1、PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 ICS 03.220.01; 13.310; 91.040.20 NO COPYING WITHOUT BSI PERMISSION EXCEPT AS PERMITTED BY COPYRIGHT LAW PUBLISHED DOCUMENT Prevention of crime Urban planning and building design Pat 7: Design and management of public transport facilitiesThis Published Document was published un
2、der the authority of the Standards Policy and Strategy Committee on 31 July 2009 BSI 2009 ISBN 978 0 580 64559 4 Amendments/corrigenda issued since publication Date Comments PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 National foreword This Published Document is the UK implementation of CEN/TR 14383-7:2009. The UK parti
3、cipation in its preparation was entrusted to Technical Committee B/562, Security of buildings. A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on request to its secretary. This publication does not purport to include all the necessary provisions of a contract. Users are respons
4、ible for its correct application. Compliance with a British Standard cannot confer immunity from legal obligations.PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 TECHNICAL REPORT RAPPORT TECHNIQUE TECHNISCHER BERICHT CEN/TR 14383-7 July 2009 ICS 03.220.01; 13.310; 91.040.20 English Version Prevention of crime - Urban plann
5、ing and building design - Part 7: Design and management of public transport facilities Prvention de la malveillance - Urbanisme et conception des btiments - Partie 7: Conception et gestion des espaces ddis au transport public Vorbeugende Kriminalittsbekmpfung - Stadt- und Gebudeplanung - Teil 7: Pla
6、nung und Management von Anlagen und Einrichtungen des ffentlichen Personennahverkehrs This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 21 March 2009. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 325. CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Rep
7、ublic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION COMIT EUROPEN D
8、E NORMALISATION EUROPISCHES KOMITEE FR NORMUNG Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels 2009 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members. Ref. No. CEN/TR 14383-7:2009: EPD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 2 Contents P
9、age Foreword 3 Introduction .4 1 Scope 7 2 Normative references 7 3 Terms and definitions .7 4 Design and management processes for transport-dedicated areas 7 4.1 General 7 4.2 Organization of the contracting authority and the stakeholders 8 4.2.1 General 8 4.2.2 Contracting authorities .8 4.2.3 Con
10、tract partners .8 4.2.4 Specialists who bring their expertise to the project 8 4.2.5 Customers, commercial partners and staff 9 4.2.6 The project managers .9 4.3 The core stages of a project .9 4.4 Creating a new location . 10 4.5 Location management 10 5 Analysis, actions and assessment: question-a
11、sking methods . 10 5.1 General . 10 5.2 Crime, antisocial behaviour and fear of crime . 11 5.3 General principles on security-related questioning 11 5.4 Design strategies 12 5.4.1 General . 12 5.4.2 Anticipation on location management 12 5.4.3 Space usage 12 5.4.4 Legibility 14 5.4.5 Location compat
12、ibility with security measures . 15 5.5 Management strategies 15 5.5.1 General . 15 5.5.2 Responsive location management policy 15 5.5.3 Regulating space usage . 16 5.5.4 Legibility and orientation . 17 5.5.5 Location compatibility with security measures . 17 Annex A (informative) Types of crime aga
13、inst people (including staff) and buildings 19 A.1 Offence against person 19 A.1.1 Assault with physical violence (without theft) . 19 A.1.2 Assault without physical violence (without theft) . 19 A.1.3 Sexual assault . 19 A.1.4 Theft against person 19 A.2 Assault against companies, properties and pl
14、ants . 19 A.2.1 Assault against properties and plants by damage and /or destruction 19 A.2.2 Theft against companies 19 A.2.3 Threat . 20 A.2.4 Trespass 20 A.3 Other offence relative to public transport rules and antisocial behaviour . 20 A.3.1 Behavioural offence . 20 A.3.2 Traffic offence . 20 Ann
15、ex B (informative) Summary of the process 21 PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 3 Foreword This document (CEN/TR 14383-7:2009) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 325 “Prevention of crime by urban planning and building design”, the secretariat of which is held by SNV. Attenti
16、on is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN and/or CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. The status of Technical Report (CEN/TR) was proposed to give all countries the opportunity to
17、 compare experiences and to harmonise procedures. This Technical Report is one of a series for the “Prevention of crime by urban planning and building design”, that consists of the following Parts: Part 1: Definition of specific terms Part 2: Urban planning Part 3: Dwellings Part 4: Shops and office
18、s Part 5: Petrol stations Part 8: Protection of buildings and sites against criminal attacks with vehicles PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 4 Introduction The public transport system has to meet the citizens mobility needs under the most advantageous economic, social and environmental
19、conditions for the community. It is an instrumental factor in national unity and solidarity, national defence, economic and social development, in balanced strategic land use planning and sustainable development, and in driving international exchanges, particularly towards European partners. In meet
20、ing these needs, it is equally important to comply with objectives on minimising or reducing risks, accidents, nuisance (particularly sound pollution), pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions by implementing measures designed to reinforce the application of the legal right of all public transport us
21、ers, including disabled or handicapped people, to move freely and to choose the means they wish to use, and to exercise their legal entitlement to transport their property themselves or to commission the services of a company or institution of their choice to do so. The success if this kind of servi
22、ce hinges on: the strength of social ties in public transport areas, which are in fact a community resource (respect for others, for community values, voluntary sharing of community resources, respect for rule of law, etc.); the efficiency of the production facilities (integrity of the technical and
23、 financial assets, the physical protection provided by the transport, a regular and reliable quality service, etc.), which are by definition a source of regular contact with the population and are thus embedded in the urban fabric. Any unruly, aggressive or assaultive behaviour will by its very natu
24、re have a negative knock-on effect on public trust in the service. More generally, public trust can be eroded by an environment left to degrade (dirt, poor lighting, graffiti, etc.) and by repeated unruliness. The erosion of public trust can foster avoidance behaviour from customers (drop in traffic
25、) and staff (strikes, skipping ticket checks, etc.) alike. Crime often also targets the production facilities (equipment, buildings, infrastructure, information systems, etc.), thus causing financial losses, equipment breakdowns, service delays, malfunctioning customer service devices, or even gener
26、ating traffic safety risks (accidents, derailments, etc.). Hence, crime, whether carried out or perceived, threatens the fundamental policy issues of any public transport system, i.e. public trust and efficient production facilities, with significant economic and social consequences. Crime problems
27、require action, on the individuals involved, on the organizations and structures that manage community activity, and on the locations housing the activity. Pre-planning for, or “designing-out”, crime and disorder often adds little or no additional cost to the project, but can save large amounts of m
28、oney in the long run. Returning to a location to “retro-fit” crime prevention measures is always more expensive than designing the location properly in the first place. All public transport systems in industrialized countries face these same issues. There are numerous examples of where public transp
29、ort companies have undertaken crime prevention actions, many of which have entailed heavy funding. We can now draw upon a significant pool of experience and best practices. Indeed, public transport facilities are fast developing towards intermodal services and expanding out to European scale. This h
30、as prompted the need to draft a set of risk analysis procedures complete with guidelines. Developments in problem orientation Recent trends in mass transport project characteristic have to be taken in account, before identifying appropriate recommendations for the design, the management and the plan
31、ning process. Below, four trends in mass transport project characteristic are discerned. PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 5 Trend 1: More and more huge and multifunctional mass public transport projects Railway stations in big cities and at airports, in order to fulfil their desired fu
32、nction as “multiservice areas” often become “mega structures” where all kind of functions are integrated: transport, shopping and leisure. The transport function is just one of the other present functions of the whole structure. In order to emphasize its huge size and importance, architects of these
33、 mega structures often propose impressive, challenging forms and constructions. These structures become regional or even national icons. However, to structures of this kind, special points of attention apply for security design and management. These points are: their huge size make people feel get l
34、ost soon if the concept of the structure is complex, the orientation on passenger routes towards the goal is limited, and the signage is incomplete; different functions in the same structure mean different proprietors and different managers; if the demarcation of the areas (what belongs to whom) is
35、not clearly defined, if managers use different rules for the public, different security systems (every function its own surveillants and CCTV system) the management of the total structure will not as effective as it could be and should be; big structures are more different to connect to their enviro
36、nment properly; there is a greater danger that they become and remain isolated, internally oriented blocks, which often make an unfriendly impression to their direct environment. From the outside, you mainly see blind walls and huge car parks; different functions mean different opening times when it
37、 is not possible to close off the not-in-service parts (for example the shopping mall in the late evening) and offer alternative routes to transport passengers, the latter will have to walk long routes through scary, unsurveilled corridors different functions have different peak hours; but if more f
38、unctions have a peak at the same time of the day and all corridors have to be designed on this maximum flow of visitors, these corridors will be far too big for the silent hours and the visitors will feel lost there. This document give recommendations for not only regular and simple transport facili
39、ties, but also recommendations that take into account the specific design and management attention points as mentioned for the complex multifunctional mega structures. Trend 2 : More and more underground structures In former times, underground structures formed a minority and existed only in huge me
40、tropoles. Nowadays, underground projects become more and more common. In existing urban areas, only very little space is available for expansion of buildings and railway facilities. The space required is only available under the surface. Engineers and architects have to look more and more to undergr
41、ound solutions. Underground structures, however, are critical to safety. This applies to fire safety (escape routes are longer and carry on more in the vertical dimension) but also to security. Especially the perception of security is at stake: “the deeper, the more sensitive” one could say. To reac
42、h the same level of security perception in underground structures, designers have to perform twice as well as in normal buildings. Trend 3 : More and more stations and transfer points in the outskirts of town With the expansion of the public transportation networks in urban areas (train, metro, tram
43、way, buses) more and more stations, not only simple metro stations but also important regional transfer points, are being located in the outskirts of town. These are often unpleasant areas: in the middle of an industrial zone and/or near a noisy highway. Designers have to look to special solutions t
44、o make people feel comfortable in these kind of places, when walking to and from the station/bus station, or when waiting for the connecting train/bus. PD CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 CEN/TR 14383-7:2009 (E) 6 Trend 4 : More and more separation between public and private space Historically, the spaces devote
45、d to transport facilities have been open spaces: train and bus stations, regular lines for road, maritime stations, etc. In practice, all those facilities that did not have the role of international border were of an open and public character. Today, some of these spaces still belong to the field of
46、 the public space, but the standard becomes more and more to establish two distinguished spaces: the public area and the private area. The public area serves as an area of access for the control (public space) and the private area serves as safe area. From a point of view of formal surveillance and
47、effective support in emergency cases, this separation may be a favourable condition. The separation between public and private areas has, however, also negative consequences. The most important consequence is the limitation of the individual rights of the users. Only allowed persons (in the possessi
48、on of the travel ticket) have right to the restricted safe areas. Thus, these private spaces are not contributing any more to urban integration (= all spaces for all functions for all people). From this former consequence, another consequence, very relevant for the crime prevention subject, follows: persons without allowance to enter the private zones, all have to be concentrated in the (little) space remaining public. In addition, a third consequence, related to the former: not all functions, like restaurants and shops, are suitable for both types of space (the priv
