1、Lessons Learned Entry: 1505Lesson Info:a71 Lesson Number: 1505a71 Lesson Date: 2003-07-01a71 Submitting Organization: MSFCa71 Submitted by: Lisa CarrSubject: Orbital Space Plane - Design Participation & Rules of Engagement - Teaming - Civil Servant & Contractor Teams Abstract: The Orbital Space Plan
2、e (OSP) had problems defining the proper technical engagement of civil service personnel with contractor teams. In competitive environments, decide, define and communicate up front how NASA participation is to be conducted with the contractors and staff to support that participation. Description of
3、Driving Event: OSP had problems defining the proper technical engagement of civil service personnel with contractor teams.Lesson(s) Learned: Because of our zeal to protect the competitive environment, OSP had problems defining the proper technical engagement of civil service personnel with contracto
4、r teams. In the end, we were getting real traction in the right direction with the participation of our experts in the prime contractors design efforts. But we started staffing and empowering the engineering expert teams later than we should have, and the early constraints on their participation wer
5、e too severe. Additionally: a. Systems Experts. OSP did not form a standing team of human spaceflight system experts until after the contract data deliverables were defined and many of the government and prime contractor system-level trade studies and requirement development analyses were completed.
6、b. Design Participation. During Competition The single largest start-up obstacle we encountered Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-when trying to get the NASA engineering teams engaged on OSP were the limits on their participation. When
7、the NASA teams were formed, these constraints were not clearly defined or recorded. We wanted to create value-adding design participation relationships with the prime contractors, but we did not want to “pollute” their ideas with our own. We needed to prevent cross-contamination - revealing one cont
8、ractors ideas to another - in order to preserve the integrity of the competitive acquisition. We had to consider whether people who were doing activities like performing government task agreements for delivery to one contractor could be a participant with other contractors, or be assigned to manage
9、a subsystem or discipline area, or be allowed to work on RFP development or proposal evaluation.c. Deliverables - required verses needed. The newly established NASA engineering expert teams found themselves inundated at major program milestone reviews with contractual deliverables that were heavy on
10、 paper and light on data.d. Release of Government Data. Concerns about releasing pre-decisional, government-developed data and capabilities limited our participation. OSPs initial policy was not to release any government trade or requirement development analysis data, but finally shared some require
11、ments development rationale data. We eventually recorded very useful guidance shortly before the SDR that allowed the teams to share data unless it potentially implied a government-preferred solution, was proprietary, was pre-decisional or was acquisition sensitive.e. Government Task Agreements (GTA
12、). The OSP program and the prime contractors both benefited from GTAs. However, GTAs create considerable consternation for both parties. The program has little insight to GTA performance and even less authority to manage them. Additionally, the contactor can easily blame the Agency at large for issu
13、es involving GTAs. Contractors find it difficult to manage GTAs since at a macro level their customer is also their subcontractor.f. Rules of Engagement. OSP Developed and tested a set of Rules of Engagement by which we participated with two competing contractors equally but separately.g. Data Relea
14、se Policies. OSP Developed, but did not test, policies for government trade study data release to the two competing contractors.h. Current Competencies New human spaceflight systems are not developed frequently - less often via competitive acquisition. No one does enough human-rated spacecraft devel
15、opment to sustain a current competency, and our contracts and collaboration relationships shouldnt presume that everyone already knows how to do this work well - it was a lesson we learned from the ISS experience.i. Contractors view of design participation. OSP was not fully aware of the design part
16、icipation rules of engagement we had established for ourselves.Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Recommendation(s): In competitive environments, decide, define and communicate up front how NASA participation is to be conducted with the
17、contractors and staff to support that participation. Expert teams should be formed early enough to help define contract data requirements to adequately demonstrate the contractors technical baseline and precise enough to be reviewed by the appropriate experts within the allotted time and resource co
18、nstraints. Record information release information policies and procedures. Policies should also be developed to clearly establish and describe the line between what design participants can do as members of integrated product teams versus what work should be agreed-to in the form of a government task
19、 agreement that is considered in the determination of contract value. NASAs technical role with industry should be as a cooperative, constructive contributor beginning early in formulation phase. Any design participation rules adopted by Exploration Systems should be communicated formally to governm
20、ent and prime contractor collaborating teams. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/ADocuments Related to Lesson: N/AMission Directorate(s): a71 Exploration Systemsa71 Space Operationsa71 Aeronautics ResearchAdditional Key Phrase(s): a71 Administration/OrganizationAdditional Info: Provided
21、 by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-Approval Info: a71 Approval Date: 2005-04-12a71 Approval Name: Lisa Carra71 Approval Organization: MSFCa71 Approval Phone Number: 256-544-2544Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-
