1、 ANSI/TIA-136-510-B-2000 APPROVED: MARCH 31, 2000 REAFFIRMED: OCTOBER 20, 2004 REAFFIRMED: AUGUST 14, 2013 WITHDRAWN: JUNE 12, 2015 TIA-136-510-B (Revision of TIA-136-510-A) March 2000TDMA Third Generation Wireless- Authentication, Encryption of Signaling Information User Data and Privacy NOTICE TIA
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20、1. DCCH Authentication . 11.1 Shared Secret Data (SSD) . 11.2 Random Challenge Memory (RAND). 11.3 Call History Parameter (COUNTs-p) 11.4 MIN1 and MIN2 . 21.5 Authentication of Mobile Station Registrations 21.6 Unique Challenge-Response Procedure 31.7 Authentication of Mobile Station Originations .
21、41.8 Authentication of Mobile Station Terminations 61.9 SSD Update. 71.10 Authentication of Mobile Station R-DATA Messages 111.11 Authentication of Mobile Station SPACH Confirmations. 121.12 Auth_Signature, SSD_Update and SSD_Generation Procedures Algorithm 132. ACC, AVC, and DTC Authentication 142.
22、1 Shared Secret Data (SSD) . 142.2 Random Challenge Memory (RAND). 142.3 Call History Parameter (COUNTs-p) 152.4 MIN1 and MIN2 . 152.5 Authentication of Mobile Station Registrations 152.6 Unique Challenge-Response Procedure 162.7 Authentication of Mobile Station Originations . 182.8 Authentication o
23、f Mobile Station Terminations 202.9 Updating the Shared Secret Data (SSD) 212.10 Re-Authentication . 272.11 Auth_Signature, SSD_Update and SSD_Generation_Procedure Algorithm. 293. Signaling Message Encryption 303.1 Signaling Message Encryption Control, Domain A 303.2 Signaling Message Encryption Con
24、trol, Domain B. 323.2.1 Encryption Keys 323.2.1.1 CMEA Encryption Key and VPM Generation Procedures 333.2.1.2 DCCHKey Generation Procedure 333.2.1.3 DTCKey Generation Procedure .333.2.2 Signaling Message Encryption, DCCH. 343.2.3 Signaling Message Encryption, DTC 363.2.4 Signaling Message Encryption
25、/Decryption Procedure 394. Voice Privacy 414.1 Voice Privacy Domain A 414.1.1 Voice Privacy Control During Call Establishment . 424.1.1.1 Mobile Station Originations.424.1.1.1.1 Analog Operation .42TIA/EIA-136-510-Bii4.1.1.1.2 Digital Operation 424.1.1.2 Mobile Station Terminations . 424.1.1.2.1 Ana
26、log Operation. 424.1.1.2.2 Digital Operation 424.1.2 Voice Privacy Control After Initial Channel Assignment . 434.2 Voice Privacy Domain B. 434.2.1 Voice Privacy Control During Call Establishment 454.2.1.1 Mobile Station Originations. 454.2.1.1.1 Analog Operation. 454.2.1.1.2 Digital Operation 464.2
27、.1.2 Mobile Station Terminations . 464.2.1.2.1 Analog Operation. 464.2.1.2.2 Digital Operation 464.2.2 Voice Privacy Control After Initial Channel Assignment . 464.3 Voice Privacy Algorithm. 475. Data Privacy . 485.1 Data Privacy Control, Domain A. 485.2 Mobile Station Originations, Domain A 485.2.1
28、 Analog Operation 485.2.2 Digital Operation.485.3 Mobile Station Terminations, Domain A 495.3.1 Analog Operation 495.3.2 Digital Operation.495.4 Data Privacy Control, Domain B. 495.5 Data Privacy Control After Initial Channel Assignment 505.6 Data Privacy Algorithm. 506. Common Cryptographic Algorit
29、hms 517. Change History for TIA/EIA-136-510 52TIA/EIA-136-510-BiiiFiguresFigure 1 Partitioning of SSD. 1Figure 2 Computation of AUTHR for Authentication of Mobile Station at Registrations 3Figure 3 Computation of AUTHU for Unique Challenge-Response Procedure 4Figure 4 Computation of AUTHR for Authen
30、tication of Mobile Station Originations. 6Figure 5 Computation of AUTHR for Authentication of Mobile Station Terminations 7Figure 6 SSD Update Message Flow. 9Figure 7 Computation of Shared Secret Data (SSD) . 10Figure 8 Computation of AUTHBS 10Figure 9 Computation of AUTHR for Authentication of Mobi
31、le Station R-DATA Messages 12Figure 10 Computation of AUTHR for Authentication of Mobile Station SPACH Confirmations 13Figure 11 Partitioning of SSD. 14Figure 12 Computation of AUTHR for Authentication of Mobile Station Registration . 16Figure 13 Computation of AUTHU for Unique Challenge-Response Pr
32、ocedure 17Figure 14 Computation of AUTHR for Authentication of Mobile Station Originations. 19Figure 15 Computation of AUTHR for Authentication of Mobile Station Terminations 21Figure 16 SSD Update Message Flow. 23Figure 17 Computation of Shared Secret Data (SSD) . 24Figure 18 Computation of AUTHBS
33、24Figure 19 Computation of AUTHRA for Re-Authentication Procedure. 28TIA/EIA-136-510-B11. DCCH Authentication1The term Authentication refers to the process during which information is exchanged2between a mobile station and the BMI for the purposes of enabling the base station to3confirm the identity
34、 of the mobile station. In short, a successful outcome of the4authentication process occurs only when it can be demonstrated that the mobile station5and base station possess identical sets of Shared Secret Data (SSD).6The following DCCH Authentication procedures are equivalent to the ACC7Authenticat
35、ion procedures described in Section 2.81.1 Shared Secret Data (SSD)9SSD is a 128-bit pattern that is generated in the mobile station using the10SSD_Generation_Procedure, stored in the mobile station (in semi-permanent memory)11and readily available to the BMI. As depicted in Figure 1, SSD is partiti
36、oned into two12distinct subsets. Each subset is used to support a different process.13Figure 1 Partitioning of SSD14Contents SSD-A SSD-BLength (bits) 64 64Specifically,15SSD-A is used to support the Authentication procedures, and16SSD-B is used to support voice privacy and message confidentiality.17
37、SSD is generated according to the procedure specified in Common Cryptographic18Algorithms (see Section 1.9).191.2 Random Challenge Memory (RAND)20RANDsis a 32-bit value held in the mobile station. It is a value received on the BCCH in21the Access Parameters Message, andis used in conjunction with SS
38、D-A and other22parameters, as appropriate, to authenticate mobile station originations, terminations,23registrations, SPACH Confirmations and R-DATA messages.241.3 Call History Parameter (COUNTs-p)25The Call History Parameter is a modulo-64 count held in the mobile station. COUNTs-p is26updated at t
39、he mobile station upon receipt of a Parameter Update Order message on a27DCCH or a Parameter Update Order message on the DTC or AVC.28TIA/EIA-136-510-B21.4 MIN1 and MIN21The 24-bit parameter referred to as MIN1 in the Authentication procedures is derived as2indicated in TIA/EIA-136-005.3The 8-bit pa
40、rameter referred to as MIN2 in the Authentication procedures is derived as4indicated in TIA/EIA-136-005.51.5 Authentication of Mobile Station Registrations6When the AUTH or AUTH Map information element indicates that the Authentication7message for Registrations is required (see TIA/EIA-136-123), and
41、 the mobile station8attempts to register, the following authentication-related procedures shall be performed:9 In the mobile station:10 Initialize the authentication algorithm (Auth_Signature) as illustrated in11Figure 2 and set the parameter SAVE_REGISTERS to FALSE unless12DCCHKey is to be generate
42、d, in which case set SAVE_REGISTERS to13TRUE.14 Execute the Auth_Signature procedure (see Section 1.12).15 Set AUTHR equal to the 18 bits of Auth_Signature algorithm output.16 Send AUTHR together with RANDC (eight most significant bits of RAND)17and COUNTs-p to the BMI via the Authentication message
43、.18 On Power Up, ACC to DCCH, Forced, and New System Registrations19generate DCCHKey by following the Auth_Signature procedure (see20Section 1.12) with the CMEA Encryption Key and VPM Generation21Procedure, (see Section 3.2.1.1) and then the DCCH Key Generation22procedure (see Section 3.2.1.2).23 At
44、 the BMI:24 Compare the received values for RANDC, and optionally COUNT, with the25internally stored values associated with the received MSID/ESN.26 Compute AUTHR as described above, except use the internally stored value27of SSD-A.28 Compare the value for AUTHR computed internally with the value of
45、29AUTHR received from the mobile station.30 On Power Up, ACC to DCCH, Forced, and New System Registrations31generate DCCHKey by following the Auth_Signature (see Section 1.12)32procedure with the CMEA Encryption Key and VPM Generation Procedure,33(see Section 3.2.1.1) and then the DCCH Key Generatio
46、n procedure (see34Section 3.2.1.2).35If any of the comparisons by the BMI fail, the BMI may deem the registration attempt36unsuccessful, initiate the Unique Challenge-Response procedure (see Section 1.6), or37commence the process of updating the SSD (see Section 1.9).38TIA/EIA-136-510-B3Figure 2 Com
47、putation of AUTHR for Authentication of Mobile Station at1Registrations2RAND32ESN32MIN124SSD-A64AUTHR18RAND_CHALLENGE ESN AUTH_DATA SSD_AUTHAuth_SignatureSAVE_REGISTERSBOOLEANVALUE1.6 Unique Challenge-Response Procedure3The Unique Challenge-Response procedure is initiated by the BMI and is carried o
48、ut as4follows:5 At the BMI:6 A 24-bit, random pattern referred to as RANDU is generated and sent to the7mobile station via the Unique Challenge Order message.8 Initialize the authentication algorithm (Auth_Signature) as illustrated in9Figure 3 and set the parameter SAVE_REGISTERS to FALSE.10 Execute
49、 the Auth_Signature algorithm (see Section 1.12).11 Set AUTHU equal to the 18 bits of the Auth_Signature algorithm output.12 At the mobile station:13 Compute AUTHU as described above using the received RANDU and its14internally stored values for the remaining input parameters.15 Send AUTHU to the BMI via the Unique Challenge Order Confirmation16message.17TIA/EIA-136-510-B4Upon receipt of the Unique Challenge Order Confirmation from the mobile station, the1BMI compares the received value for AUTHU to that generated/stored internally. If the2comparison fails, the BMI may
