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    REG NASA-LLIS-5376-2012 No Clear Communication on Human Factors Lessons Learned between the Apollo Program and the Shuttle Program.pdf

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    REG NASA-LLIS-5376-2012 No Clear Communication on Human Factors Lessons Learned between the Apollo Program and the Shuttle Program.pdf

    1、Public Lessons Learned Entry: 5376 Lesson Info: Lesson Number: 5376 Submitting Organization: KSC Submitted by: Ryan Luttrell Subject: No Clear Communication on Human Factors Lessons Learned between the Apollo Program and the Shuttle Program Abstract: During the transition from the Apollo Program to

    2、the Shuttle Program, there was no clear review of what was learned from the Apollo Program and how it could assist the efforts in the Shuttle Program concerning human factors for ground processing. One example of this was a lesson from Apollo to protect wiring in the spacecraft during ground process

    3、ing. This lesson was lacking in the Space Shuttle Orbiter AFT designs for ground processing. Situations that evolved from previous programs should be reviewed to see if those solutions can be implemented and incorporated in the new program or project. Description of Driving Event: Since Apollo was n

    4、ot a reusable spacecraft, the emphasis on human factors in ground processing was not as profound. Because the extensive maintenance processing of the Space Shuttle was not foreseen, there was a lack of emphasis on ground human factor contributions for the Space Shuttle during the early design develo

    5、pment. It was not until after the Orbiter vehicle was designed and in operation that the full extent of ground processing was realized, as was also the case in Apollo. Due to the small size of the crew compartment in Apollo, it was found impractical to try to do the spacecraft wiring, measuring, cut

    6、ting, and other operations within the vehicle compartments. Thus, a special assembly fixture was developed to assist in the assembly of the crew compartment harness. All fabrication operations were preformed on the fixture. Initially, the wiring in the crew compartment was exposed and subject to pos

    7、sible damage during ground-based operations as well as during flight. To protect the cables from physical damage and to reduce the risk of flame propagation, special protective trays were designed. It is important to note that these features to protect wiring in the aft of the Orbiter during process

    8、ing were lacking in the Space Shuttle design for ground processing. This situation indicated that some lessons from Apollo were overlooked during the development of the Space Shuttle. Lesson(s) Learned: It is extremely important from the beginning of a program to review and use what has been learned

    9、 from previous programs. One Center may be able to learn from a situation at another Center that could assist them in the development process of a program. Ground processing human factors concerns can be easily be underestimated in the early stages of a program. Recommendation(s): 1. At the pre-begi

    10、nning stages of a program or a project, review situations that evolved from previous programs and see if those solutions can be implemented and incorporated in the new program or project. 2. Human factors and other lessons from the flight crew can be applied to ground crews, and ground crew lessons

    11、can be applied to flight crews. 3. A lesson from launch vehicle systems, ground systems, or crewed vehicle systems may be applicable to all three systems. Evidence of Recurrence Control Effectiveness: N/A Documents Related to Lesson: Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitt

    12、ed without license from IHS-,-,-N/A Mission Directorate(s): Exploration Systems Additional Key Phrase(s): Missions and Systems Requirements Definition.Human factors impact on mission design Mission Operations and Ground Support Systems .Ground processing and manifesting Engineering Design (Phase C/D

    13、).Human Factors/Habitability Systems Engineering and Analysis.Human factors planning Additional Info: Project: N/A Approval Info: Approval Date: 2012-07-19 Approval Name: mbell Approval Organization: HQ Provided by IHSNot for ResaleNo reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS-,-,-


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