damper No. or Equipment Normal Mode Protection Mode D-1 Open (or modulating) Closed D-2 Open (or modulatin
37、g) Closed D-3 Open (or modulating) Closed AHU On Off Return Fan On Off Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 3-11Figure 3-2. Very Low Level of Protection Local Air-Handling System Requiring Continuous Operation Dam
38、per No. or Equipment Normal Mode Protection Mode Release Outside Conditioned Area Protection Mode Release Inside Conditioned Area D-1 Open (or modulating) Closed Closed D-2 Closed Open Open or Closed D-3 Open Closed Open or Closed AHU On On Off Return Fan On On Off Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo re
39、production or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 3-12Figure 3-3. Very Low Level of Protection Fan Coil System Damper No. or Equipment Normal Mode Protection Mode D-1 Open Closed AHU On Off Fan Coil Blowers On Off 3-5.1.3 Mailroom Ventilation The design and in
40、stallation of mailroom ventilation should conform to the level of protection for the building. At a minimum, mailrooms must be constructed and sealed in accordance with the minimum antiterrorism standards provided in UFC 4-010-01. Figure 3-4 illustrates a typical dedicated air-handling system for ma
41、ilrooms to meet the basic requirements for all levels of protection. Mailroom ductwork should not be run in the plenum space in a protective area as contaminated air could leak from the ductwork into the protective area. The table under Figure 3-4 indicates the recommended damper positions and fan o
42、perating status for the normal operating mode, for the protection mode when a release has occurred outside of the mailroom, and for the protection mode when a release has occurred inside of the mailroom. As a first response to an unknown release, it is recommended that the facility operate in the pr
43、otection mode for a release outside of the mailroom, with all dampers closed and all fans de-energized. If the release is determined to be inside the mailroom, the exhaust fan can be energized and the exhaust damper opened. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without
44、 license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 3-13Figure 3-4. All Levels of Protection Dedicated Air-Handling System for Mailrooms Damper No. or Equipment Normal Mode Protection Mode Release Outside of Mailroom Protection Mode Release Inside of Mailroom D-1 Open (or modulating) Closed Closed D-2 O
45、pen Closed Open Supply Fan On Off Off Exhaust Fan On Off On 3-5.2 Recommended Protection Measures for All Levels of Protection Recommended measures to protect facilities regardless of the level of protection are provided in Paragraphs 3-5.2.1 through 3-5.2.9, below. These measures exceed the minimum
46、 standards presented in UFC 4-010-01. 3-5.2.1 Building Sealing Measures Particular attention should be paid to ensure adequate sealing of the building or protective area envelope as well as all utility penetrations and building interface joints (for example, the wall and roof interface). Reducing th
47、e rate of air exchange with the outside air greatly improves the effectiveness of sheltering in place and reduces the cost of installing and operating a ColPro system to provide overpressure to a protective area. Measures to reduce the air exchange rate and ensure proper sealing are as follows: Inco
48、rporate typical weatherizing sealing measures and continuous vapor barriers in the building or protective area envelope. Include sealing of the window and wall interfaces as well as weather stripping of exterior doorways and doorways between the protective area and potentially contaminated areas of the building. Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-UFC 4-024-01 10 June 2008 3-14 Perform a seal integrity pressure test, with an internal pressure applied to the seals, and perform a smoke test to locate area
